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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation consists of three essays focusing on diverse aspects of liquidity creation, 
an essential role of commercial banks. The first essay (Chapter 2) addresses the 
interrelationships among liquidity creation, regulatory capital, and the profitability of U.S. 
banks. We find that regulatory capital and liquidity creation affect each other positively after 
controlling for bank profitability. However, this relationship is largely driven by small banks 
and adequately capitalized banks, and primarily during non-crisis periods. It is also sensitive 
to how regulatory capital is measured. Furthermore, we find that banks that create more 
liquidity and exhibit higher illiquidity risk have lower profitability. The relationship between 
regulatory capital and bank performance is found to be non-linear and dependent on the level 
of capitalization. Regulatory capital is negatively related to bank profitability for higher 
capitalized banks but positively related for lower capitalized banks.  
The second essay (Chapter 3) investigates the impact of competition and revenue 
diversification on bank liquidity creation. We find that bank competition and revenue 
diversification enhance liquidity creation. However, the impact of competition on liquidity 
creation is weaker when banks’ revenue streams are more diversified. Similarly, the liquidity 
enhancing role of revenue diversification is weakened in the presence of more market 
competition. In addition, both competition-liquidity creation and revenue diversification-
liquidity creation relationships depend on bank characteristics such as traditional banking 
business performance, bank location, and, most importantly, bank size. 
In the third essay (Chapter 4), we examine the impact of liquidity creation on bank 
stability and how capital buffers, competition, and revenue diversification affect this 
relationship. Consistent with the “fragility hypothesis” of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), we 
find empirical evidence that liquidity creation is related to bank fragility. Our results further 
 7 
corroborate the “capital-at-risk” effect, as capital buffers are found to enhance bank soundness. 
We also provide find support for the “competition-fragility” hypothesis and report an overall 
destabilizing effect of competition on bank stability. Banks that moderately diversify revenue 
are likely to be less fragile than those with high or low levels of revenue diversification. Further, 
we document the influence of capital, competition, and revenue diversification on the effect of 
liquidity creation on bank stability. The results particularly emphasize the role of capital 
regulation in attenuating the destabilizing effect of liquidity creation. We also find that 
competition and revenue diversification somewhat alleviate the negative impact of liquidity 
creation on bank stability. Finally, we find that distressed banks and banks that do not fulfil 
Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) liquidity requirements can potentially benefit from a 
successful “gamble for resurrection” through the creation of more liquidity.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Modern financial intermediation theory has formally recognized liquidity creation as one 
of the preeminent functions of commercial banks. Banks create liquidity by holding illiquid 
assets such as business loans and providing cash and demand deposits to the rest of the 
economy. In this way, they provide solutions to a number of market frictions that prevent direct 
liquidity flows from entities with excess liquidity (depositors) to entities in need of liquidity 
(borrowers) (Greenbaum & Thakor 2007).  
On the one hand, liquidity creation has been empirically found to have more positive 
effects on economic growth than other services provided by banks (Berger & Sedunov 2016). 
The drying up of liquidity for an extended period of time would have severe consequences for 
the real economy, as evidenced by the recent global financial crisis. However, large amounts 
of liquidity created on- and off-balance sheet in a given period are likely to facilitate bank 
failure (Diamond & Rajan 2001). The recent introduction of the Basel III package with tougher 
capital requirements and two new liquidity requirements has also put increased pressure on 
banks.1 Being “squeezed from all sides”, it is therefore important that banks have a full 
understanding of liquidity creation’s determinants and consequences so that they can undertake 
appropriate adjustments to meet the requirements of the new regulatory agenda with minimal 
costs. 
Although abundant theoretical academic work identifies banks’ central role as liquidity 
creators (Bryant 1980; Diamond & Dybvig 1983), empirical studies on banking liquidity 
creation have lagged far behind. Consisting of three empirical essays, this thesis therefore aims 
                                                 
1 For a detailed discussion of Basel III, see section 2.2.3. The two new liquidity requirements are Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). LCR identifies the amount of unencumbered, high-
quality liquid assets that banks need to survive a 30-day standardized stress scenario. NSFR specifies the minimum 
amount of long-term, stable sources of funding based on the liquidity characteristics of the bank’s assets and 
activities over a one-year period that a bank holds in order to be able to survive an extended closure of 
wholesale funding markets.  
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to enrich the existing literature through a focus on liquidity creation from three different but 
complementary perspectives by addressing the following questions: Are there 
interrelationships among liquidity creation, capital, and bank profitability? Do competition and 
revenue diversification affect liquidity creation individually and interactively? Is there a trade-
off for bank stability when banks create more liquidity in the economy? The first two essays 
focus on what affects liquidity creation, while the third essay concentrates on the consequences 
of liquidity creation.  
This thesis contains five chapters, namely an introduction in Chapter 1, three separate 
empirical studies in Chapters 2 through 4, and a summary of the key findings and policy 
recommendations of the three main essays in Chapter 5. 
1.1 Essay 1  
The Basel I Accord (1988) and II Accord (2004) proposed by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices primarily focused on solvency standards. 
However, widespread bank failures in the U.S. and Europe at the peak of the global financial 
crisis (2007-2009) cast doubt on the quality of bank risk management practices and 
demonstrated that regulatory attention to banks’ liquidity positions was inadequate. As a result, 
the two new liquidity requirements, concomitant to stricter capital requirements, were designed 
and included in the regulatory reform package known as Basel III (2013). Against this backdrop 
of regulatory changes, it is important to understand to what extent capital and liquidity 
regulatory frameworks might be complementary to one another. This context of regulatory 
change also raises questions about the cost of imposing stricter liquidity and capital standards 
on bank performance in term of a bank’s capacity to create liquidity and bank profitability. 
Thus, the first essay (Chapter 2) aims to offer a first-hand empirical study on the dynamic 
interrelationships among liquidity creation, regulatory capital, and bank performance. 
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First, each dynamic relationship between liquidity, capital, and profitability is modelled 
using Granger causality estimation through the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
approach. The main interest of this study is the bidirectional link between capital and liquidity 
creation, as well as their net effects on bank performance. We use the liquidity creation measure 
proposed by Berger and Bouwman (2009) and return on equity as proxy for banks’ profitability. 
This liquidity creation measure is more comprehensive than and superior to traditional, more 
simple measures, often calculated as the ratio of cash and (sometimes) other liquid assets to 
overall assets or deposits. While the liquidity creation measure takes into account the liquidity 
of both on- and off-balance sheet activities, traditional liquidity measures only take into 
account some of a bank’s assets and liabilities. We also examine the role of bank capital by 
considering three different measures of capital that have not previously been incorporated into 
any single studies: Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio, capital-to-assets ratio, and tangible common 
equity risk-based capital ratio. Subsequently, we investigate whether the interrelationships vary 
in a cross-section of banks depending on bank size, crisis period, and levels of capitalization.   
This essay contributes to the ongoing debate regarding the effects of Basel capital 
requirements on liquidity creation and bank profitability. On the one hand, the tightening of 
capital requirements could drive up capital, as well as liquidity, costs, resulting in increased 
pressure on banks’ profitability. A higher capital ratio shifts funding from liquid deposits to 
less liquid capital, which in turn reduces a bank’s capacity to create liquidity. This negative 
effect of bank capital on profitability is supported by Goddard et al.’s (2010) empirical study. 
Admati et al. (2013), on the other hand, found that this pervasive view is based on fallacious, 
irrelevant, or very weak arguments. They suggest that highly capitalized banks tend to perform 
better due to fewer distortions in lending decisions. Consistent with their argument, a number 
of empirical studies provide strong evidence of the positive impact of high capital levels on 
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bank profitability (Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga 2000; Iannotta, Nocera & Sironi 2007; Lee & 
Hsieh 2013). 
 This essay extends the current literature, which tends to focus on the effect of either 
capital or liquidity creation on bank profitability without considering their joint effects. Berger 
and Bouwman’s (2009) study is the only one that relates bank liquidity creation to bank value. 
Their summary statistics suggest a positive correlation between liquidity creation and market-
to-book ratios, as well as price-earnings ratios. We extend their study by investigating both the 
mediating effect of liquidity creation when regulatory capital changes and that of regulatory 
capital as liquidity creation changes. Examining the bidirectional interactions between 
regulatory capital and liquidity creation should provide a more complete picture of how bank 
performance is affected by these two channels.  
A distinctive feature of the present study compared to the existing literature is its use of 
multivariate Granger causality estimation embedded in a GMM framework. While Granger 
causality tests can deal with the endogeneity problem that exists due to the correlation between 
variables in the model, the ordinary least squares (OLS) approach is problematic because as 
the lagged dependent variable can be strongly correlated with error terms. Where previous 
studies mostly use OLS estimation for the Granger causality test, this thesis improves this mode 
of analysis by employing the GMM estimation on dynamic panel data. 
Using a large, unbalanced panel dataset of U.S. banks during the 1996-2010 period, we 
document a positive and bidirectional relationship between liquidity creation and capital, which 
is consistent with the risk absorption hypothesis (Bhattacharya & Thakor 1993; Repullo 2004). 
However, this positive bidirectional relationship is driven by small banks and adequately 
capitalized banks and manifests mainly during non-crisis periods. Furthermore, liquidity 
creation adversely affects bank performance, while an increase in regulatory capital has 
differential effects on bank profitability depending on the level of capitalization. A positive 
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relationship is found for undercapitalized banks, while this relationship becomes negative for 
adequately capitalized banks. Consistent with the trade-off theory of capital structure (Berger 
1995b), a higher level of regulatory capital can potentially be costly to an adequately 
capitalized bank because that bank is likely to move away from the optimal capital structure 
and thus experience lower profitability. By increasing capital, undercapitalized banks, on the 
other hand, may improve bank value as they move toward the optimal debt-equity mix.  
1.2 Essay 2  
 
There is a large amount of literature on the effects of bank competition and revenue 
diversification in banking. The most prominent continuing debate surrounds their effect on 
bank stability and performance. However, very limited research has been conducted on their 
impact on liquidity creation, one of the preeminent functions of banks. While no empirical 
study has been conducted on the relationship between bank revenue diversification and 
liquidity creation, two empirical studies, the only ones to our knowledge, relate competition 
and liquidity creation. Berger and Bouwman (2009) found that market power, used as a control 
variable in their study, is related to more liquidity creation; this relationship is primarily 
confined to small banks. Horváth, Seidler and Weill (2016) similarly documented a negative 
relationship between competition and bank liquidity creation.  
Given the lack of existing research on the effect of competition and revenue 
diversification on bank liquidity creation, this area provides fertile ground for empirical 
research. The second essay (Chapter 3) aims to extend existing literature by answering the 
following questions: How do changes in competition and revenue diversification individually 
affect a bank’s capacity to create liquidity? Do the individual impacts of competition/revenue 
diversification on a bank’s liquidity creation depend on particular bank characteristics such as 
engagement in traditional banking activities, bank holding company membership, location, and 
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regulatory authority? Do competition and revenue diversification have a combined impact on 
liquidity creation? Does this relationship vary with bank size and type? Is this relationship 
different between banks that have fulfilled liquidity requirements and those that have not? If 
so, what is the implication of the relationship of competition and revenue diversification on 
bank stability?  
Using a sample of U.S. banks from the 2001–2013 period, our results show that the 
higher the competitive pressure and the more revenue is diversified, the more liquidity is 
created. The results are robust across different measures of competition and diversification, 
which support the “competition-fragility” hypothesis. However, competition mitigates the 
positive effect of diversification on liquidity creation and vice versa.  
Furthermore, we find that the individual liquidity-enhancing effect of competition is not 
homogeneous across banks with different characteristics and sizes. To illustrate, the effect of 
competition is greater for banks with low credit risks, operating in micropolitan markets, and 
with interstate branches. Interestingly, competition has an opposite impact on liquidity creation 
for small banks (positive relationship) and large banks (negative relationship). We argue that 
the “risk absorption-opportunity cost” effect tends to dominate the “financial fragility” effect 
for large banks, while the latter tends to apply strongly to small banks.  
The positive relationship between revenue diversification and liquidity creation, on the 
other hand, is consistent across all bank types and sizes, with the exception of savings banks. 
Nevertheless, different components of non-interest income impact banks’ ability to create 
liquidity differently.  
Last but not least, we investigate the extent to which competition and diversification 
impact bank stability through liquidity creation channels. We achieve this by repeating the 
analysis for two separate groups of banks based on the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) measure 
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under Basel III. Liquidity creation does not necessarily hamper bank stability as long as the 
bank holds an adequate level of stable funding (i.e., NSFR ≥ 100%). In contrast, liquidity 
creation above a certain threshold may have implications for financial stability. The results 
show that the liquidity-enhancing effect of diversification is present for banks with NSFR ≥
 100% but absent for other banks. This indicates that revenue diversification benefits the 
economy in terms of more liquidity being created without posing a risk to bank stability. 
However, the liquidity-enhancing effect of competition for banks that do not fulfil liquidity 
requirements may have adverse implications on the banking system due to substantially higher 
illiquidity risk and threats of financial distress. 
 1.3 Essay 3  
While the first two essays address capital, competition, and revenue diversification as 
determinants of liquidity creation, the third essay (Chapter 4) aims to complete the overall 
picture by examining the consequences of liquidity creation on the banking system. In 
particular, this essay investigates whether liquidity creation has a soundness-enhancing or 
soundness-destroying effect on bank stability and whether capital, competition, and revenue 
diversification change the liquidity creation-stability relationship. 
The focus of existing theoretical studies has been on the link between asset liquidity and 
risk. Very few have addressed the concept of liquidity creation. However, two main theoretical 
research strands bear some relevance to the potential relationship between liquidity creation 
and bank stability. One might expect that liquidity creation is a driver of financial fragility due 
to its positive correlation with liquidity risk (Bryant 1980; Diamond & Dybvig 1983; Diamond 
& Rajan 2000; Diamond & Rajan 2001; Diamond & Rajan 2002; Allen & Gale 2004b), while 
others might argue that liquidity creation can mitigate moral hazard problems by influencing 
risk-taking behaviours by banks and in turn promoting bank stability (Wagner 2007; Acharya 
& Naqvi 2012). Meanwhile, little empirical evidence currently exists on the link between 
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liquidity creation and bank stability. Berger and Bouwman (2008, 2009) document periods of 
abnormal liquidity creation that followed the banking crises in the U.S. Berger and Bouwman 
(2015) further show that the aggregate excessive liquidity creation by the U.S. banking sector 
is likely to be associated with a higher probability of a future financial crisis. Given that 
liquidity creation is a prominent role performed by banks, more research is needed to confirm 
and extend our understanding of the direct effect of bank liquidity creation on bank stability.  
Our results show that banks that create more liquidity are likely to be more fragile, which 
is consistent with the “liquidity creation-fragility” hypothesis theoretically proposed by 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983). However, the fragility-aggravating effect of liquidity creation is 
found to be heterogeneous across bank types (i.e., size, ownership, and specification). To 
illustrate, liquidity creation hampers the stability of commercial banks and listed banks but 
does not affect the soundness of savings and unlisted banks. Furthermore, the destabilizing 
effect of liquidity creation is much stronger for large banks compared to banks in other size 
categories.  
In the second part of our analysis, we are specifically interested not only in the impact of 
capital requirement, bank competition, and revenue diversification on bank soundness but also 
in how their individual effects vary in interaction with liquidity creation. Our evidence 
indicates that capital buffers are an effective instrument to enhance stability in the sense that 
they not only significantly and individually promote stability but also reduce the fragility-
aggravating effect of liquidity creation. This is consistent with our prediction that capital 
buffers improve banks’ ability to absorb illiquidity risk and hence counteract the additional 
financial fragility associated with the creation of more liquidity. Interestingly, banks that create 
less liquidity benefit less than other banks from an increase in capital buffers. The less liquidity 
created, the lower the bank’s risks, reducing the importance of capital buffers as a defence 
mechanism against negative shocks.  
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We further confirm the negative effect of competition on bank stability, which supports 
the “competition-fragility” hypothesis. By the same token, revenue diversification also has an 
overall destabilizing effect. However, it seems that banks with moderate levels of 
diversification are less fragile than those that over- and under-diversify revenue. Most 
importantly, the detrimental impact of liquidity creation on bank stability is less pronounced in 
higher competitive environments and for banks with more revenue diversification.  
Finally, we offer new insights by demonstrating the important relationship between bank 
health and liquidity creation, which affects overall bank stability. In particular, distressed banks 
and banks with insufficient liquidity are likely to engage in “successful gambling for 
resurrection” through the creation of more liquidity to pursue higher payoffs and reduce their 
probability of default (Keeley 1990; Corbett & Mitchell 2000; Gropp & Vesala 2001; Freixas, 
Parigi & Rochet 2003). 
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CHAPTER 2: LIQUIDITY CREATION, CAPITAL ADEQUACY, AND 
BANK PROFITABILITY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
During the recent global financial crisis, many governments around the world had to 
provide emergency support to rescue the financial sector from collapse. The crisis undoubtedly 
raised questions regarding the effectiveness of existing capital regulations’ design and 
implementation. In response, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) introduced 
a number of new regulatory measures designed to improve the safety and soundness of the 
global banking system. This regulatory framework, known as Basel III, contains a central piece 
of reform that strengthens capital requirements. More specifically, banks are required to hold 
equity capital of up to 9.5% of their total risk-weighted assets, representing a substantial 
increase in capital requirements from Basel II. Additional capital requirements deemed to be 
systemically important can also be imposed on banks.  
Besides capital requirements, Basel III also focuses on liquidity creation. BCBS requires 
banks to maintain unencumbered high-quality liquid assets that can meet liquidity needs in a 
30-day liquidity stress scenario. A bank creates liquidity when it issues long-term illiquid assets 
(e.g., housing loans) that are funded by short-term liquid liabilities (e.g., deposits). Therefore, 
because liquidity is created by mismatching long-term assets with short-term liabilities, it 
exposes banks to illiquidity risk—the risk of disposing of illiquid assets in a fire sale to meet 
the demands of liquid liabilities. It follows that the liquidity requirements intended to reduce 
illiquidity risk also limit a bank’s capacity to create liquidity.  
Against this backdrop of regulatory changes, our study examines the interrelationships 
among liquidity creation, regulatory capital, and bank profitability. We seek to address a series 
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of questions about the effects of the most recent capital and liquidity requirements. First, how 
does a change in capital affect a bank’s capacity to create liquidity and generate profits? 
Conversely, how does a change in liquidity creation influence a bank’s regulatory capital and 
profitability? Taken together, what are the joint impacts of regulatory capital and liquidity 
creation on bank performance? Furthermore, do these interrelationships among liquidity 
creation, regulatory capital, and profitability differ with bank size? More specifically, do large 
banks perform differently from small banks when there are changes in regulatory capital and 
liquidity creation? If so, do too-big-too-fail (TBTF) banks behave differently among large 
banks? Finally, do these interrelationships vary between crisis and non-crisis periods, and do 
they fluctuate with the level of bank capitalization? The answers to these questions may have 
important policy implications for bank regulators.  
Our investigation into these questions may contribute to the ongoing debate regarding 
the effects of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 and the Basel capital requirements on liquidity 
creation and bank profitability. On the one hand, the banking industry argues that tougher 
capital rules will drive up funding costs and reduce liquidity creation, which would lead to less 
lending and investment activity in the economy. Banks are therefore likely to experience lower 
profitability because a higher capital ratio shifts funding from liquid deposits to less liquid 
capital, which in turn reduces a bank’s capacity to create liquidity. Consistent with this line of 
argument, Goddard et al. (2010) found that an increase in capital requirements has a negative 
impact on bank profitability.  
On the other hand, Admati et al. (2010) argue that claims indicating more stringent 
capital rules will raise the cost of capital and lower liquidity creation are fallacious, irrelevant, 
or weak. They contend that banks that are highly capitalized are less likely to engage in 
excessive risk-taking activities. As a result, these banks tend to perform better due to fewer 
distortions in their lending decisions and reduced moral hazard. Arguing for the importance of 
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regulatory capital, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2000), Iannotta, Nocera and Sironi (2007), 
and Lee and Hsieh (2013) demonstrate that capital ratio is positively related to bank 
profitability. Greenspan (2010) has summed up the importance of capital adequacy as follows: 
“The reason I raise the capital issue so often is that, in a sense, it solves every problem”. 
Our study extends the current literature, which tends to focus on the effect of either 
capital or liquidity creation on bank profitability without considering both effects together. For 
example, Berger and Bouwman (2009), who developed comprehensive measures of liquidity 
creation, examined the impact of capital on liquidity creation and the relationship between 
liquidity creation and bank value separately. Extending their study, we examine both the 
mediating effect of liquidity creation when regulatory capital changes and that of regulatory 
capital as liquidity creation changes. Examining the bidirectional interactions between 
regulatory capital and liquidity creation should provide a more complete picture of how bank 
performance is affected through these two channels.  
Expanding upon Berger and Bouwman (2009), Distinguin, Roulet and Tarazi (2013) 
investigated the relationship between regulatory capital and bank liquidity in a simultaneous 
equation setting. However, they assumed that bank profitability is exogenous because banks 
with higher profits, and hence higher retained earnings, increase their capital ratio. Such an 
assumption does not consider that changes in regulatory capital also influence subsequent bank 
profits, which in turn affect regulatory capital. In a related study, Horváth, Seidler and Weill 
(2014) examined potential reverse causality between capital and liquidity creation without 
incorporating bank profitability in their interrelationship.  
To our knowledge, ours is the first study that investigates the dynamic interrelationships 
among liquidity creation, regulatory capital, and bank performance. Furthermore, we 
investigate whether these interrelationships differ across bank size, sub-periods, regulatory 
capital measurements, and levels of capitalization. We use vector autoregression (VAR) to 
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estimate these dynamic interrelationships, thereby addressing the endogeneity problems among 
the three key variables. However, the estimations may still be plagued with heterogeneity 
related to potential correlations between the lagged dependent variables and the error terms. 
We therefore apply the generalized method of moments (GMM) to correct for the heterogeneity 
problem present in ordinary least square (OLS) estimation.  
This empirical study is based on a large unbalanced panel dataset of U.S. banks during 
the 1996-2010 period. This long sampling period provides a perfect setting, allowing the 
estimation of interrelationships over several financial cycles. In the late 1990s, the 1997 Asian 
and 1998 Russian financial crises brought on widespread recession in the U.S. stock market 
after a decade of accelerating and rapid growth. Following is the collapse of Long-Term Capital 
Management and fears about potential catastrophic losses and a wider collapse in the financial 
system. This resulted in the Federal Reserve to organize an agreement on $3.6 billion 
recapitalization among 16 participating financial institutions in September 1998. The early 
2000s witnessed the dot.com bubble and September 11 terrorist attacks. Bank capital ratios and 
profitability were significantly high throughout the 1990s and early 2000s due to the 
introduction of tougher capital requirements in Basel I and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) (Jackson et al. 1999). Furthermore, the recent global 
financial crisis has caused substantial losses for the banking system and has highlighted 
important issues regarding bank capital. The inclusion of these significant events in the 
sampling period is intended to test whether the relationships among capital, liquidity, and 
profitability vary between normal periods and those signified by crises and stressed conditions.  
We find that the relationship between liquidity creation and capital is positive and 
bidirectional. An increase in a bank’s liquidity creation corresponds to a rise in regulatory 
capital. Conversely, an increase in regulatory capital is also likely to improve a bank’s capacity 
to create liquidity. However, this positive bidirectional relationship is driven by small banks 
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and adequately capitalized banks and applies mainly during non-crisis periods. Furthermore, 
liquidity creation appears to be negatively related to bank performance, as an increase in 
liquidity creation corresponds to a decline in bank profitability and vice versa. In contrast, the 
effect of regulatory capital on bank performance depends on the extent that a bank is 
capitalized. The relationship is positive for a lower capitalized bank but negative for a higher 
capitalized bank. Hence, an increase in capital requirements is likely to have differential 
impacts on bank performance. These differential effects tend to be present during normal 
periods.  
Overall, our results support the risk absorption hypothesis (Bhattacharya & Thakor 1993;  
Repullo 2004), which suggests that banks with more capital are in a better position to absorb 
higher liquidity risk due to liquidity creation. It can therefore be said that banks with more 
capital have a higher capacity to create liquidity. Our results also suggest that a higher level of 
regulatory capital can be potentially costly to an adequately capitalized bank, as that bank is 
likely to move away from the optimal capital structure and thus experience lower profitability. 
Our results are also consistent with the expected bankruptcy-cost hypothesis, which argues that 
liquidity creation is negatively related to bank profitability. A higher illiquidity risk due to 
liquidity creation increases the likelihood of bankruptcy, hence lowering bank profitability.  
Our findings show that interrelationships among liquidity creation, regulatory capital, 
and bank performance vary with bank size, sub-periods, regulatory capital measurements, and 
levels of regulatory capital. From a policy perspective, our results suggest that policymakers 
and bank regulators should be cautious about a one-size-fits-all approach and may need to 
develop specific regulations for banks with different characteristics. For example, a change in 
capital standards has a limited impact on liquidity creation for all but small banks. Therefore, 
increasing capital requirements on all banks may not affect liquidity creation to the extent that 
regulators expect. 
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides a literature 
review on the relationships among liquidity creation, capital, and bank performance. Sections 
2.3 and 2.4 discuss our data and methodology, respectively. Our empirical results are reported 
in Section 2.5. In the final section, we make concluding remarks and discuss the regulatory 
implications of our results. 
2.2 Literature Review 
 
Our study draws from three branches of banking literature, namely, liquidity creation, 
capital, and bank performance. This section first provides a summary of the major theoretical 
underpinnings of this literature and the results of empirical studies on liquidity creation 
measurements. The interrelationships among liquidity creation, capital, and bank profitability 
are then reviewed.  
2.2.1 Liquidity creation 
 
2.2.1.1 Definitions 
 
According to standard theories on financial intermediation and banking, one of the 
preeminent functions of commercial banks is to meet the funding needs of firms in the form of 
loans through a combination of demand deposits and equity from banks’ shareholders 
(Greenbaum & Thakor 2007). Through these qualitative assets transformations, banks assume 
two essential roles, that is, as liquidity providers and risk transformers.  
As liquidity providers, Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) have 
demonstrated how banks transform liquidity and risk for depositors on the liabilities side of 
their balance sheet. On the assets side, Diamond (1984) and Calomiris and Kahn (1991) 
examined efficient credit allocation by banks through loan monitoring and provisions. 
However, it is worth noting that liquidity is not created from assets or liabilities in isolation; 
rather, it derives from the joint structure of both sides of the balance sheet. Based on the 
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balance-sheet approach, Diamond and Rajan (2001a, 2001b) have demonstrated the essential 
role banks play in facilitating liquidity transformation through their liquidity-mismatched 
balance-sheet structure. They suggested that banks can create liquidity on the balance sheet by 
acting as a deposit-taking and loan-making entity. In particular, a bank creates one dollar of 
liquidity by issuing one dollar of long-term, illiquid assets (e.g., commercial real estate loans, 
industrial loans) funded by one dollar of short-term, liquid liabilities (e.g., savings or 
transaction deposits). The bank would end up with an illiquid claim against borrowers, while 
depositors, with the ability to withdraw funds at a moment’s notice, hold a liquid claim against 
the bank. Accordingly, banks are said to create liquidity for the rest of the economy because 
they provide liquid items to the public and hold illiquid items. 
Expanding the scope of liquidity creation beyond balance-sheet activities, Holmstrom 
and Tirole (1998) and Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2002) highlight that off-balance sheet activity 
is also a relevant liquidity creation indicator through loan commitments and similar claims to 
liquid funds.  
2.2.1.2 Empirical studies on liquidity creation measurement 
 
Although abundant theoretical academic research demonstrates banks’ central role as 
liquidity creators, empirical studies on banking liquidity creation have lagged far behind 
theoretical constructs in the literature.  
There has been limited progress on examining liquidity transformation models due to a 
lack of comprehensive empirical measures for bank liquidity creation. Deep and Schaefer 
(2004) first identified a liquidity transformation gap (henceforth LT gap), which refers to the 
difference between liquid liabilities and liquid assets divided by the total assets a bank holds. 
This gap measures the extent to which liquid liabilities are converted into productive capital. 
All assets and liabilities that are easily converted into cash or have the maturity of being less 
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than or equal to one year are considered liquid items. Measuring this gap in the 200 largest 
U.S. banks during 1997-2001, Deep and Schaefer (2004) found that on average banks do not 
create much liquidity with about 20% of their total assets. Although the LT gap can be easily 
applied, it is an inadequate measure for liquidity creation because it does not include off-
balance sheet activities and classifies loans solely by maturity.  
To provide more comprehensive measurements for liquidity creation, Berger and 
Bouwman (2009) (henceforth BB measures) constructed a three-step procedure based on 
categories of assets, liabilities, equity, and off-balance sheet activities. They proposed four 
different measures of liquidity creation, which are the pair combinations from four criteria: 
items classified by category or maturity and whether liquidity is created on- or off-balance 
sheet.  
There are two advantages of using BB measures over Deep and Schaefer’s (2004) LT 
gap. First, BB measures include off-balance sheet items such as derivatives, letters of credit, 
and loan commitments and are therefore consistent with Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and 
Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2002). Second, they indicate that loan classification according to 
category is preferable to maturity. For example, corporate loans are considered illiquid assets 
regardless of maturity because banks generally cannot easily dispose of them upon liquidity 
need. In contrast, consumer and residential mortgage loans are treated as semi-illiquid because 
they can often be securitized and sold upon liquidity demand. It follows that BB comprehensive 
measures provide a more accurately estimation for liquidity creation. As a result, subsequent 
empirical studies have tended to apply the BB approach when examining issues related to 
liquidity creation.  
2.2.2 Relationship between liquidity creation, capital, and profitability 
 
2.2.2.1 Regulatory capital and bank profitability 
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According to DuPont analysis, where return on equity (ROE) is the product of return on 
assets (ROA) and an equity multiplier (total assets/equity), a bank with higher capital and 
thereby a lower equity multiplier exhibits lower ROE. In other words, higher financial leverage 
is associated with additional risk for a firm’s common shareholders because debt holders, who 
receive fixed interest payments, bear no additional financial risk. The use of leverage, in turn, 
increases ROE to compensate for higher risk. In contrast, the substitution of additional equity 
for debt reduces ROE, which lowers the equilibrium expected return required by investors 
(Modigliani & Miller 1958).2 Furthermore, if corporate tax is considered, an increase in equity 
with a corresponding decrease in debt reduces tax-shield savings, which in turn lowers after-
tax earnings. Taken together, a higher capital ratio tends to lower bank profitability.  
However, this negative relationship assumes that markets are largely frictionless (with 
the exception of taxes). Other market imperfections may also affect the relationship between 
capital and bank profitability. Berger (1995b) argues that expected bankruptcy costs and 
asymmetric information could reverse the impact of capital on profitability. Based on the static 
trade-off theory, the optimal capital structure is obtained when the total benefits (including tax 
shields) are equal to the total costs of debt (including bankruptcy costs). Therefore, a bank with 
a capital ratio below its optimal level may benefit from additional capital. In an adverse 
environment where there is information asymmetry between banks and investors, a well-
capitalized bank may provide positive signals to the markets that lower its cost of capital and 
increase its profitability.  
                                                 
2 In frictionless markets, it is noteworthy that the return on equity required by shareholders (i.e., cost of equity for 
the firm) is a linear function of the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio. However, the use of debt does not affect the market 
value of the firm. This is because the increase in return to common shareholders resulting from the use of leverage 
is exactly offset by the increase in risk. In other words, the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is constant 
because the increase in the cost of equity offsets the cheaper source of capital used (that is, debt). 
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Empirical findings are also mixed on the relationship between regulatory capital and 
bank profitability. On the one hand, Bourke (1989) found that regulatory capital is positively 
related to bank profitability across different countries. High-capitalized banks tend to have 
better access to financing sources and higher quality asset markets than low capitalized banks. 
Similarly, Berger (1995b) found that regulatory capital was more likely to positively Granger-
cause earnings in the mid-to-late 1980s because it tends to be below its optimal level. However, 
this effect became negative for the 1990-1992 period when capital exceeded its optimal level. 
Earnings also positively Granger-cause regulatory capital, as profitable banks can retain more 
earnings. Similar results are documented by Jacques and Nigro (1997), Goddard, Molyneux 
and Wilson (2004), Iannotta, Nocera and Sironi (2007), and Lee and Hsieh (2013).  
On the other hand, Altunbas et al. (2007) reported that inefficient European banks appear 
to be highly-capitalized. Goddard et al. (2010) found that well-capitalized banks appeared to 
have lower profitability in eight European Union member countries between 1992 and 2007. 
Kashyap et al. (2010), who examined the impact of higher capital requirements on the overall 
cost of bank capital, suggested that a 10% increase in capital ratios would increase the cost of 
funding by up to 45 basis points in the worst-case scenario. Baker and Wurgler (2013) found 
that higher capital requirements are also related to a higher cost of bank equity. Using CAPM 
and the Fama and French three-factor model, they found that banks with higher capital ratios 
have lower risk but higher realized returns. Through this low-risk anomaly mechanism (i.e., 
low risk and high returns), higher capital requirements should lead to a higher cost of equity 
and therefore to lower profitability.  
2.2.2.2 Liquidity creation and regulatory capital 
 
According to Berger and Bouwman (2009), regulatory capital can be related to liquidity 
creation in two opposing ways. One theory, known as the “financial fragility-crowding out” 
hypothesis, suggests a negative relationship between capital and liquidity creation. Diamond 
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and Rajan (2000, 2001a) have argued that banks are inherently fragile because they collect 
funds from depositors to issue loans. With an informational advantage from monitoring 
borrowers, banks have an incentive to increase deposits for a greater share of loan income at 
the expense of their depositors. Depositors may then be reluctant to make deposits at the bank. 
Consequently, in the absence of complete deposit insurance, banks tend to adopt a fragile 
financial structure with a large share of liquid deposits to gain depositors’ confidence and 
reduce the likelihood of a bank run. Financial fragility is considered a commitment service that 
makes depositors entrust their funds to banks because they are confident that banks can repay 
their money without prompting a run. Therefore, it favors banks to raise more deposits in order 
to issue loans and maximize liquidity creation. While a higher capital standard mitigates 
financial fragility, it “crowds out” deposits in an unsegmented capital market (Gorton & 
Winton 2000). Deposits are asserted claimed to be more liquid hedges than bank equity capital 
for investors.3 As a result, a bank with higher regulatory capital may experience lower liquidity 
creation.  
According to the risk absorption hypothesis, on the other hand, regulatory capital is 
positively related to liquidity creation. Because liquidity creation tends to increase a bank’s 
illiquidity risk in the event that illiquid assets are forcibly disposed to meet demand deposits 
(Allen & Santomero 1998; Allen & Gale 2004b), Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) and Repullo 
(2004) have argued that liquidity creation encourages banks to strengthen their capital base. 
Conversely, a well-capitalized bank with higher risk capacity is in a stronger position to create 
more liquidity. The underlying argument of this hypothesis relies on the adjustment between 
                                                 
3 This is because investors can totally or partially withdraw them on demand at par value to meet their liquidity 
needs. In contrast, bank capital is generally not easily withdrawable, and its value depends on the bank’s 
fundamental condition and the liquidity of stock exchange.   
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capital and the level of illiquidity risk. Therefore, the relationship between regulatory capital 
and liquidity creation is both positive and bidirectional. 
To date, empirical evidence for these competing hypotheses is mixed. Using U.S. data, 
Van den Heuvel (2008) measured the welfare costs of capital requirements by incorporating 
the bank function of liquidity creation into the standard equilibrium model. His argument was 
based on Gorton and Winton’s (2000) aforementioned “crowding out of deposits” hypothesis 
that capital requirements limit banks’ acceptance of deposits, thus limiting the amount of 
liquidity banks create. In fact, the adequacy capital ratio of 8% is found to be costly as 
expressed by the permanent loss in consumptions of 0.1% to 1% because of the reduction of 
the bank’s ability to create liquidity in equilibrium.  
Berger and Bouwman (2009) reported that when liquidity creation measures include off-
balance sheet items, the relationship between liquidity creation and capital is positive for large 
banks but negative for small banks. The former is therefore consistent with the risk absorption 
hypothesis, while the latter is consistent with the “financial fragility-crowding out” effect. For 
medium-sized banks, they fail to find a significant relationship between capital and liquidity 
creation. When off-balance sheet items are excluded from their measurements, the relationship 
for small banks remains negative, but the relationship is insignificant for both medium-sized 
and large banks. 
Fungacova, Weill and Zhou (2012) extended the work of Berger and Bouwman (2009) 
by examining how the introduction of a deposit insurance scheme affects the relationship 
between liquidity creation and capital in the context of a major emerging economy. The 
aforementioned theoretical literature argues that the “financial fragility” effect only applies in 
the absence of deposit insurance, where depositors have little incentive to withdraw their 
deposits. Accordingly, the impact of increased capital on liquidity creation should become 
weaker once a deposit insurance scheme is implemented. Adopting the difference-in-difference 
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approach to a large dataset of all Russian banks, where deposit insurance has been implemented 
since 2004, Fungacova, Weill and Zhou (2012) surprisingly found that the presence of the 
deposit insurance scheme does not have much effect on the relationship between capital and 
liquidity creation. However, when only the banks most affected by this scheme are considered, 
they observed a significant role of deposit insurance on this relationship, as predicted. 
Nonetheless, the sign of the relationship does not change, remaining negative for small and 
medium-sized banks and for private domestic banks both before and after introduction of the 
insurance scheme. However, they failed to find the existence of such a relationship for large 
banks, foreign banks, and state-owned banks.  
 In two-way causality tests, Horváth, Seidler and Weill (2014) found that liquidity 
creation Granger-caused a reduction in capital for a sample of Czech banks. They also found a 
negative impact of capital on liquidity creation for small banks. Similarly, Distinguin, Roulet 
and Tarazi  (2013) reported that Basel III’s illiquidity measure and liquidity creation are jointly 
and negatively related to Tier-1 and 2 capital ratios. However, when they replaced stable 
deposits with core deposits for liquidity measures, capital appeared to be positively related to 
liquidity creation for small banks.  
2.2.2.3 Liquidity creation and bank profitability 
 
To manage liquidity, banks may reduce liquidity creation by holding more liquid assets 
to hedge against liquidity risk due to the mismatching of maturity between assets and liabilities. 
Because liquid assets tend to generate lower returns relative to illiquid assets, holding liquid 
assets lowers bank revenues. Accordingly, liquidity creation should be positively related to 
bank profitability. However, Bordeleau and Graham (2010) found that holding more liquid 
assets reduces a bank’s illiquid risk and hence the probability of default. This, in turn, tends to 
reduce financing costs and generate higher profits. The benefits of lower default risk with more 
liquid assets may outweigh the costs of lower returns.  
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Given the opposing arguments, it is surprising that few studies have directly examined 
the relationship between liquidity creation and bank profitability. Among them, Berger and 
Bouwman (2009) suggested that as more liquidity is created, higher net surpluses are shared 
among stakeholders—banks, borrowers, and depositors. The effect of liquidity creation on 
bank value is therefore positive. Consistently, Molyneux and Thornton (1992) and Goddard et 
al. (2010) documented a negative effect of liquidity on bank performance across European 
countries for the periods of 1986-1989 and the mid-1990s, respectively. Nevertheless, Bourke 
(1989) and Lartey, Antwi and Boadi (2013) reported a significant positive relationship between 
liquidity and profitability. 
2.2.3 Background of U.S. banking capital regulation 
 
In July 1998, the BCBS published the first Basel Capital Accord (hereafter Basel I), 
which was fully implemented in the U.S. by the end of 1992. Basel I established an obligation 
to maintain a minimum amount of bank capital of at least 8% of a bank’s risk-weighted assets. 
The drawback of this framework mainly lies in the risk-weighting system, which assigns the 
same risk weights for all loans of a particular category, regardless of differences in degrees of 
credit risk. Consequently, the same percentage of capital would be required for two commercial 
loans with very different credit qualities. As suggested by Jones (2000), this “one-size-fits-all” 
approach thus induces arbitrage activities. The capital-to-assets ratio under this framework no 
longer reliably measures regulatory capital, at least for large banks.  
To address its perceived shortcomings, the second Basel Accord (hereafter Basel II) was 
introduced in June 2004. The revised version allowed for more risk differentiation in the 
weighting system, in particular, by adopting a greater array of risk weights. Basel II proposed 
external rating assessments or internal ratings to proportionate the amount of bank assets’ true 
underlying credit risk rather than a simple percentage. In the U.S., Basel II was initially only 
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applied to the 19 largest U.S. banks. In general, the process of compliance with Basel II was 
slow and delayed until the wake of the 2007 major banking crisis. The final guidance on the 
adoption of new advanced Basel II capital adequacy was eventually announced by Federal 
Banking Regulators on July 16, 2008 and became effective on April 1 of the same year. There 
has been, however, doubt cast over the effectiveness of Basel II. A common concern is whether 
the determination of risk weights based on credit rating agencies (given that the rating agencies 
are paid by the rated parties) and the reliance on internal rating through banks’ own rating 
models are sufficiently transparent, reliable, and consistent among banks (Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Enrica & Merrouche 2013). 
In mid-2012, Federal Banking Regulators issued the final rule on the adoption of Basel 
II.5, known as the market capital risk rule, and proposed Basel III as an amendment to Basel 
II. The comprehensive package of Basel III reform was thereafter finalized in July 2013. Basel 
III aimed to revise the definition of various forms of capital and increase the minimum capital 
requirement amount. In particular, all supervised financial institutions will now be required to 
hold, as a percentage of risk weighted assets (RWA), at least 4.5% of common equity core Tier 
1 (up from 2% under Basel II), a conservation buffer of 2.5%, and a countercyclical capital 
buffer of 2.5%. Furthermore, the required minimum ratio of Tier-1 capital over RWA will 
increase from 4% to 6% under the new rule, while the total risk-adjusted capital ratio will 
increase from 8% to 10.5%. All changes will be phased in gradually for all financial 
institutions. Large banks began the phase-in period from January 2014, while smaller banks 
began in 2015. The transition period is different among banks but will be completed by 2019.  
2.3 Data 
 
Our sample comprises of an unbalanced panel dataset constructed from quarterly figures 
of all U.S. banks over the 1996–2010 period. The start of the sample period was chosen to 
coincide with the date that Tier-1 and Tier-2 capital were collected and reported. We rely on 
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Christa H.S Bowman’s website for liquidity-creation data, which ends in 2010.4 We use panel 
data because it is a very valuable resource for investigating empirical solutions to banking 
puzzles, especially in causal relationships. It allows researchers to explore variations more 
thoroughly both within and across cross-sectional units and to account for unobserved effects 
(Arellano & Honore 2001). To calculate the capital ratio, profitability and bank-specific control 
indicators, information on banks’ financial statements were obtained from the Call Report of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. The dollar amount of liquidity created by every bank in 
the U.S. was sourced from “Quarterly Bank Liquidity Creation Data” on Christa H.S 
Bowman’s website.5 Market and macroeconomic control variables included in the regression 
models such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, stock market volatility, and the growth rate 
of real GDP were collected from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) website, 
DataStream, and the U.S. Department of Commerce, respectively. Table 2.1 defines each 
variable and its corresponding data source. Our final sample consists of 507,715 bank-quarter 
observations. 
The sample period covers several market and banking crises. The former category 
includes the Russian debt crisis and the Long-Term Capital Management bailout (1998Q3-
1998Q4), the dot.com bubble, and the September 11 terrorist attacks (2000Q2-2002Q3), while 
the latter category includes the recent global financial crisis (2007Q3 – 2009Q4). This sample 
period, therefore, enables us to examine whether and how the interrelationships among bank 
capital, liquidity creation, and profitability vary across sub-periods marked by these events.  
Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics of key variables over the full sample period and 
sub-periods. Data is also sorted by bank size, where large, medium, and small banks are 
classified by total assets of more than $3 billion, between $1 billion and $3 billion, and less 
                                                 
4 We thank Christa Bouwman for providing the liquidity creation data. 
5 http://web.mit.edu/cbouwman/www/data.html. 
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than $1 billion, respectively (Berger & Bouwman 2009). As expected, average capital varies 
over the full sample period depending on how it is measured. It ranges from 9.1% when 
measured as the total capital to total assets (CARB) to 19.4% when defined as Tier-1 (Basel I) 
capital of the total risk-weighted assets (CARA). Given that CARB is scaled by total assets 
rather than risk-weighted assets, it provides the most conservative bank capital ratio estimate. 
Interestingly, according to Basel III capital standards, banks on average seem to have sufficient 
core capital (CARC) during banking and market crises. Small banks have a higher capital ratio 
under Basel I and Basel III capital standards (CARA and CARC, respectively), while the 
CARB measure shows a lower capital ratio.  
Bank profitability as measured by ROE averages 6% over the sample period. It falls to 
an average of 2.7% during periods of banking crisis but surprisingly rises to 7.3% during 
periods of market crisis. These variations in ROE suggest that bank performance is only 
affected by banking crises. Large banks enjoy a higher average ROE of 7.8% compared to that 
of small and medium-sized banks. There appears to be a monotonic positive relationship 
between bank profitability and bank size.  
Liquidity creation estimates differ substantially between those with off-balance sheet 
items (LC1) and those without (LC2). The averages for LC1 and LC2 are 63.6% and 19.1%, 
respectively. Similar to variations in ROE across different sub-periods, liquidity creation also 
differs across sub-periods. LC1 falls to an average of 44.9% as off-balance sheet activities 
decline during banking crises but increases to 78% during market crises. Differences in LC2 
are lower across sub-periods because regular balance-sheet activities are less sensitive to 
business cycles. These preliminary results suggest that it is important to include off-balance 
sheet items in the estimation of liquidity creation. Liquidity creation also varies across bank 
size. Large and small banks create more liquidity as a proportion of total assets from off-
balance items than medium-sized banks. 
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Table 2.1: Variable definitions and data sources 
Variables Acronym Definition Source 
Main variables 
   
Liquidity creation LC1 Dollar amount of “catfat” liquidity creation normalized by gross total assets. The “catfat” 
measure classifies loans based on category and includes off-balance sheet activities.  
 Bouwman’s website  
 
LC2 Dollar amount of “catnonfat” liquidity creation normalized by gross total assets. The 
“catnonfat” measure classifies loans by category but excludes off-balance sheet activities. 
 Bouwman’s website  
Regulatory capital CARA Tier-1 capital ratio, which is Tier-1 capital divided by total risk-weighted assets  Call Report  
CARB Equity capital ratio, which is the total capital divided by total assets  Call Report  
CARC Basel III capital ratio, which is the ratio of tangible common equity capital to risk-weighted 
assets 
 Call Report 
Profitability ROE Return on equity  Call Report 
 ROA Return on assets     
Bank control variables 
   
Risk RISK A measure of bank risk taking, which is a bank’s Basel I risk-weighted assets divided by 
gross total assets 
 Call Report 
Bank size SIZE Logarithm of gross total assets  Call Report 
Productivity growth  GROWTH Rate of change in the ratio of gross total revenue over personnel  Call Report 
Operating management  OMA The ratio of operating expenses over gross total assets   Call Report 
Market control variables  
   
Market concentration HHI Bank-level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of deposit concentration for the local market in 
which the bank is operating. The local market is defined as the state in which the 
headquarters of a bank is located.  
Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC)  
Stock market volatility SPVOL Volatility of S&P 500 Economic Sector Financial Index Price  Datastream 
Macro control variables 
   
Real GDP growth  GGDP Quarterly growth rate of the real GDP U.S. Department of 
Commerce 
Business cycle indicator GDP_GAP The cyclical component of real GDP obtained by applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter  Calculated by author 
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics of key variables from 1996 to 2010 
This table presents the summary statistics for explanatory variables on the interrelationships between capital, liquidity creation, and profitability. It is broken into sub-periods 
of banking crisis (2007Q3 – 2009Q4), market crisis (1998Q3-1998Q4 and 2000Q2-2002Q3), and normal times (remaining quarters). Summary statistics are also shown for 
large banks (total assets exceeding $3 billion), medium-sized banks (total assets between $1 billion and $3 billion), and small banks (total assets up to $1 billion).  
 Full sample  Sub-periods  Size  
   Normal times Bank crisis Market crisis  Large banks Medium banks Small banks  
CARA 0.194  0.196 0.189 0.192  0.132 0.140 0.197  
CARB 0.091  0.086 0.116 0.093  0.100 0.099 0.091  
CARC 0.151  0.140 0.189 0.157  0.126 0.125 0.153  
ROE 0.060  0.065 0.027 0.073  0.078 0.066 0.059  
LC1 0.636  0.633 0.449 0.780  0.602 0.474 0.644  
LC2 0.191  0.187 0.239 0.170  0.218 0.255 0.188  
OMA 0.050  0.065 0.022 0.025  0.020 0.020 0.053  
GROWTH 0.090  0.022 0.007 0.076  0.347 0.312 0.016  
RISK 0.648  0.642 0.690 0.640  0.423 0.682 0.653  
SIZE 11.793  11.772 11.995 11.714  16.226 14.270 11.564  
HHI 0.065  0.064 0.072 0.062  0.095 0.080 0.063  
SPVOL 3.647  2.980 7.669 2.850  - - -  
GGDP 0.007  0.009 -0.002 0.007  - - -  
GDP_GAP 0.032  0.744 -20.886 12.714  - - -  
N 507,715  326,887 75,170 105,658  13,550 19,603 474,562  
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2.4 Methodology 
 
This section describes the research methodology and outlines the variables used in this study. 
2.4.1 Model framework  
 
The vector autoregressive model (VAR) has been widely used to examine intertemporal 
relationships in the banking literature (e.g., Fiordelisi & Molyneux 2010; Fiordelisi, Marques-
Ibanez & Molyneux 2011; Horváth, Seidler & Weill 2014). This test does not necessarily prove 
economic causality between two variables, but it does identify a gross statistical association. 
Therefore, it is an ideal tool for studying different sets of predictions about parameter signs 
empirically.6 It is also useful in determining what, among the various theories’ effects, 
empirically dominates the data. It allows us to test time-ordered relationships and addresses 
potential endogeneity problems among liquidity creation, regulatory capital, and bank 
profitability. We therefore estimate the following VAR equations: 
titintintiti ZityprofitabilcapitalfLiquidity ,,,,, ),,( H                          (2.1) 
titintintiti ZityprofitabilliquidityfCapital ,,,,, ),,( H                            (2.2) 
titintintiti ZcapitalliquidityfyofitabilitPr ,,,,, ),,( H                                       (2.3) 
where the i subscript denotes the cross-sectional dimension across banks, t denotes the time 
dimension, Capital, Liquidity, and Profitability are endogenous variables, Z represents a set of 
control variables including banking-specific, market, and macroeconomic factors influencing 
the capital-liquidity-profitability relationship, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the random error term. These variables 
are defined in subsection 2.4.2. 
                                                 
6 As aforementioned in Section 2.2, the relationships among pairs of capital, liquidity creation, and bank 
performance all theoretically experience counterarguments on their signs. 
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Eq. (2.1) indicates whether the variations in bank capital and profitability temporally lead 
to the variations in liquidity amount bank created. Similarly, Eq. (2.2) tests whether the change 
in bank capital is temporally preceded by changes in liquidity creation and profitability. The 
last equation (2.3) considers whether changes in bank capital and liquidity creation temporally 
precede changes in bank profitability.  
For the optimal number of lagged endogenous variables, Berger (1995b) used three lags 
to determine the causal relationship between bank capital and earnings. Horváth, Seidler and 
Weill (2014) used four and twelve lags to analyse the relationship between liquidity creation 
and capital. To ensure that our results are robust, we estimate Eqs. (2.1) through (2.3) with two, 
three, four, and twelve lags. Because the results are similar with higher lags, we only report 
those with two lags. A conclusion on causality is then reached by running Wald tests with the 
null hypothesis that the sum of all lagged coefficients of each of determinants in question is 0. 
The rejection of the null hypothesis that y does not Granger-cause x implies evidence of a 
“long-run effect” of y over x. Indeed, the sum of lagged coefficients is a referred statistic to the 
individual lag coefficients because the sum is much more precisely measured and captures the 
total effect we are interested in.  
2.4.2 Variable definitions 
2.4.2.1 Liquidity creation 
Following Berger and Bouwman (2009), we use two measures of liquidity creation. A 
bank’s assets, liabilities, and off-balance sheet activities are first classified as liquid, 
semiliquid, or illiquid items. Appendix 1 lists the balance sheet and off-balance sheet items for 
each of the three categories. These items are then assigned different weights. The first liquidity 
creation measure, catfat, which includes off-balance sheet items, is estimated as follows:  
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where off-balance sheet items include derivatives, letters of credit, and loan commitments. 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2002) have suggested that off-
balance sheet activities such as loan commitments are relevant to liquidity creation, as they 
have claims to liquid funds.  
 The second measure for liquidity creation, which does not include off-balance sheet 
items, catnonfat, is estimated as follows: 
)equity   sliabilitie  illiquid  assets liquid                     
 s)liabilitie  semiliquidassets  semiliquid                     
 s)liabilitie liquidassets illiquidCatnonfat
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 
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           (2.5) 
It is important to note that both measures in Eqs. (2.4) and (2.5) classify loans based on 
category rather than maturity. Berger and Bouwman (2009) highlight that this type of 
classification is preferable to one based on maturity because liquidity creation on the asset side 
is about the ease, cost, and time banks take to dispose of their obligations to obtain liquid funds. 
Therefore, corporate loans are classified as illiquid assets regardless of their maturity because 
banks cannot quickly dispose of them to meet their liquidity needs. The ability to securitize 
loans is also closer to the concept of liquidity creation than maturity. For example, long-term 
loans such as consumer and residential mortgage loans are considered more liquid because they 
can be securitized and sold when liquidity demands increase. Our measures of liquidity creation 
therefore do not include those based on maturity. 
2.4.2.2 Capital 
 There are three measures of bank capital. The first measure is the ratio of Tier-1 capital 
(i.e., common equity, non-perpetual, and non-cumulative preference shares based on the Basel 
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Accord) to risk-weighted assets (RWA). The second measure is the ratio of total equity to total 
assets. The final measure is the ratio of tangible common equity capital to RWA.7 These are 
denoted as CARA, CARB, and CARC, respectively.  
2.4.2.3 Profitability  
There are two measures for profitability. The first measure is return on equity (ROE), the 
ratio of net income over the average total stockholders’ equity. ROE provides a comprehensive 
measure of bank performance to allocate capital across divisions, including off-balance sheet 
activities. The second measure is return on assets (ROA), the ratio of net income over average 
total assets. ROA takes into account the performance of both traditional and non-traditional 
banking activities. 
2.4.2.4 Control variables 
 A set of control variables includes bank-specific, market, and macroeconomic factors. 
We provide a brief description of each group of control variables below. 
Bank-specific variables: 
Bank risk (RISK)—the ratio of Basel risk-weighted assets to gross total assets (Berger 
& Bouwman 2013). Profitability is the key incentive for excessive risk-taking by banks, while 
absorbing risk is the primary reason for banks to hold capital. Therefore, it is rational to control 
for bank risk when measuring the association between capital and profitability. Moreover, 
                                                 
7 CARB is the most common variable used in banking capital literature (Rime 2001; Berger & Bouwman 2009;  
Berger & Bouwman 2013). CARA has become popular in most recent banking sector research since the 
introduction of the risk-weighted capital standards in the Basel I context (Aggarwal & Jacques 1998; Rime 2001; 
Distinguin, Roulet & Tarazi 2013). However, the Basel III regulatory capital reform has emphasized tangible 
common equity capital in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 great recession because it is the most loss-absorbing 
component of bank capital. Therefore, the third measure, CARC, is also used to measure bank capital (Yan, Hall 
& Turner 2012). Tier 1 consists of common equity, non-perpetual, and non-cumulative preference shares. The 
difference between tangible common equity and Tier-1 capital is the exclusion of preferred equity and non-
controlling interests.  
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controlling for bank risk allows us to disentangle the association between regulatory capital 
and bank profitability from the risk transformation function of banks.  
Bank size (SIZE)—the natural log of total assets. Larger banks may receive implicit 
guarantees and be considered too-big-to-fail. The interrelationships between liquidity creation, 
regulatory capital, and bank profitability may therefore vary by bank size. 
Productivity growth (GROWTH) and expense management (OMA)—these two ratios 
measure bank efficiency. The former is the rate of change in the ratio of gross total revenue to 
personnel costs, and the latter is the ratio of operating costs to total assets. Athanasoglou et al. 
(2008) have suggested that an increase in GROWTH and a decline in OMA improve bank 
profitability. In contrast, Fiordelisi, Marques-Ibanez and Molyneux (2011) contend that bank 
efficiency has a negative impact on regulatory capital, as higher bank efficiency provides banks 
with a buffer to build up capital if needed in the future. Therefore, banks have less incentive to 
raise more capital. 
Market variables: 
Market risk—the volatility of the S&P 500 Economic Sector Financial Index (SPVOL), 
which is calculated as standard deviation divided by the mean price index over four quarters 
and multiplied by 40 for a scale from 1 to 20. A volatility rating of 10 indicates average 
volatility of the market. 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)—deposit concentration in the local markets in 
which the bank is operating. HHI measures the level of competition for deposits among banks 
in local markets. The local market is defined as the state in which a bank’s headquarters are 
located. The index is computed as the sum of the squares of market deposit shares of each bank 
competing in a state. Markets in which the HHI falls between 10% and 18% are considered to 
be “moderately concentrated”, and those in which the HHI is in excess of 18% are considered 
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to be “highly concentrated” (Petersen & Rajan 1995; Berger & Bouwman 2009). Market 
concentration may have a significant impact on liquidity creation through a bank’s credit 
availability and on its earning through the exercise of market power (Berger & Bowman 2009; 
Petersen & Rajan 1995; Berger 1995).  
Macroeconomic variables: 
Quarterly growth rate of real gross domestic product (GGDP) and cyclical output gap 
(GDP_GAP) —these common variables are used to measure macroeconomic conditions and 
business cycles, respectively. The latter is estimated using the Hodrick–Prescott filter to 
remove the segmented trend from time-series variables such as real GDP for a robust measure 
of cyclicality of economic activity. Empirical studies have proved that it is important to control 
for the influence of the business cycle in the determinants of regulatory capital ratios and 
profitability.8  
2.4.3 Arellano–Bond generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator 
 
The interrelationships among liquidity creation, capital, and bank profitability pose 
potential endogeneity and serial correlation problems in dynamic panel models. Although the 
introduction of a lagged dependent variable in the panel Granger-causality model resolves the 
possible simultaneity between capital and liquidity creation (profitability), it gives rise to the 
possibility of autocorrelation. Arellano and Honoré (2001) have shown that ordinary least 
squares (OLS), instrumental variables estimators, and panel data estimators such as least 
squares dummy variables (LSDV) may not adequately address biased and inconsistent 
estimates for dynamic panel models. Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) 
                                                 
8 Athanasoglou et al. (2008) have suggested that banks’ capital could behave in a pro-cyclical manner because 
equity tends to follow the phase of the cycle. Others, however, have pointed out that capital buffers under Basel I 
exhibit negative co-movement with the business cycle (Ayuso, Pérez & Saurina 2004; Jokipii & Milne 2008; 
Lindquist 2004; Heid 2007). Regarding the behaviour of bank profitability, its positive co-movement with GDP 
was highlighted by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) and Athanasoglou et al. (2008).  
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found that the dynamic panel GMM is superior to conventional estimators in the following 
ways: First, the dynamic panel GMM technique corrects potential endogeneity, 
heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation problems in the panel data. Second, it uses lagged 
values of the dependent variable and the exogenous variables as valid instruments to account 
for simultaneity. The availability of a set of “internal” instruments within the panel itself 
eliminates the need for external instruments. Third, the GMM estimator captures potential 
correlations between any of the independent variables.  
Accordingly, we use the two-step system GMM dynamic panel estimators of Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (2000) for our empirical estimates. This improves 
the efficiency of Arellano and Bond’s (1991) “difference GMM” by using both regressions in 
level and in difference. We then use the robust standard error of Windmeijer (2005) to correct 
for the potential downward bias of the two-step estimator. The Arellano-Bond (AB) serial 
correlation test is also performed. The rejection of the null hypothesis implies the absence of 
second-order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals in both the difference regression 
and the system difference-level regression. 
Before conducting the estimation, we conduct the unit root test to check the stationarity 
of the data. Table 2.3 shows the statistics of four types of panel unit root tests: the Levin-Lin-
Chu test, the Im-Pesaran-Shin test, a Fisher-type test using Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF), 
and the Philips-Person (PP) test. Recent literature suggests that panel-based unit root tests have 
higher power than unit root tests based on individual time series. All tests have the null 
hypothesis that all panels contain unit roots but differ in the alternative hypothesis. A rejection 
of the Levin-Lin-Chu test’s null hypothesis indicates the absence of unit roots. The alternative 
hypothesis of the other tests, however, implies at least some panels are stationary. As seen in 
Table 2.3, the results consistently indicate that all variables do not contain a unit root and are 
stationarity at their level, which allows us to proceed to the Granger-causality tests. 
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Table 2.3: Panel unit root tests 
This table shows the statistics of the four types of panel unit root tests for all variables used in regressions: 
Levin-Lin-Chu test, Im-Pesaran-Shin test, Fisher-type test using Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF), and Philips-
Person (PP) tests. The definitions of all variables are the same as in Table 2.1.  
𝐻0: All panels contain unit roots 
𝐻𝑎: Some panels have no unit roots (for Im-Pesaran-Shin, ADF, and PP-Fisher) 
𝐻𝑎: All panels have no unit roots (for Levin, Lin and Chu test) 
 Im-Pesaran-Shin ADF-Fisher PP-Fisher Levin-Lin-Chu 
 W-stat Chi-square Chi-square t*-stat 
CARA -403.592 109447 149176 -726.71 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CARB -193.594 75871.5 154656 -232.941 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CARC -289.619 88544.4 181671 -598.308 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROE -62.8596 48637.9 176884 -99.2161 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LC1 -117.353 67903.7 83976.9 -165.726 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LC2 -132.074 71383.4 90450.2 -269.019 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OMA  -97.2008 55305.9 365492 -2.51727 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GROWTH -304.451 153127 181476 -521.579 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RISK -118.572 63797.7 75929.1 -186.788 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE -90.7743 63835.1 81273.7 -278.21 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HII -12.0225 25528.1 24899.7 -44.7057 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SPVOL -126.634 61904.7 34829.5 -107.581 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GGDP -288.413 135299 226406 -419.387 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP_GAP -164.877 79986.3 48543 -63.5007 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
2.5 Empirical Results  
2.5.1 The interrelationships of liquidity creation, capital, and bank profitability  
 
Table 2.4a reports the empirical results of the full sample using two lags on capital, 
liquidity creation, and profitability where capital is measured using CARA, CARB, and CARC, 
alternatively. LC1 and ROE are the proxies for two other endogenous variables, respectively. 
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The models seem to fit the U.S. panel data properly, as the Wald-test shows reasonable 
goodness of fit and the AB test rejects the presence of second-order autocorrelation. 
We first report the results of VAR estimates on the relationship between capital and 
liquidity creation. Overall, columns 1-3 in Table 2.4a show that capital appears to positively 
Granger-cause liquidity creation. Using Tier-1 capital (CARA total) and equity (CARB total), 
banks with higher capital exhibit more liquidity creation. An increase of 1% in CARA total 
(CARB total) over the previous two quarters corresponds to an increase in liquidity creation of 
0.325 (0.255). However, when only common equity (without preferred equity in Tier-1 capital) 
is treated as capital (CARC total), the relationship turns marginally negative. Therefore, under 
the current Basel III capital requirements, an increase in regulatory capital does not help to 
create more liquidity. The results highlight the fact that the relationship between regulatory 
capital and liquidity creation is sensitive to how regulatory capital is defined. Different 
components of capital constitute different effects on bank liquidity creation. In particular, the 
positive impact of lagged equity capital (or Tier-1 capital) on liquidity creation seems to be the 
net result of a positive effect of preferred equity dominating the negative effect of tangible 
common equity capital on liquidity creation.9 In other words, the sum of lagged coefficients on 
CARC appears negative because the impact of preferred equity on liquidity creation is excluded 
in such a case. It is also worth noting that alternating the denominator between risk-weighted 
assets and gross total assets does not qualitatively change the results. 
Turning to other explanatory variables on liquidity creation, increases in bank credit risk 
and real GDP growth are associated with increases in liquidity creation. A change in a bank’s 
operating expenses does not affect liquidity creation, while a bank’s productivity growth and 
size limits the amount of liquidity it creates. In addition, banks are likely to create less liquidity 
                                                 
9 Given that tangible common equity is calculated by subtracting goodwill and intangibles from equity capital 
and tangible common equity capital differs from Tier-capital due to the exclusion of preferred equity.  
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when they are operating in higher concentrated markets and associated with high volatile stock 
markets. The impact of a cyclical output gap on liquidity creation is mixed depending on how 
capital is measured.  
On reverse causality, from liquidity creation to capital, columns 4-6 in Table 2.4a show 
that LC1 is positively related to all three measures of bank capital. Therefore, higher liquidity 
creation tends to enhance regulatory capital. Overall, our results show a positive bidirectional 
relationship between liquidity creation and regulatory capital. Our findings are therefore more 
consistent with the risk absorption hypothesis and provide less support for the financial 
fragility-crowding out hypothesis. Focusing on control variables in the capital equation, we 
observe that U.S. banks with lower operating expenses, higher productivity growth, lower risk, 
a larger size, and those that operate in less volatile stock markets are more likely to be better 
capitalized. Interestingly, the effect of the business cycle on the three bank capital measures is 
consistently negative over the sample period, which is in line with previous studies by Ayuso, 
Pérez and Saurina (2004), Jokipii and Milne (2008), Lindquist (2004), and Heid (2007).  
Columns 7-9 in Table 2.4a show the effect of liquidity creation and regulatory capital on 
bank profitability. It appears that regulatory capital negatively Granger-causes ROE after 
controlling for bank characteristics, market risk, and macroeconomic conditions. This negative 
relationship is robust to different capital measures. The results are in line with the argument 
that higher capital requirements may lower bank profitability through the higher cost of capital 
and lower tax shield savings. LC1 total also appears to negatively Granger-cause ROE. 
Therefore, consistent with the expected bankruptcy-cost hypothesis, an increase in liquidity 
creation, and thereby higher illiquidity risk, may increase default risk, which in turn enhances 
financing costs and reduces bank performance.  
All control variables appear to be significant in the profitability equation with the 
exception of productivity growth and market concentration. Not surprisingly, the positive effect 
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of bank size on profitability is in accordance with previous studies (Smirlock 1985; Goddard, 
Molyneux & Wilson 2004). Previous studies have pointed out that the economies of scale 
achieved through increasing bank size enable banks to achieve higher marginal cost savings, 
especially in developed markets. The positive coefficient of operating expenses, however, is 
not as expected. Plausibly, higher personnel expenses are related to a higher volume of business 
activity and hence are associated with higher revenues. In addition, this counterintuitive finding 
implies the likely existence of expense preference behaviour in the U.S. banking industry, as 
suggested by Molyneux and Thornton (1992). This could be observed in a developed banking 
industry where higher staff expenses indicate higher quality staff. In other words, the more 
payroll expenditures are paid for productive human capital, the more profits banks are able to 
earn. The impact of other control variables like credit risk and macroeconomic condition is 
statistically significant but mixed among equations using different capital measures.  
In summary, our findings highlight the fact that the benefits to the economy of creating 
more liquidity and raising higher regulatory capital to strengthen financial stability may be 
offset by lower bank profitability. 
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Table 2.4a: Results of VAR estimates of liquidity creation, regulatory capital, and bank profitability 
This table presents the results of a system of VAR equations of liquidity creation, capital, and profitability. We use three measures of capital: Tier-1 capital ratio (CARA), 
capital-to-assets ratio (CARB), and tangible common equity ratio (CARC). The measures of bank profitability and liquidity creation are ROE and “catfat” scaled by gross total 
assets, respectively. All other variables are defined in Table 2.1. The estimation method is the two-step GMM dynamic panel estimator with Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected 
standard errors. Data is on quarterly frequency and covers the period 1996-2010. CARA/CARB/CARC Total, ROE Total, and LC1 Total are the estimated coefficients for the 
test that the sum of lagged terms (for bank capital, return on equity, and liquidity creation, respectively) is equal to 0. P-value is reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The Arellano-Bond (AB) test for serial correlation is based on the null hypothesis of second-order autocorrelation in the first 
differenced residuals. The coefficients of GROWTH, SPVOL and GDP_GAP are multiplied by 1,000. 
 Liquidity Creation Regulatory Capital   Bank profitability 
 LC1 CARA Total CARB Total CARC Total  ROE 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
CARA(-1) 0.552    1.323***    -1.471***   
 (0.433)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
CARA(-2) -0.227    -0.334***    1.060***   
 (0.688)    (0.000)    (0.003)   
CARA Total 0.325**    0.989***    -0.411***   
 (0.036)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
CARB(-1)  0.104    0.852***    0.544***  
  (0.542)    (0.000)    (0.008)  
CARB(-2)  0.151    0.102    -1.120***  
  (0.520)    (0.602)    (0.000)  
CARB Total  0.255**    0.954***    -0.576***  
  (0.041)    (0.000)    (0.000)  
CARC(-1)   0.572    1.274***    -0.041 
   (0.357)    (0.000)    (0.487) 
CARC(-2)   -1.137**    -0.304***    -0.220*** 
   (0.045)    (0.000)    (0.000) 
CARC Total   -0.564*    0.969***    -0.261*** 
   (0.073)    (0.000)    (0.000) 
ROE(-1) 0.615** -0.062*** 0.617  0.008** 0.028*** 0.008  0.107*** 0.138*** 0.093*** 
 (0.023) (0.000) (0.410)  (0.046) (0.001) (0.621)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROE(-2) -1.176** 0.105*** -0.915  -0.041*** -0.006 -0.052***  0.169*** 0.105*** 0.066*** 
 (0.016) (0.000) (0.672)  (0.000) (0.482) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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ROE Total -0.561** 0.042** -0.299  -0.033*** 0.022*** -0.044***  0.276*** 0.243*** 0.158*** 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.838)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LC1(-1) 1.039*** 1.019*** 0.948***  -0.002 -0.008 0.010  0.320*** 0.426*** 0.219** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.809) (0.147) (0.760)  (0.000) (0.004) (0.014) 
LC1(-2) -0.023 0.018 0.140**  0.008 0.012** 0.001  -0.406*** -0.492*** -0.283*** 
 (0.631) (0.860) (0.046)  (0.305) (0.028) (0.965)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
LC1 Total 1.016*** 1.037*** 1.088***  0.006** 0.004* 0.012**  -0.086*** -0.066*** -0.065*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.035) (0.063) (0.027)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
OMA 0.452 0.089 1.983  -0.211*** -0.099** -0.199***  3.730*** 3.215*** 3.325*** 
 (0.423) (0.121) (0.242)  (0.000) (0.036) (0.004)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GROWTH -0.641*** 0.046 -0.626  0.151* 0.028 0.253  1.430 -0.008 -0.028 
 (0.005) (0.817) (0.637)  (0.052) (0.552) (0.104)  (0.209) (0.996) (0.981) 
RISK 0.090* -0.050 -0.012  -0.009*** -0.005** -0.014**  -0.079*** 0.050*** -0.043*** 
 (0.092) (0.330) (0.951)  (0.000) (0.015) (0.050)  (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) 
SIZE -0.006** -0.001 0.005  0.001*** 0.001** 0.002***  0.011*** 0.004*** 0.008*** 
 (0.043) (0.524) (0.475)  (0.002) (0.047) (0.008)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HII -0.093*** -0.004 -0.312  -0.026 -0.006*** -0.047**  -0.039 0.039 0.037 
 (0.004) (0.790) (0.145)  (0.128) (0.002) (0.012)  (0.105) (0.103) (0.167) 
SPVOL -1.745** -0.171 2.603  -0.011 0.001 -0.275***  -3.586*** -3.737*** -4.266*** 
 (0.019) (0.441) (0.488)  (0.820) (0.983) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GGDP 0.878*** 0.343*** 0.896*  0.010 0.013 -0.106***  0.179** -0.077* -0.136*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.099)  (0.524) (0.155) (0.010)  (0.024) (0.059) (0.001) 
GDP_GAP -0.034*** -0.0004 0.081***  -0.001* -0.002*** -0.006***  -0.027*** -0.013*** 0.010** 
 (0.008) (0.913) (0.009)  (0.060) (0.002) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) 
AB test AR(2) 0.113 0.140 0.150  0.264 0.922 0.460  0.577 0.674 0.733 
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 336,317 336,405 324,508  337,391 336,405 317,792  336,312 336,398 323,459 
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To check if the results in Table 2.4a differ from alternative measures, we repeat VAR 
estimates using liquidity creation that exclude off-balance sheet items (LC2) and return on 
assets (ROA) for bank profitability. For brevity, we only report the results of the sum of lagged 
coefficients of each key variable without tabulating the control variables. Panel A of Table 2.4b 
shows that the interrelationships among liquidity creation, capital, and bank profitability are 
weaker when we use LC2. For example, the positive bidirectional relationship between 
regulatory capital and liquidity creation and the negative impact of liquidity creation on bank 
profitability reported earlier are less robust. The results highlight the importance of including 
off-balance sheet activities; Berger and Bouwman (2009) report that only about half of the 
liquidity created by banks is on the balance sheet.  
The results of these interrelationships using ROA are largely consistent with those using 
ROE. Panel B of Table 2.4b shows that the bidirectional relationship between regulatory capital 
and liquidity creation remains positive. Regulatory capital also continues to have an adverse 
effect on bank profitability. The only exception is the disappearance of the negative impact of 
liquidity creation on bank profitability. Given that the results using LC2 and ROA are generally 
consistent with those when using LC1 and ROE, we only tabulate results for the latter in our 
subsequent analyses.   
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Table 2.4b: Results of VAR estimates of liquidity creation, regulatory capital, and bank profitability with alternative measures 
This table presents the results of a system of VAR equations of bank capital, liquidity creation, and profitability. We use three measures of capital: Tier-1 capital ratio (CARA), 
capital-to-assets ratio (CARB), and tangible common equity ratio (CARC). Panel A uses the “catnonfat” measure scaled by total assets (LC2) as the measure of liquidity 
creation and ROE as the measure of bank profitability. Panel B employs the “catnonfat” measure scaled by total assets (LC1) as the measure of liquidity creation and ROA as 
the measure of bank profitability. The estimation method is the two-step GMM dynamic panel estimator with Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected standard errors. The variables 
CARA/CARB/CARC Total, ROE Total, ROA Total, LC1 Total, and LC2 Total are the estimated coefficients for the test that the sum of lagged terms (for bank capital, return 
on equity, return on assets, and liquidity creation, respectively) are equal to 0. P-value is reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. The Arellano-Bond (AB) test for serial correlation is based on the null hypothesis of second-order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals. All control 
variables are included but not tabulated. 
 Liquidity creation  Regulatory capital  Bank profitability 
Panel A  LC2   CARA Total CARB Total CARC Total   ROE  
 (1a) (2a) (3a)  (1b) (2b) (3b)  (1c) (2c) (3c) 
CARA Total 0.005       1.013***      -0.178***   
 (0.865)    (0.000)    (0.009)   
CARB Total  0.072    1.031***    0.190  
  (0.440)    (0.000)    (0.553)  
CARC Total   -0.067***    0.857***    -0.380*** 
   (0.005)    (0.000)    (0.001) 
ROE Total 0.079* -0.003 -0.030  0.018 0.037 0.146*  1.166*** 0.933*** 0.034 
 (0.089) (0.935) (0.479)  (0.697) (0.357) (0.089)  (0.000) (0.007) (0.946) 
LC2 Total 0.952*** 0.958*** 0.911***  0.031 0.024** -0.05  -0.022 0.026 -0.220*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.160) (0.033) (0.129)  (0.598) (0.635) (0.005) 
AB test AR(2) 0.275 0.155 0.757  0.267 0.105 0.545  0.468 0.322 0.191 
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 336,317 337,479 324,464  336,317 343,796 317,792  336,312 336,398 323,459 
Panel B  LC1   CARA Total CARB Total CARC Total   ROA  
 (1a) (2a) (3a)  (1b) (2b) (3b)  (1c) (2c) (3c) 
CARA Total 0.152*       0.971***    -0.025***   
 (0.087)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
CARB Total  0.051*    0.899***    -0.066***  
  (0.057)    (0.000)    (0.000)  
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CARC Total   -0.206**        1.007***      -0.025*** 
   (0.034)    (0.000)    (0.000) 
ROA Total 0.485 0.065 -0.858*    -0.318*** 0.309 0.708  1.065*** 1.396***    0.240*** 
 (0.155) (0.699) (0.042)  (0.000) (0.256) (0.511)  (0.000)     (0.000) (0.000) 
LC1 Total      0.953***    1.021***  1.009***    0.007**     0.004*** 0.008*  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.032) (0.000) (0.072)  (0.772) (0.878) (0.832) 
AB test AR(2) 0.337 0.449 0.435  0.265 0.287 0.544  0.243 0.563 0.302 
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 379,533 397,941 379,533  399,134 405,867 379,534  397,942 404,530 385,086 
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2.5.2 Size effect 
To delve deeper into the interrelationships among capital, liquidity creation, and 
profitability, Eqs. (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3) are run separately for large banks, medium-sized banks, 
and small banks during the period of 1996-2010. We examine whether these interrelationships are 
sensitive to bank size. Panel A of Table 2.5 shows that regulatory capital affects liquidity creation 
for small banks only. Furthermore, the effect on small banks is sensitive to how capital ratio is 
measured. In particular, the effect of regulatory capital is positive using CARA and CARC but 
negative using CARB. Because CARB is a general measure of capital ratio, it can be said that an 
increase in regulatory capital (as defined by Basel I or III) has a positive effect on banks’ ability 
to create liquidity. Conversely, Panel B shows that LC1 total has a positive impact on CARA and 
CARC for small banks only. Taken together, the results in Table 2.4a suggest that the positive 
bidirectional relationship between regulatory capital and liquidity creation is driven by small 
banks. 10  
Panel C in Table 2.5 shows that the negative effects of liquidity creation and regulatory 
capital on bank profitability are not uniform across bank size. The effect of liquidity creation 
applies only to small and large banks, while the effect of regulatory capital is limited to small 
banks. The weak linkage between regulatory capital and bank profitability for large banks is 
consistent with Goddard, McKillop and Wilson (2008) and Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004), who 
have suggested that large banks tend to engage in more off-balance sheet or fee-based activities 
                                                 
10 This positive interrelationship is not inconsistent with Berger and Bouwman (2009), who documented a negative 
causal link from bank capital to liquidity creation for small banks. Their conclusion and ours are reached differently 
through the use of different capital proxies. Using CARB as a capital proxy, we obtain the same results (i.e., 
significantly negative relationship for small banks, positive for large banks, and insignificant for medium-sized banks). 
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that generate higher volatile revenues with less capital. Overall, the results suggest that the 
interrelationships are largely driven by small banks. 
Distinguin, Roulet and Tarazi (2013) suggested that the size effect is likely to be caused by 
larger banks being less exposed to illiquidity risk because they are too-big-to-fail (TBTF). As a 
result, TBTF banks are less responsive in adjusting their regulatory capital. To examine if the weak 
relationship between liquidity creation and regulatory capital for large banks is due to TBTF, we 
separate these banks from other large banks. Following the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, we define TBTF 
banks as those with gross total assets exceeding $50 billion. Table 2.6 shows that the 
interrelationships change little when TBTF banks are separated from other large banks. One 
potential reason for this lack of effect is that implicit government guarantees may apply to a 
broader group of large banks than just TBTF banks.    
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Table 2.5: Results of VAR estimates sorted by bank size 
This table presents the results of a system of VAR equations of bank capital, liquidity creation, and profitability separately for small banks, medium-sized banks, 
and large banks (using total assets of $1 and $3 billion as the cut-off points). We use three measures of capital: Tier-1 capital ratio (CARA), capital-to-assets ratio 
(CARB), and tangible common equity ratio (CARC). The measures of bank profitability and liquidity creation are ROE and “catfat” scaled by gross total assets, 
respectively. Panels A, B, and C show the results of the liquidity, capital, and ROE equations, respectively. Our estimation method is the two-step GMM dynamic 
panel estimator with Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected standard errors. The variables CARA/CARB/CARC Total, ROE Total, and LC1 Total are the estimated 
coefficients for the test that the sum of lagged terms (for bank capital, return on equity, and liquidity creation, respectively) are equal to 0. P-value is reported in 
parentheses). ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The Arellano-Bond (AB) test for serial correlation is based on the null 
hypothesis of second-order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals. All control variables are included but not tabulated. 
 
 Size 
Large banks  Medium banks  Small banks 
Panel A: Liquidity creation      
CARA Total 0.594    0.006    0.103**    
(0.285)    (0.954)    (0.041)   
CARB Total  0.893**    0.167    -0.312***  
  (0.020)    (0.470)    (0.001)  
CARC Total   0.494    0.044    0.118** 
   (0.318)    (0.700)    (0.018) 
ROE Total 0.063 0.127** 0.071  0.077*** 0.076** 0.081***  0.236*** 0.041 0.236** 
 (0.159) (0.029) (0.129)  (0.000) (0.035) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.295) (0.033) 
LC1 Total 1.053*** 1.040*** 1.055***  0.975*** 0.990*** 0.972***  1.035*** 1.108*** 1.046***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AB test AR(2) 0.473 0.474 0.491  0.258 0.255 0.255  0.353 0.161 0.349 
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 6,342 6,401 6,140  15,329 15,405 14,697  321,064 323,999 308,735 
Panel B: Regulatory capital       
CARA Total 1.088***    0.994***    1.021***    
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
CARB Total  0.988***    1.032***    0.956***  
  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)  
CARC Total   1.076***    0.948***    0.996*** 
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   (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000) 
ROE Total -0.026 -0.004 -0.010  0.001 0.037*** -0.028  -0.016*** 0.048*** -0.045***  
(0.938) (0.870) (0.974)  (0.730) (0.008) (0.171)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LC1 Total -0.012 0.0002 -0.003  0.003* -0.0002 -0.001  0.006*** -0.002 0.006***  
(0.515) (0.666) (0.849)  (0.092) (0.970) (0.892)  (0.001) (0.109) (0.000) 
AB test AR(2) 0.618 0.335 0.558  0.152 0.945 0.824  0.459 0.323 0.379 
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 6,337 6,396 6,030  15,329 15,341 14,368  321,064 321,081 302,295 
Panel C: ROE       
CARA Total -0.025    -0.554    -0.434***    
(0.566)    (0.250)    (0.000)   
CARB Total  -0.129    0.014    -0.579***  
  (0.365)    (0.975)    (0.000)  
CARC Total   -0.023    -0.315    -0.297*** 
   (0.425)    (0.478)    (0.000) 
ROE Total 1.065*** 0.978*** 1.055***  1.245*** 1.077** 1.007**  0.244*** 0.243*** 0.187***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.002) (0.043) (0.022)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LC1 Total -0.027** -0.023** -0.027**  -0.004 -0.030*** 0.029*  -0.089*** -0.086*** -0.083***  
(0.022) (0.036) (0.045)  (0.870) (0.010) (0.067)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
AB test AR(2) 0.549 0.550 0.632  0.542 0.135 0.277  0.291 0.279 0.279 
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 6,337 6,396 6,135  15,412 16,159 14,775  321,059 321,074 308,730 
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Table 2.6: Results of VAR estimates for large banks 
This table presents the results of a system of VAR equations of bank capital, liquidity creation, and profitability 
for a large bank sub-sample that includes and excludes too-big-too-fail (TBTF) banks. In every quarter, all banks 
with gross total assets (GTA) exceeding $50 billion are considered TBTF. We use three measures of capital: Tier-
1 capital ratio (CARA), capital-to-assets ratio (CARB), and tangible common equity ratio (CARC). The measures 
of bank profitability and liquidity creation are ROE and “catfat” scaled by gross total assets, respectively. The 
estimation method is the two-step GMM dynamic panel estimator with Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected standard 
errors. Panels A, B, and C show the results of the liquidity, capital, and ROE equations, respectively. The variables 
CARA/CARB/CARC Total, ROE Total, and LC1 Total are the estimated coefficients for the test that the sum of 
lagged terms (for bank capital, return on equity, and liquidity creation, respectively) is equal to 0. P-value is 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The Arellano-Bond 
(AB) test for serial correlation is based on the null hypothesis of second-order autocorrelation in the first 
differenced residuals. All control variables are included but not tabulated.  
 Large banks with TBTF banks  Large banks without TBTF banks 
Panel A: Liquidity creation   
CARA Total 0.594    0.347    
(0.285)    (0.251)   
CARB Total  0.893**    0.609  
  (0.020)    (0.204)  
CARC Total   0.494    0.418 
   (0.318)    (0.611) 
ROE Total 0.063 0.127** 0.071  0.035 0.065 0.014 
 (0.159) (0.029) (0.129)  (0.327) (0.159) (0.912) 
LC1 Total 1.053*** 1.040*** 1.055***  1.048*** 1.047*** 1.050***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AB test AR(2) 0.473 0.474 0.491  (0.337) 0.346 0.341 
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 6,342 6,401 6,140  6,208 6,266 6,010 
Panel B: Regulatory capital  
CARA Total 1.088***    1.100***    
(0.000)    (0.000)   
CARB Total  0.988***    0.957***  
  (0.000)    (0.000)  
CARC Total   1.076***    1.138*** 
   (0.000)    (0.000) 
ROE Total -0.026 -0.004 -0.010  0.081 -0.038 -0.125  
(0.938) (0.870) (0.974)  (0.538) (0.479) (0.401) 
LC1 Total -0.012 0.0002 -0.003  0.001 0.00003 -0.013*  
(0.515) (0.666) (0.849)  (0.519) (0.920) (0.096) 
AB test AR(2) 0.618 0.335 0.558  0.496 0.454 0.597 
Wald test 0.000 (0.000) 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 6,337 6,396 6,030  6,203 6,261 5,903 
Panel C: ROE   
CARA Total -0.025    -0.018   
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(0.566)    (0.776)   
CARB Total  -0.129    0.008  
  (0.365)    (0.950)  
CARC Total   -0.023    -0.074 
   (0.425)    (0.177) 
ROE Total 1.065*** 0.978*** 1.055***  1.098*** 1.038*** 1.171***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LC1 Total -0.027** -0.023** -0.027**  -0.009 -0.011** -0.009**  
(0.022) (0.036) (0.045)  (0.189) (0.034) (0.026) 
AB test AR(2) 0.549 0.550 0.632  0.588 0.314 0.157 
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 6,337 6,396 6,135  6,203 6,261 6,010 
 
2.5.3 Crisis vs. non-crisis periods  
Financial crises raise questions regarding how effectively banks can be disciplined during 
episodes of extraordinary stress and whether capital can absorb risk in terms of liquidity 
creation and affect bank performance. From a policy perspective, it is therefore important to 
ascertain whether the effects of capital differ during crisis and non-crisis periods. Table 2.7 
shows the regression results for all banks across sub-periods that can be characterized as 
normal, market crises, or banking crises.  
Beginning with the relationship between liquidity creation and capital, Panels A and B in 
Table 2.7 show that the positive bidirectional relationship holds only during normal sub-
periods. We find that this relationship disappears during market and banking crises. The results 
are consistent with Berger et al.’s (2012) findings that liquidity creation only responds to capital 
support during non-crisis years. One possible explanation for the disappeared linkage over crisis 
periods is that banks tend to reduce lending activities and lower liquidity creation. At the same 
time, banks are likely to experience losses and may attempt or be forced to sell assets to improve 
capital ratios. The interactions between liquidity creation and capital are therefore weaker 
 58 
during crisis periods relative to normal periods. Furthermore, the inexistent lead-lag effect of 
liquidity creation on capital during both market crises and banking crises may be attributable to 
the “too-many-to-fail” phenomenon. When the number of bank failures is large, financial 
regulators find it ex-post optimal to bail out every failed bank to reduce the social loss due to 
systemic risk. Expecting a bailout when all banks are failing together, the “too-many-to-fail” 
problem may give banks incentive to herd and reluctantly strengthen their capital base against 
the increase in bank illiquidity during a crisis.  
In addition, Panel C shows that the negative effects of liquidity creation and capital on 
bank performance are present during normal and banking crisis periods. These results 
emphasize the sensitivity of the interrelationships to sampling sub-periods.   
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Table 2.7: Results of VAR estimates over sub-periods 
This table presents the results of a system of VAR equations of bank capital, liquidity creation, and profitability for each period of market crisis (1998Q3-
1998Q4 and 2000Q2-2002Q3), banking crisis (2007Q3-2009Q4) and normal times (remaining quarters). We use three measures of capital: Tier-1 capital ratio 
(CARA), capital-to-assets ratio (CARB), and tangible common equity ratio (CARC). The measures of bank profitability and liquidity creation are ROE and 
“catfat” scaled by gross total assets, respectively. Panels A, B, and C show the results of the liquidity, capital, and ROE equations, respectively. The estimation 
method is the two-step GMM dynamic panel estimator with Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected standard errors. The variables CARA/CARB/CARC Total, ROE 
Total, and LC1 Total are the estimated coefficients for the test that the sum of lagged terms (for bank capital, ROE, and liquidity creation, respectively) are 
equal to 0. P-value is reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The Arellano-Bond (AB) test for serial 
correlation is based on the null hypothesis of second-order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals. All control variables are included but not tabulated. 
 
 Sub-periods 
Normal  Market crisis  Banking crisis 
Panel A: Liquidity creation      
CARA Total 0.205**    0.128**    -0.042    
(0.050)    (0.049)    (0.369)   
CARB Total  0.424**    0.646***    -0.085  
  (0.024)    (0.001)    (0.331)  
CARC Total   -0.133    -0.064    -0.038 
   (0.527)    (0.864)    (0.454) 
ROE Total 0.050 0.065 0.371  0.700* 1.004*** 0.467  0.189 0.248** 0.204 
 (0.544) (0.287) (0.778)  (0.073) (0.004) (0.533)  (0.283) (0.015) (0.281) 
LC1 Total 1.068*** 1.069*** 1.029***  1.027*** 1.021*** 1.022***  0.959*** 0.966*** 0.961***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AB test AR(2) 0.132 0.170 0.108  0.164 0.142 0.879  0.765 0.675 0.843 
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 177,251 177,293 164,584  55,426 55,462 55,678  49,543 49,549 49,543 
Panel B: Regulatory capital     
CARA Total 0.985***    0.983***    0.985***    
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
CARB Total  0.914***    0.997***    0.860***  
  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)  
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CARC Total   0.955***    0.988***    1.006*** 
   (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000) 
ROE Total -0.022** 0.004 0.033  -0.057 -0.108*** -0.206***  0.021 0.109* -0.051  
(0.019) (0.905) (0.106)  (0.444) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.469) (0.068) (0.322 ) 
LC1 Total 0.003** 0.009*** 0.008**  -0.001 0.003 -0.0002  0.004 -0.004 -0.005  
(0.018) (0.008) (0.049)  (0.902) (0.134) (0.986)  (0.372) (0.197) (0.526) 
AB test AR(2) 0.484 0.504 0.406  0.312 0.153 0.234  0.021 0.214 0.271 
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 177,838 177,293 164,535  55,426 55,462 55,426  49,543 49,549 49,543 
 Panel C: ROE      
CARA Total -0.633***    -0.061    -0.407***    
(0.000)    (0.731)    (0.004)   
CARB Total  -0.760***    -1.153**    -1.035***  
  (0.001)    (0.029)      (0.000)  
CARC Total   -0.250**    -0.126    -0.449*** 
   (0.012)    (0.131)    (0.000) 
ROE Total 0.213*** 0.256*** 0.409  -0.150 -0.153 -0.170  1.572*** 1.258*** 1.509***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.231)  (0.247) (0.409) (0.195)  (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
LC1 Total -0.099*** -0.238*** -0.008  -0.017** -0.007 -0.014**  -0.239*** -0.226*** -0.252***  
(0.001) (0.006) (0.134)  (0.047) (0.442) (0.035)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AB test AR(2) 0.547 0.572 0.562  0.451 0.118 0.597  0.384 0.465 0.518 
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 177,247 177,287 163,975  55,678 55,714 55,678  49,543 49,549 49,543 
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2.5.4 The effect of regulatory capital 
Banks are subject to minimum capital requirements. When a bank fails to maintain 
adequate capital standards, it may face mandatory restrictions on its activities and incur 
reputational costs from adverse market reactions. The regulatory requirements may therefore 
affect the interrelationships among liquidity creation, capital, and bank profitability. To 
estimate the effects of regulatory capital on liquidity creation and profitability, we split the 
sample banks into undercapitalized and adequately capitalized banks according to Saadaoui 
(2011). A bank is undercapitalized if its Tier-1 capital ratio (CARA) is less than the minimal 
Tier-1 regulatory threshold of 4% plus one standard deviation of its Tier-1 capital ratio. It is 
otherwise considered adequately capitalized.  
Panels A and B in Table 2.8 show that the positive bidirectional relationship between 
liquidity creation and capital applies only to adequately capitalized banks. A bank without 
sufficient regulatory capital is likely to be under financial distress with limited capacity to create 
liquidity. Conversely, an undercapitalized bank is less likely to create liquidity to boost its 
regulatory capital to the required level. It may either reduce risky assets to meet regulatory 
capital requirements or raise capital externally. Therefore, liquidity creation and capital may 
not be strongly interrelated in an undercapitalized bank.  
According to the trade-off theory of capital structure, a bank that moves toward the 
optimal debt-equity mix should increase its firm value. It follows that an undercapitalized bank 
that raises capital may improve bank performance, while an adequately capitalized bank with 
additional capital may lead to lower profitability. Panel C shows that—similar to the results 
reported earlier for the whole sample—the effects of capital and liquidity creation on ROE 
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remain negative for adequately capitalized banks. However, it is interesting to note that capital 
has a positive impact on bank profitability for undercapitalized banks. The opposite result for 
these two groups of banks appears to be consistent with the trade-off theory of capital structure.  
Table 2.8: Results of VAR estimates sorted by capitalization level 
This table presents the results of a system of VAR equations of bank capital, liquidity creation, and profitability 
separately for undercapitalized banks and adequately capitalized banks. A bank is considered undercapitalized if 
its Tier-1 capital ratio is less than the minimal Tier-1 regulatory threshold of 4% plus one standard deviation of its 
own Tier-1 capital ratio, and it is considered adequately capitalized otherwise. There are three measures of capital: 
Tier-1 capital ratio (CARA), capital-to-assets ratio (CARB), and tangible common equity ratio (CARC). The 
measures of bank profitability and liquidity creation are ROE and “catfat” scaled by gross total assets, respectively. 
Panels A, B, and C show the results of the liquidity, capital, and return on equity equations, respectively. The 
estimation method is the two-step GMM dynamic panel estimator with Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected standard 
errors. The variables CARA/CARB/CARC Total, ROE Total, and LC1 Total are the estimated coefficients for the 
test that the sum of lagged terms (for bank capital, return on equity, and liquidity creation, respectively) are equal 
to 0. P-value is reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
The Arellano-Bond (AB) test for serial correlation is based on the null hypothesis of second-order autocorrelation 
in the first differenced residuals. All control variables are included but not tabulated. 
 
 Adequately capitalized banks  Undercapitalized banks 
Panel A: Liquidity creation   
CARA Total 0.052**    0.123    
(0.026)    (0.154)   
CARB Total  0.213***    0.324  
  (0.000)    (0.905)  
CARC Total   0.094***    0.162* 
   (0.008)    (0.073) 
ROE Total 0.072*** 0.079*** 0.064***  0.018 0.203 0.034* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.008)  (0.335) (0.683) (0.054) 
LC1 Total 1.025*** 1.027*** 1.036***  0.941*** 1.03*** 0.958***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AB test AR(2) 0.165 0.139 0.225  0.517 0.618 0.508 
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 303,113 303,198 292,519  368,15 36,816 34,342 
Panel B: Regulatory capital   
CARA Total 1.006***    0.961***    
(0.000)    (0.000)   
CARB Total  0.985***    1.018***  
  (0.000)    (0.000)  
CARC Total   1.008***    0.957*** 
   (0.000)    (0.000) 
ROE Total -0.025*** 0.033*** -0.083**  0.041 0.013* 0.011  
(0.000) (0.003) (0.029)  (0.139) (0.077) (0.453) 
 63 
LC1 Total 0.003** 0.001** 0.003  -0.005 -0.001 -0.001  
(0.045) (0.023) (0.172)  (0.297) (0.289) (0.377) 
AB test AR(2) 0.193 0.330 0.270  0.309 0.375 0.696 
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 303,113 303,926 287,757  36,815 36,816 32,990 
Panel C: ROE   
CARA Total -0.222***    0.069***    
(0.000)    (0.003)   
CARB Total  -0.751***    0.246*  
  (0.000)    (0.096)  
CARC Total   -0.240***    0.062** 
   (0.000)    (0.018) 
ROE Total 0.137*** 0.178*** 0.076***  1.194*** 1.315*** 1.144***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LC1 Total -0.045*** -0.057*** -0.057***  -0.011 -0.017 -0.012**  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.175) (0.189) (0.040) 
AB test AR(2) 0.166 0.158 0.131  0.409 0.427 0.365 
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 303,109 303,192 292,515  36,815 36,816 34,342 
 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This study extends current literature with a comprehensive analysis of the joint 
differential impacts of regulatory capital and liquidity creation and their interrelationships with 
bank profitability. We document that the effect of regulatory capital on a bank’s capacity to 
create liquidity is not homogeneous across bank size, sample periods, capital measures, or level 
of regulatory capital. We find that the positive bidirectional relationship between liquidity 
creation and regulatory capital applies only to small banks and banks with higher regulatory 
capital and that this relationship holds true primarily during non-crisis periods.  
Overall, our finding of a negative relationship between liquidity creation and bank 
performance is consistent with the expected bankruptcy-cost hypothesis. However, the 
relationship between regulatory capital and bank performance is subject to a bank’s regulatory 
capital level. Increasing capital improves bank performance for lower capitalized banks but 
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weakens bank performance for higher capitalized banks. These results are consistent with the 
trade-off theory of capital structure, which argues that deviations from optimal capital structure 
affect bank performance.   
More importantly, our results raise important implications for current regulatory financial 
reforms. First, the positive bidirectional relationship between liquidity creation and regulatory 
capital for small banks suggests that an increase in capital requirements does not reduce a bank’s 
capacity to create liquidity. Second, lower capitalized banks should increase their regulatory 
capital, not only to reduce their default risk but also to enhance their performance. Large banks, 
which tend to have lower capital ratios, should therefore be required to hold higher regulatory 
capital. In contrast, there is less need to increase regulatory capital for smaller banks. In sum, 
our results caution against a one-size-fits-all approach to bank regulations and support measures 
that impose higher capital requirements on large and systemically important banks. 
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CHAPTER 3: EFFECTS OF COMPETITION AND REVENUE 
DIVERSIFICATION ON LIQUIDITY CREATION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Banks’ competitive behaviour and diversified strategies lie at the core of a rich body of 
literature due to their important roles in influencing bank stability and performance. The current 
debate revolves around whether competition and bank revenue diversification have a 
soundness-enhancing or soundness-destroying effect. For example, “competition-fragility” 
theories postulate that intensified competition can reduce bank profit margin and franchise 
value, incentivize banks to engage in excessive risk, and hence lead to more fragility (Keeley 
1990; Demsetz, Saidenberg & Strahan 1996; Jimenez, Lopez & Saurina 2008; Marcus 1984; 
Hellmann, Murdock & Stiglitz 2000; Repullo 2004; Allen & Gale 2000; Allen & Gale 2004b). 
Conversely, “competition-stability” theories advocate that less competition results in more 
fragility as stronger market power drives banks to charge higher loan interest rates. This makes 
it harder for borrowers to repay their loans, increasing banks’ portfolio risk and fragility (Boyd, 
De Nicolo & Jalal 2006; Boyd, De Nicolo & Jalal 2009; De Nicolo & Loukoianova 2007).  
The effect of revenue diversification on bank stability is similarly unclear. The well-
known portfolio theory suggests that revenue diversification into non-interest income activities 
helps banks reduce risk. However, recent studies found that a greater reliance on non-interest 
income hampers banks’ financial stability by increasing bank risk and earning stream volatility 
(DeYoung & Roland 2001; Stiroh 2004; Lepetit et al. 2008; Hidayat, Kakinaka & Miyamoto 
2012; Stiroh & Rumble 2006; Mercieca, Schaeck & Wolfe 2007). Despite these studies, the 
root effects of both competition and revenue diversification on bank stability is not yet fully 
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understood. In addition, most of the debate has focused on credit risk rather than illiquidity risk 
as a source of risk-taking behaviour and instability. 
The lack of existing research on the effect of competition and revenue diversification on 
illiquidity risk is surprising given that banks are subject to illiquidity risk when they perform 
their core function of liquidity creation in the economy. One of the preeminent functions of 
commercial banks is to create liquidity by satisfying the funding needs of economic entities in 
the form of loans and demandable deposits (Greenbaum & Thakor 2007). They provide 
solutions to a number of market frictions that prevent direct liquidity flows from entities with 
excess liquidity (depositors) to entities in need of liquidity (borrowers). These market frictions 
include informational asymmetries, contracting costs, and scale mismatches between liquidity 
suppliers and liquidity demanders (DeYoung & Rice 2004). The more banks create liquidity, 
the more they are exposed to the risk of being unable to meet unexpected withdrawals from 
customers. The recent subprime crisis clearly illustrated the liquidity risk arising from 
shortcomings in bank funding and liquidity management. 
Given the key function of banks as liquidity creators, the resulting illiquidity risks and 
divergent views on the impact of market power and revenue diversification on financial 
stability, the main goal of this paper is to empirically investigate how bank competition interacts 
with revenue diversification in shaping the liquidity creation behaviours of individual banks. In 
particular, we provide an empirical assessment of theories concerning the impact of both 
competition and revenue diversification on liquidity creation.11 This study also analyses the 
possibility that these relationships are dependent on banks’ institutional, regulatory, and crisis 
                                                 
11 Horváth, Seidler and Weill (2016) focuses solely on the competition-liquidity creation relationship and uses the 
conventional Lerner index as the only proxy for bank competition. 
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environments. Third, we investigate the extent to which competition and diversification impact 
bank stability through the liquidity creation channel. We achieve this objective by repeating the 
analysis separately for two different groups of banks based on their level of net stable funding 
ratio (NSFR) measure under Basel III.12 Liquidity creation does not necessarily hamper bank 
stability as long as banks maintain an adequate level of stable funding in relation to their on- 
and off-balance sheet activities. In this scenario, banks have the capacity to repay the liabilities 
claimed on demand without selling assets at a loss, thus reducing the likelihood that their 
liquidity creation role increases the risk of bank failure and broader systemic stress. In contrast 
to Berger and Bouwman’s (2009) liquidity creation measure that is assumed to increase with 
bank illiquidity and transformation risk, the NSFR measure reflects the threshold beyond which 
a bank is likely to face difficulties due to its inability to absorb transformation risks (Angora & 
Roulet 2011). We adopt a comprehensive set of variables as a proxy for bank liquidity creation, 
competition, and diversification, in addition to a large variety of different sub-samples and 
robustness tests. Specifically, we employ comprehensive Call Report data, which provides 
detailed bank-level information not available in the Bankscope database.13 As a result, our 
findings are based on actual maturities, not assumptions of maturities.  
Our study matters for banking theory because it provides new insights on whether 
liquidity creation is the single channel though which competition and diversification can affect 
                                                 
12 Under Basel III, NSFR is defined as the ratio of the available amount of stable funding to the amount of required 
stable funding, which is required to be at least 100% on an on-going basic. It is designed to “promote longer-term 
funding of the assets and activities of banking organizations by establishing a minimum acceptable amount of 
stable funding based on the liquidity of an institution’s assets and activities over a one-year horizon” (BCBS 2010, 
p. 22). The two groups of banks that we consider are those that fulfil the liquidity requirement (NSFR ≥ 100%) 
and those that do not (NSFR < 100%).  
13 In particular, Call Reports distinguish time deposits, borrowed money, broker deposits, loans, and leases 
according to maturity, enabling us to calculate various liquidity creation measures to make the findings more robust 
(“mat” vs “fat” measures) and NSFR measures. Call Reports also offer a decomposition of non-interest income, 
while Bankscope does not.   
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financial stability. This is important for bank managers, regulators, and financial economists. 
To illustrate, a negative effect of bank competition and revenue diversification on liquidity 
creation (if any) would benefit the stability of the banking system by reducing illiquidity risk 
and banks failures. A reduction in created liquidity, however, would not spur economic growth. 
This important trade-off, therefore, needs to be carefully considered when banks set their 
strategic liquidity creation, liquidity risk management, and diversification policies.  
We base our empirical analyses on several theoretical keystones. First, the well-known 
“competition-fragility” theories suggest that market powers lead to higher franchise or charter 
value, thus associating with higher financial distress costs when bank runs occur (Marcus 1984; 
Keeley 1990; Hellmann, Murdock & Stiglitz 2000; Repullo 2004; Allen & Gale 2000; Allen & 
Gale 2004b). Banks operating in less competitive market thus have more incentives to behave 
prudently and accordingly create less liquidity to protect themselves against bank runs. Second, 
in less completive markets, unfavourable price and non-price terms are more likely to be 
imposed on banks’ customers (Berger 1995a; Garmaise & Moskowitz 2006; Carbo-Valverde, 
Rodriguez Fernandez & Udell 2009; Hannan 1991; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic 2004; 
Hainz, Weill & Godlewski 2013). This reduces demand for loans and deposits, which in turn 
results in lower liquidity. Collectively referred to as the “financial fragility-pricing” theories, 
this strand of literature argues that competition has a positive effect on liquidity creation.  
However, other authors pose an opposing view on the impact of competition on liquidity 
creation. An increase in competition erodes bank profit margins and capital buffers against 
liquidity shock (Keeley 1990). As suggested by the “risk absorption” theory (Berger & 
Bouwman 2009), lower risk-bearing capacity restricts bank liquidity creation to the economy. 
Carletti and Leonello (2014) have argued that loans are more profitable in less competitive 
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markets because market power allows banks to raise interest rates on loans. The opportunity 
costs of banks holding liquid assets (reserves) are higher in term of foregone return on the loans. 
As a result, these banks would prefer to resort to the interbank market to obtain additional 
liquidity rather than maintain a large buffer stock of liquid assets. They would invest more in 
loans and create more liquidity. In addition, banks with market power are more likely to build 
continued lending relationships that help reduce information asymmetry. This improves banks’ 
capacity to screen and monitor their borrowers, hence allowing them to extend loans (Petersen 
& Rajan 1995). These arguments collectively refer to the “risk absorption-opportunity costs-
lending relationship” effect, which predicts a negative relationship between competition and 
liquidity creation.  
In the same line of argument as the “risk absorption” theory, revenue diversification,  
associated with increased bank risk, volatile earning streams, and exacerbated bank instability, 
may reduce a bank’s incentives to create more liquidity in order to protect itself against the 
threat of bank runs and liquidity crises (Demsetz & Strahan 1997; DeYoung & Roland 2001; 
Stiroh 2004; Lepetit et al. 2008; Hidayat, Kakinaka & Miyamoto 2012; Stiroh & Rumble 2006; 
Mercieca, Schaeck & Wolfe 2007). In contrast, a lower level of capitalization resulting from a 
reliance on non-interest income activities is expected to be associated with higher liquidity 
creation based on the “financial fragility and crowding-out” hypothesis. In essence, it is argued 
that because diversified sources of income allow banks to maintain lower capital ratios and raise 
more deposits, which are more liquid than capital, diversification is likely to increase a bank’s 
capacity to create liquidity.  
In addressing the research questions, we estimate dynamic panel models in a generalized 
method of moments (GMM) framework on unbalanced panel data from U.S. banks over the 
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2001-2013 period. GMM estimations allow us to address endogeneity, as well as the 
heterogeneity issue relating to potential correlations between the lagged dependent variables 
and the error terms.  
In selecting an appropriate sample, we were attracted to the U.S. banking system because 
of its unique history of banking regulation. First, the restrictions on geographic expansion of 
banking operations within and across state borders have relaxed since the passage of the Rigel-
Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. Second, the introduction of the 
U.S. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 removed barriers between commercial and investment 
banks to facilitate underwriting and agency activities in securities and insurance. The removal 
of bank barriers has promoted mergers and acquisitions, facilitated competition, and 
encouraged U.S. banks to implement revenue diversification strategies in order to improve their 
future cash flows and franchise values (Huang 2008). In addition, U.S. commercial banks are 
also required to comply with the international standards of the Basel III framework and its new 
liquidity rules proposed in late 2010 by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. As a 
result, the U.S. banking system offers an interesting environment for investigating how banks’ 
liquidity creation behaviour responds to a drastically changing environment in terms of 
competition and emerging non-traditional revenue activities. 
 The key findings of the study can be summarized as follows: First, we find that banks 
appear to increase liquidity creation when they are faced with competitive pressures and 
diversified in their income sources. However, competition adversely impacts the positive effect 
of diversification on liquidity creation and vice versa. Our findings are consistent across all 
measures of competition and diversification and support the “financial fragility” hypothesis. 
Second, we find that the positive effect of competition on liquidity creation is greater for banks 
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with low credit risks, those that operate in micropolitan markets, and those with interstate 
branches. Third, when non-interest income is decomposed into its four components of fiduciary 
income, service charges, trading income, and fee and other non-interest income, we find that 
banks’ enhanced capacity to create liquidity is primarily driven by increases in fiduciary and 
other income. In contrast, an increase in service income is related to lower liquidity creation. 
Fourth, with the exception of savings banks, the favourable effect of revenue diversification on 
banks’ ability to create liquidity is present in all bank types and sizes. However, the results 
strongly suggest that bank size, the financial crisis period, and bank types are important drivers 
in the competition-liquidity creation nexus. Most notably, competition has opposite impacts on 
liquidity creation for small banks (positive relationship) and large banks (negative relationship). 
We argue that the “risk absorption-opportunity cost” effect tends to dominate the “financial 
fragility” effect for large banks, while the latter tends to apply more strongly in small banks. 
Finally, we find that competition only affects liquidity creation in banks that fulfil the Basel III 
NSFR liquidity requirement. The impact of revenue diversification on liquidity creation only 
exists for banks that are yet to meet the liquidity requirement. Our analysis suggests that 
diversification strategies can promote economic development through strengthening banks’ 
ability to provide more liquidity to the market and corporate borrowers without incurring 
excessive illiquidity risk. However, for banks with NSFR <100%, the intensity of competition 
that leads to excessive liquidity creation may have adverse implications given the existing 
liquidity health of these banks.  
Our findings indicate that from a policy perspective commercial banks, regardless of their 
size, should diversify their revenue sources with a focus on fiduciary and fee income share. Our 
findings also suggest that policymakers and regulators should be cautious about a one-size-fits-
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all approach to monitoring competition. Particularly, they should take into account the 
heterogeneity of liquidity conditions across different banks to avoid excessive illiquidity risks.  
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 provides the theoretical 
background and hypothesis development for our analysis. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 describe the 
methodology and data, respectively. Section 3.5 presents our empirical results, and the last 
section concludes the chapter.  
3.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
The existing empirical liquidity creation literature has confirmed the important role of 
bank capital on liquidity creation. Nevertheless, the direct effect of bank competition and 
diversification, independently or jointly, on liquidity creation is somewhat lacking. Similarly, 
while the competition and revenue diversification effects on bank financial stability through 
risk taking incentives, bank earnings, and efficiency channels are well established in literature, 
the same does not apply to liquidity creation.  
This section reviews the most relevant literature and, more importantly, develops new 
testable hypotheses with respect to competition and revenue diversification as major 
determinants of liquidity creation. 
3.2.1 Impact of competition on bank liquidity creation  
The importance of banks’ market power in liquidity creation was first documented in 
Berger and Bouwman (2009). They found that market power is positively related to liquidity 
creation, although this relationship is primarily confined to small banks. Horváth, Seidler and 
Weill (2016) similarly found that increased bank competition reduces liquidity because it leads 
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to the financial fragility of banks, which incentivizes them to reduce their lending and deposit 
activities. 
Market competition can affect the amount of liquidity created by banks in various ways. 
Previous studies have shown that demand-side lending interest rates (Berger 1995a) and supply-
side credit availability (Persen & Rajan 1995) are affected by the concentration of the bank 
credit market. Loan portfolios, lending relationships to borrowers, risk-taking behaviour, and 
capital buffers are also found to be significantly different between more competitive banks and 
less competitive banks. Thus, competition may also affect banks’ ability to create liquidity 
through the amount and types of loans banks extend and the way they fund their activities. 
Based on the financial stability literature, we develop opposing predictions for the direction of 
the relationship between competition and liquidity creation. In particular, the hypothesized 
relationship is developed through five main channels: “fragility”, “pricing”, “opportunity cost 
of holding reserve”, “risk absorption”, and “lending relationship”. 
H1. Competition positively affects liquidity creation.  
The positive impact of bank competition on bank liquidity creation is suggested based on 
two sets of theories. The first, that higher competition can encourage excessive risk taking of 
banks resulting in more fragility (Marcus 1984; Keeley 1990; Hellmann, Murdock & Stiglitz 
2000; Repullo 2004; Allen & Gale 2000; Allen & Gale 2004b), is generally referred to as the 
“competition- fragility” view. According to Keeley (1990), because a lower franchise value will 
result in lower opportunity costs when bankruptcy occurs, banks in high competitive conditions 
tend to behave less prudently and choose more risky investments. Bank risk-taking behaviour 
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and moral hazard incentives manifest through an expansion of both the volume of loans granted 
and deposits accepted, despite an increase in illiquidity risk.  
The second set of theories supporting a positive link between competition and bank 
liquidity creation is based on banks’ “pricing channels”. The basic idea is that banks operating 
in less competitive environments tend to take advantage of their market power by charging a 
higher lending rate, offering lower deposit rates, and imposing less beneficial non-price terms 
on their borrowers (Berger 1995a; Garmaise & Moskowitz 2006). This consequently mitigates 
the demand for loans and deposits, which in turn leads banks to provide less liquidity creation. 
Carbo-Valverde, Rodriguez Fernandez and Udell (2009) and Hannan (1991) have provided 
empirical evidence for the negative movement between competition and lending rates. Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic  (2004) and Hainz, Weill and Godlewski (2013) similarly 
found the co-existence of increased bank concentration and increased financing obstacles and 
collateral requirements. SMEs are also reported to experience financing constraints due to bank 
market power (Ryan, O’Toole & McCann 2014).  
H2. Competition negatively affects liquidity creation.  
The “risk absorption” theory developed by Berger and Bouwman (2009), advocates for a 
negative relationship between competition and liquidity creation. In this framework, increased 
competition is argued to result in a decline in bank profit margins and bank capital buffers 
(Keeley 1990). When the level of capital, which normally acts as a “buffer” against external 
economic and liquidity shocks, is low, banks tend to behave more prudently and create less 
liquidity due to the lower risk-bearing capacity. They would prefer to keep a large volume of 
liquid assets such as cash and securities on the asset side of their balance sheet as another 
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“buffer” to protect themselves against the risk of large liquidity shocks, which in turn restricts 
their ability to create more liquidity.14  
Alternatively, Carletti and Leonello (2014) analysed the impact of credit market 
competition on incentives to hold liquidity reserves though its effect on loan profitability and 
asset prices. They argue that when market competition is intense, loans are less profitable due 
to lower lending rates and the decreased opportunity cost of banks to hold liquid assets 
(reserves). As a result, banks find it optimal to maintain a buffer stock of liquid assets to repay 
the deposits that are claimed on demand in both bull and bear market conditions. When 
competition is low, the opportunity cost of holding buffer reserves increases, leading banks to 
use the interbank market to obtain additional liquidity. Banks accordingly invest more in loans 
and create more liquidity.  
Furthermore, in more competitive environments, banks have less incentive to properly 
screen borrowers. They are also reluctant to establish long-term relationships with new 
borrowers because they earn less information rent from the relationship that could create future 
surpluses (Allen & Gale 2000, 2004b). Conversely, banks with high market power are likely to 
build up continuing lending relationships and reduce the information asymmetry problem 
(Petersen & Rajan 1995). This improves banks’ capacity to screen and monitor their borrowers, 
hence allowing them to extend loans.  
                                                 
14 The underlying assumption is that a bank cannot accommodate liquidity shocks simply by raising new external 
finance on short notice, and/or it is very costly to raise external finance unexpectedly.  
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3.2.2 Impact of revenue diversification on bank liquidity creation 
Diversification of income is a strategy focusing on other sources of income apart from 
traditional net interest income. The shift from traditional bank lending activities toward non-
interest income-related activities leads to changes in the structure of on-balance sheet and off-
balance sheet items. Therefore, the amount of liquidity created from banks adopting a more 
diversified strategy may differ from those who do not diversify (Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga 
2010). We postulate that revenue diversification affects liquidity creation through both risk and 
capital channels.  
H3. Revenue diversification reduces bank liquidity creation.  
A large stream of research focuses on the impact of revenue diversification on bank 
stability and risk. Diversified income sources are traditionally believed to stabilize overall 
operating income, thus generating more stable streams of profit and capital inflow.15 The 
expansion into non-interest income activities fosters banks’ resilience to financial distress by 
diversifying away risk (Chiorazzo, Milani & Salvini 2008; Smith, Staikouras & Wood 2003). 
However, this has been challenged by recent studies that lend support to the view that non-
interest income activities are more likely to cause volatile revenue streams, thus increasing bank 
risk and instability (DeYoung & Roland 2001; Stiroh 2004; Lepetit et al. 2008; Hidayat, 
Kakinaka & Miyamoto 2012; Stiroh & Rumble 2006; Mercieca, Schaeck & Wolfe 2007; and 
DeJonghe 2010). If the positive link between non-interest income and bank risk exists and the 
                                                 
15 This view is based on the assumption of non-correlation or imperfect correlation between non-interest income 
and interest income activities. 
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risk absorption hypothesis holds, we expect that financial institutions with diversified revenue 
sources are incentivized to reduce liquidity creation to mitigate the threat of bank runs.  
Compared to traditional banking activities, the reliance on non-interest income could be 
associated with lower capital ratios (i.e., higher leverage) because capital is not required for 
many fee-based activities, as well as some off-balance sheet activities such as derivatives and 
trust services (DeYoung & Rice 2004; Demsetz & Strahan 1997). According to the risk 
absorption hypothesis of Berger and Bouwman (2009), banks with lower capitalization are less 
able to absorb illiquidity shocks and therefore less likely to create liquidity. In summary, a 
negative relationship between revenue diversification and liquidity creation is expected under 
the “risk absorption” hypothesis.  
H4. Revenue diversification allows banks to create more liquidity. 
Many non-interest income activities are not subject to capital adequacy requirements. As 
a result, diversified sources of income allow banks to maintain a lower level of capital and raise 
more deposits. Considered in conjunction with the “financial fragility and crowding-out” 
hypothesis, which postulates that bank capital mitigates financial fragility and “crowds out” 
deposits for funding purposes in an unsegmented capital market (Diamond & Rajan 2000; 
Diamond & Rajan 2001a; Gorton & Winton 2000), diversification strategies are likely to 
increase banks’ capacity as liquidity creators.  
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Model framework 
This study employs the dynamic panel data model suggested by Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (2000) to investigate the relationships among bank competition, 
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revenue diversification, and liquidity creation. We first investigate the individual effects of 
competition and revenue diversification on liquidity by estimating the following equations: 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡, 𝑍𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡              (3.1) 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡, 𝑍𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                         (3.2) 
We then examine the impact of regulatory and institutional frameworks on the 
competition/revenue diversification and liquidity creation relationship through extended 
models specified as follows: 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡, 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡×
𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡, 𝑍𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                            (3.3) 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡, 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡, 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡×
𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡, 𝑍𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                    (3.4) 
Finally, we examine whether competition and revenue diversification jointly affect 
liquidity creation by introducing an interaction term to the baseline regression model. In 
particular, we estimate the following equation: 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡, 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡×
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡, 𝑍𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                   (3.5) 
In Eqs. (3.1)-(3.5), our dependent variable is liquidity creation measured by the preferred 
“catfat” measure, advocated by Berger and Bouwman (2009), scaled by total assets. The main 
explanatory variables of interest are bank competition and bank revenue diversification. 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is 
a set of bank-specific control variables. 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is a set of dummy variables that capture the 
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influence of location and regulatory and institutional frameworks on liquidity creation. i and t 
denote bank i and year t, respectively. We include the time-fixed effects in all regressions to 
account for time-specific features. Descriptions of each variable are reported in Table 3.1 and 
discussed in more detail in Section 3.3.2.  
These regressions are estimated using the two-step system GMM with the robust standard 
error of Windmeijer (2005). As aforementioned in Section 2.4.3, this framework is employed 
to deal with the potential problem of endogeneity and heteroskedasticity among variables. We 
instrument for all regressors, while the variables treated as endogenous are liquidity creation 
and capital ratio. To examine the validity of the instruments, we adopt the Hansen’s test for 
over-identifying restrictions in addition to the Arellano-Bond (AB) serial correlation test.  
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Table 3.1: Variable definitions  
Variables Acronym Description Values 
Main 
variables 
      
Liquidity 
creation 
CATFAT Dollar amount of “catfat” liquidity creation normalized by real total assets. The “catfat” 
measure classifies loans based on category and includes off-balance sheet activities.  
High values indicate a high 
level of liquidity creation.  
CATNONFAT Dollar amount of “catnonfat” liquidity creation normalized by real total assets. The 
“catnonfat” measure classifies loans by category but excludes off-balance sheet activities.  
MATFAT Dollar amount of “matfat” liquidity creation normalized by real total assets. The “matfat” 
measure classifies loans by maturity and includes off-balance sheet activities.  
  MATNONFAT Dollar amount of “matnonfat” liquidity creation normalized by real total assets. The 
“matnonfat” measure classifies loans by maturity but excludes off-balance sheet activities. 
Competition  LERNER The conventional Lerner index captures a bank's pricing power by measuring the mark-up 
of price over marginal costs expressed as a percentage of price.   
Higher values indicate high 
market power and less 
competitive behaviour.  LERNER_ADJ The funding-adjusted Lerner index is free of any deposit market distortions such as 
monopoly power in deposit markets, which can be reflected in the conventional Lerner 
index.  
H-STAT The Panzar-Rosse H-statistic measures the sum of the elasticity of revenue with respect to 
the input price. 
High values of H-statistics 
indicate a more 
competitive market. These 
range from -∞ to 1. A value 
of one represents perfect 
competition; competition 
disappears when H-
statistics fall below 0.  
HHI_LOAN Bank-level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of loan concentration for the local market in 
which the bank is operating. The local market is defined as the state in which the 
headquarters of a bank is located. 
Higher values indicate high 
local market power and 
less competition. 
 
HHI _DEPOSIT Bank-level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of deposit concentration for the local market in 
which the bank is operating. The local market is defined as the state in which the 
headquarters of a bank is located. 
Revenue 
diversification 
NON The non-interest income share is the ratio of non-interest income to net operating income. 
 
 
FIDUCIARY The fiduciary income share is the ratio of fiduciary income to net operating income. 
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TRADING The trading income share is the ratio of trading income to net operating income. 
 
 
SERVICES The service charge share is the ratio of service charges to net operating income. 
 
 OTHERS The fees & other non-interest income share is the ratio of fee and other non-interest 
income to net operating income. 
 
 
DIV Revenue diversification is measured as 𝐷𝑖𝑣 = 1 −  |𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒−𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒|
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
 High values indicate more 
diversified revenue. This 
ranges between 0 and 1.  
  HHI_REV The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index accounts for diversification between non-interest 
income and interest income related activities, which is defined as 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑅𝑒𝑣 =
( 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
)
2
+ ( 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
)
2
 
As the HHI rises, the bank 
becomes more 
concentrated and less 
revenue is diversified. 
Control Variables 
Bank size LN(GTA) Log natural of real total assets 
 
Bank capital 
ratio 
CAPITAL Total equity capital divided by total assets  
 
Bank 
profitability 
ROA Return on assets: Net income divided by average total assets 
 
Bank risk ROASD The standard deviation of a bank's return on assets calculated over the last three years 
 
 
CR1 Ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans 
 
Asset 
composition 
CR2 Average total loan/total assets (averaged quarterly) 
 
Dummy variables 
 
BHC status OBHC A dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is a member of a one-bank holding company 
 
 
MULBHC A dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is a member of a multibank holding company 
 
Location METRO A dummy variable that equals 1 if the local market in which a bank’s offices are located is 
in a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and 0 otherwise 
 
Bank charter 
 
FEDCHRTR A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a bank is chartered by an agent of the 
federal government 
 
Interstate 
Branches 
Crisis 
STMULT 
 
CRISIS 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a bank has branches that can accept FDIC-
insured deposits in more than one state (has interstate branches) 
 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the financial crisis period from 2007 to 
2010 
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3.3.2 Variable definitions 
3.3.2.1 Liquidity creation measures 
We construct four liquidity creation measures (scaled by total assets) following the 
methodology of Berger and Bouwman (2009): “catfat”, “matfat”, “catnonfat”, and “matnonfat”. 
The measures differ depending on whether we classify loans based on category or maturity (“cat” 
versus “mat”) and include or exclude off-balance sheet activities (“fat” versus “nonfat”).16 First, a 
bank’s assets, liabilities, and off-balance sheet activities other than loans are classified as liquid, 
semiliquid, or illiquid items by combining information on product category and maturity. Due to 
data limitations, loans are classified as liquid, semiliquid, or illiquid items entirely by category 
(cat) or maturity (mat). Appendix 1 lists the balance sheet and off-balance sheet items for each of 
the three categories. These items are then assigned different weights. The liquidity creation 
measures, “catfat” and “matfat”, which include off-balance sheet items, are calculated as follows: 
𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑡 = 0.5[𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠(𝑐𝑎𝑡) + 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑠] +
0[𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠(𝑐𝑎𝑡) + 𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑠] −
0.5[𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑠 +
𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠]                                                                                                (3.6) 
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑎𝑡 = 0.5[𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠(𝑚𝑎𝑡) + 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠] +
0[𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠(𝑚𝑎𝑡) + 𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠] − 0.5[𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 +
𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦]                                                                   (3.7) 
                                                 
16 In Chapter 2, we use the “Quarterly Bank Liquidity Creation Data” from the website of Christa H.S Bouwman from 
which two measures of liquidity creation (i.e., “catfat” and “catnonfat”) are available.  In this chapter, all four measures 
of liquidity creation are self-constructed using Call Report data.  
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Liquidity creation measures without off-balance sheet items, “catnonfat” and “matnonfat”, are 
estimated as follows: 
𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑎𝑡 = 0.5[𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠(𝑐𝑎𝑡) + 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠] + 0[𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠(𝑐𝑎𝑡) +
𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠] − 0.5[𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦]                 (3.8) 
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑎𝑡 = 0.5[𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠(𝑚𝑎𝑡) + 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠] +
0[𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠(𝑚𝑎𝑡) + 𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠] − 0.5[𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 +
𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦]                                                        (3.9) 
All liquidity creation measures are normalized by total assets. Following Berger and 
Bouwman (2009), we use “catfat” (scaled by total assets) as our preferred measure in all 
regressions, while alternative measures are employed in robustness checks.  
3.3.2.2 Competition measures 
There are three common measures of competition frequently used in bank competition 
literature. First, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index measure of market concentration is based on a 
traditional industrial organization (IO) approach. The “structure-conduct-performance” paradigm 
justifies the application of the HH concentration index, because a concentrated market is more 
likely to facilitate less competitive behaviour, allowing banks to over-price their products and 
services. The traditional IO approach tests the market structure to assess bank competition. 
However, it fails to capture market contestability and is only measured at the country level (Berger 
et al. 2004; Berger, Klapper & Turk-Ariss 2009).17 A new empirical IO approach, on the other 
hand, provides non-structural tests and direct measures of bank pricing behaviour. These measures 
                                                 
17 In a contestable market, bank behaviour is determined by the threat of entry and exit. Even in a concentrated market, 
banks are pressurised to behave competitively in an environment characterised by low entry and exit restrictions.  
 84 
include the Panzar and Rosse H-statistic measure of bank competition and the Lerner index 
measure of bank market power. In this study, we employ both structural and non-structural 
measures of competition to examine the effect of competition on liquidity creation. Specially, five 
different competition measures are used: two specifications of the Lerner index (conventional 
Lerner and funding adjusted Lerner), H-statistic, HHI loan concentration, and HHI deposit 
concentration. With the exception of the H-statistic, higher index values indicate a higher degree 
of market power and concentration, hence a lack of competition. Higher values of the H-statistic, 
on the other hand, imply a strong competitive environment.  
Our first measure of competition is the conventional Lerner index, which has been utilized 
in a number of recent banking studies.18 This measure represents the mark-up of output price over 
marginal cost, calculated as follows:  
𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = (𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡)/𝑃𝑖𝑡                                                                     (3.10) 
Where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the price of assets, measured as the ratio of total bank revenue over total assets 
for bank i at time t, 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 is marginal cost, which is obtained from an estimated translog cost 
function with respect to output for bank i at time t. In order to derive 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡, we first estimate the 
following translog cost function using a fixed effect model with robust standard errors to control 
for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and serial correlation:19 
                                                 
18 See Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss (2009), Anginer et al. (2014), Beck et al. (2013), Turk-Ariss (2010), Amidu 
and Wolfe (2013), and Fu, Lin and Molyneux (2014). 
19 To test whether the fixed effects model is appropriate, we apply a series of specification tests. First, F-text (fixed 
effects) and Breusch-Pagan LM test (random effects) reject the pooled OLS in favour of individual effects. The 
Hausman test then suggests fixed-effect estimations. Third, the time-fixed effect test suggests the need for the 
inclusion of time-fixed effects in the regression.  
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log(𝐶𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1× log(𝑄𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2× log(𝑄𝑖𝑡
2) + 𝛽3× log(𝑊1,𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4× log(𝑊2,𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝛽5× log(𝑊3,𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝛽6× log(𝑄𝑖𝑡) × log(𝑊1,𝑖𝑡) +𝛽7× log(𝑄𝑖𝑡)
× log(𝑊2,𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽8× log(𝑄𝑖𝑡) × log(𝑊3,𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽9× log(𝑊1,𝑖𝑡
2) + 𝛽10× log(𝑊2,𝑖𝑡
2)
+ 𝛽11× log(𝑊3,𝑖𝑡
2) + 𝛽12× log(𝑊1,𝑖𝑡) × log(𝑊2,𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝛽13× log(𝑊1,𝑖𝑡) × log(𝑊3,𝑖𝑡) +𝛽14× log(𝑊2,𝑖𝑡) × log(𝑊3,𝑖𝑡) + 𝛾×𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                (3.11) 
Where  𝐶𝑖𝑡 is total operating costs and 𝑄𝑖𝑡  is bank output, measured as bank total assets. 𝑊1,𝑖𝑡, 
𝑊2,𝑖𝑡, and 𝑊3,𝑖𝑡 represent the input price of labour (the ratio of personnel expenses over total 
assets), the input price of funds (the ratio of interest expenses over total deposits), and the input 
price of fixed capital (the ratio of administrative and other operating expenses over total assets), 
respectively. i and t denote bank i and year t, respectively. Time-fixed effects are needed to capture 
changes in technological and economic development overtime. Input price homogeneity of degree 
one and standard symmetry restrictions are also required. Therefore, the following restrictions are 
imposed: 
𝛽3 + 𝛽4 + 𝛽5 = 1,  𝛽6 + 𝛽7 + 𝛽8 = 0,  𝛽9 + 𝛽12 + 𝛽13 = 0, 𝛽10 + 𝛽12 + 𝛽14 = 0, 𝛽11 + 𝛽13 +
𝛽14 = 0                                    (3.12) 
Using coefficients estimated from Eq. (3.6), marginal costs 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 are then calculated as: 
𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 =
𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑄𝑖𝑡
×[𝛽1 + 2×𝛽2× log(𝑄𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽6× log(𝑊1,𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽7× log(𝑊2,𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽8× log(𝑊3,𝑖𝑡)]                                
                     (3.13) 
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Maudos and Guevara (2007) and Turk-Ariss (2010) have suggested that including financing 
costs (W2) in the translog cost function may produce biased results because this variable may 
already incorporate some form of deposit market power, for example, banks’ ability to raise funds 
at a lower cost. In fact, bank loans are priced based not only on the bank funding costs and risk 
premium related to loan contracts but also a premium that reflects bank market power. As a result, 
following Turk-Ariss (2010), we further employ the funding-adjusted Lerner index 
(LERNER_ADJ) as an improved version of the Lerner index. In particular, we re-estimate Eq. 
(3.11) with the exclusion of the cost of funds. By including only the operating costs (W1) and the 
price of fixed capital (W3) in the translog cost function, we obtain a “raw” or “clean” proxy for 
pricing power that is free from market power distortions in the deposit market. We apply the 
adjusted marginal cost (𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡) measure to Eq. (3.10) to derive a funding adjusted Lerner index.  
Our third measure of competition is the H-statistic based on Panzar and Rosse’s (1987) 
methodology. This measure is defined as the elasticity of revenue with respect to each input price 
used in the production of banking services. We follow Moch (2013) and Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
and Zhu (2014) to estimate the following reduced-form revenue regression using fixed effects 
estimation for each state: 20 
ln(𝑇𝐼𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1× ln(𝑊1,𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2× ln(𝑊2,𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3× ln(𝑊3,𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4× ln(𝑊4,𝑖𝑡) + 𝛾1×
ln(𝑌1,𝑖𝑡) + 𝛾2× ln(𝑌2,𝑖𝑡) + 𝛾3× ln(𝑌3,𝑖𝑡) + 𝛾4× ln(𝑌4,𝑖𝑡) + 𝛿×𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡            (3.14) 
                                                 
20 The F-text (fixed effects), Breusch-Pagan LM test (random effects), and Hausman test suggest fixed effect 
estimation in favour of random effect and pooled OLS. Because there is a presence of heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation, we employ robust standard errors to control for these problems.  
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Where 𝑇𝐼𝑖𝑡 is total income of bank i at time t. 𝑊1, 𝑊2, and 𝑊3 are the input price of labour, funds, 
and fixed capital as defined in Eq. (3.11). 𝑊4 is input price for equity calculated as pre-tax profit 
over total equity. 𝑌1, 𝑌2, 𝑌3, and 𝑌4 are the loans to total assets ratio, deposits to total deposits and 
short-term funds ratio, equity to total assets ratio, loans impairment charges to total loans ratio, 
respectively. 
Following Moch (2013), we use total income (TI) as opposed to interest income as the 
dependent variable to acknowledge the growing importance of non-interest income sources. Moch 
(2013) also suggests the inclusion of input price for equity in the revenue function because capital 
adequacy rules limit outstanding credit, thus crowding out opportunities to generate interest 
income. A set of bank-level exogenous factors, namely loans to total assets ratio, deposits to total 
deposits and short-term funds ratio, equity to total asset ratio, loans impairment charges to total 
loans ratio, are also included in a bank’s revenue function.  
The H-statistic is calculated as the sum of all factor price elasticities, i.e., 𝛽𝑠. The H-statistic 
has values in the range of negative infinity to 1. A value of 1 indicates perfect competition, a value 
below 0 represents a monopoly, and a value between 0 and 1 indicates monopolistic competition. 
As in Olivero, Li and Jeon (2011), we interpret the H-statistic estimate as a continuous measure of 
competition, with high values indicating stronger competition.  
Finally, bank loan and deposit concentration (HHI_LOAN and HHI_DEPOSIT) are 
employed as alternative proxies for bank competition. Bank concentration is approximated by the 
Herfindahl-Hirchman Index (HHI), which is the sum of deposit/loan market share of each bank in 
a system and calculated at the U.S. state level.  
Among five measures, the funding Lerner index is employed as our primary competition 
measure for the following reasons: First, it does not assume that concentration is negatively 
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correlated to competition. It also does not depend on precise definitions of geographical markets 
(Horváth, Seidler & Weill 2016; Aghion et al. 2005). Second, unlike alternative non-structural 
measures such as the H-statistic, Lerner indexes do not require the banking system to be in long-
run equilibrium, which is not always the case in practice (Schaeck & Cihak 2010). Third, unlike 
the H-statistic and HHI indexes that provide an aggregate measure of competition at the state level, 
Lerner indexes enable us to exploit bank-level variations in market power. In turn, they better 
capture the theoretical concept of bank franchise value (Beck, De Jonghe & Schepens 2013). 
Finally, compared to the conventional Lerner measure, the funding adjusted Lerner index reduces 
measurement bias, as it accounts for market power that may have previously been exercised in the 
deposit market.  
3.3.2.3 Revenue diversification measures 
To assess the degree of bank revenue diversification, we examine the structure of bank 
income statements. We distinguish between net interest income stemming from traditional banking 
activities and non-interest income generated from non-traditional banking businesses. We develop 
three measures of revenue diversification. The first measure is the non-interest income ratio (NON) 
calculated as the ratio of total non-interest income to net operating income.21 Net operating income 
is the sum of non-interest income and net interest income. The non-interest income ratio measures 
revenue diversification as a linear function of non-interest income whereby a higher ratio indicates 
a stronger reliance on non-traditional bank activities.  
                                                 
21 Similarly, Stiroh (2004), Lepetit et al. (2008), Sawada (2013), and Baele, De Jonghe and Vander Vennet (2007) 
used this measure to capture  the degree of non-traditional banking activities or diversification.  
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A second measure of bank diversification, which is widely utilized in recent studies, is 
revenue diversity (DIV).22 DIV is calculated as follows:  
𝐷𝑖𝑣 = 1 −
 |𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 − 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒|
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
                                                  (3.15) 
The value of DIV ranges between 0 and 1. A higher value implies an increasing degree of 
diversification. The value is 1 when non-interest income equals net interest income and 0 when 
the bank either has no non-interest income or 100% non-interest income. DIV measures revenue 
diversification as a relative relationship between interest income and non-interest income. A bank 
is considered to be fully diversified when its incomes are equally distributed between lending and 
non-lending activities.  
In line with Mercieca, Schaeck and Wolfe (2007) and Amidu (2013), we construct the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI_REV) as a third measure of revenue diversification. The 
HHI_REV index is specified as follows: 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑅𝑒𝑣 = (
𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
)
2
+ ( 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
)
2
                                                          (3.16) 
A higher value of HHI indicates greater concentration and less diversification between 
traditional and non-traditional banking activities. Furthermore, following and extending the work 
of DeYoung and Roland (2001), Stiroh (2004), Lepetit et al. (2008), and Sawada (2013), we 
disaggregate non-interest income into four components: fiduciary income (revenue from 
administering investments for others rendered by a bank’s trust departments), trading income (net 
gain or loss from trading cash instruments, off-balance sheet derivative contracts, purchases and 
                                                 
22 See Baele, De Jonghe and Vander Vennet (2007), Laeven and Levine (2007), Elsas, Hackethal and Holzhäuser 
(2010), and Sawada (2013). 
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sales of assets, liability, and other financial instruments and revaluation activities due to marking 
to market), service charges (charges for deposit accounts maintenance and other fees on deposit 
accounts such as early withdrawals, account closure, failure to meet minimum balances, and excess 
check writing) and fee and other non-interest income shares (all other non-interest income items 
not reported elsewhere). Appendix 2 provides a detailed account of the revenue items included in 
each category.    
3.3.2.4 Control variables 
Following the literature, we include the following control variables in our cross-sectional 
regressions:  
Bank size (SIZE): To capture the size effect, we use the natural log of total assets, ln(GTA). 
The effect of size on liquidity creation is generally inconclusive. For instance, Berger and 
Bouwman (2009) and Berger et al. (2012) reported a positive correlation between size and liquidity 
creation, while a negative relationship was found by Horváth, Seidler and Weill (2014).  
Bank capital (CAPITAL): Berger and Bouwman (2009) hypothesized that bank capital is 
related to liquidity creation in two opposite ways. The “financial fragility–crowding out” 
hypothesis suggests a negative relationship between capital and liquidity creation. Capital 
mitigates financial fragility and “crowds out” deposits for funding purposes in an unsegmented 
capital market (Diamond & Rajan 2000; Diamond & Rajan 2001a; Gorton & Winton 2000). 
Because deposits are more liquid than capital, higher capital is related to lower liquidity creation. 
In a competing hypothesis, the “risk absorption” theory predicts a positive relationship between 
capital and liquidity creation. Following Berger and Bouwman (2009), we use the ratio of equity 
capital over total assets to control for the effect of capital on liquidity creation.  
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Bank profitability: Banks may rely on retained earnings to build up their buffer against 
liquidity shocks and increase their risk-bearing capacity. Thus, an increase in bank profitability is 
likely to allow banks to create more liquidity. Bank profitability is measured as the return on assets 
(ROA) ratio, which is defined as net income over average total assets.  
Bank risk: The impact of competition and revenue diversification on excessive risk-taking 
behaviours by banks is well established in the literature. Following Berger and Bouwman (2009), 
we control for bank risk by isolating the effect of competition and revenue diversification on 
liquidity creation. We use two measures as proxies for bank risk: earning volatility (ROASD), 
measured as the standard deviation of the bank’s return on assets over the previous three years 
(Berger, Klapper & Turk-Ariss 2009; Laeven & Levine 2009) and credit risk (CR1) calculated as 
the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans.23 ROASD is one of the most popular bank risk-
taking measures, while CR1 is widely used as a proxy for ex-post credit risk in the banking 
literature (Ayuso, Pérez & Saurina 2004; Fiordelisi, Marques-Ibanez & Molyneux 2011; Shim 
2013). Given that banking crises typically originate from a prolonged deterioration in asset quality 
captured by a rapid increase in non-performing loans, this measure provides a good indicator of 
bank risk (Shim 2013).  
Bank asset composition: Stiroh and Rumble (2006) and Lee, Hsieh and Yang (2014) argue 
that bank asset composition between loan and non-loan assets is directly related to liquidity 
creation. Accordingly, we measure bank asset composition (CR2) as the ratio of net loans to total 
assets. A positive relationship is expected between CR2 and liquidity creation.   
                                                 
23 The potential multicollinearity problem introduced as a result of the inclusion of both bank risk measures in the 
regression is dealt with using GMM estimators.  
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3.3.2.5 Dummy variables 
We construct a number of dummy variables to capture the influence of location and 
regulatory and institutional frameworks on the link between competition, revenue diversification, 
and liquidity creation. The inclusion of these variables also provides a simple robustness test for 
our findings. 
Bank holding company (BHC) status: OBHC is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank 
is a member of a one-bank holding company. Similarly, MULBHC is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if the bank is a member of a multibank holding company. Berger and Bouwman (2009) found 
that multi-BHC members tend to create more liquidity, while one-BHC and independent banks 
tend to create less liquidity.  
Location: Competition is argued to be more pronounced in metropolitan areas. As a result, 
we include the location dummy variable (METRO) in the regressions. METRO takes on the value 
of 1 if the bank local market is in a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and 0 otherwise.24  
Bank charter: With a dual banking system, commercial banks in the U.S. have a choice with 
regard to their chartering and supervising agent. Federally chartered banks are supervised by the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) while state-chartered banks are supervised jointly 
by their state chartering authority and either the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) or 
the Federal Reserve System (FRS). State banks typically incur lower supervisory costs, whereas 
federal banks benefit from the pre-emption of certain state laws. As a result, smaller and more 
                                                 
24 “Metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas (metro and micro areas) are geographic entities delineated by 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for use by Federal statistical agencies in collecting, tabulating, and 
publishing Federal statistics. A metro area contains a core urban area of 50,000 or more population, and a micro area 
contains an urban core of at least 10,000 (but less than 50,000) population”. 
(http://www.census.gov/population/metro/) 
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traditional banks are more likely to be attracted by the state charter, while the federal charter is 
preferred by large and more complex banks (Blair & Kushmeider 2006). In addition, the choice of 
charter also determines a bank’s power, minimum capital requirement level, liquidity and asset 
quality, and lending limits. Accordingly, this is likely to affect the relationship between 
competition, revenue diversification, and liquidity creation. To capture the effect of the bank 
charter on liquidity creation, we develop a federal charter dummy variable (FEDCHRTR). This 
dummy variable equals 1 if a bank is a federally chartered bank and 0 otherwise. 
Interstate branches restriction: Strahan (2003) argue that allowing banks to enter into new 
markets is associated with increased competition in the entire banking industry. A bank that 
operates in an interstate banking allowance zone is more likely to grow its number of customers 
and grant more loans. To capture the effect of geographical banking deregulation, we employ a 
dummy variable (STMULT) that is set to 1 if a bank has branches that can accept FDIC-insured 
deposits in more than one state and 0 otherwise. We expect a positive relationship between 
liquidity creation and STMULT.   
Financial crisis: As a final dummy variable, we include CRISIS, which takes on the value 
of 1 if an observation is made during the financial crisis period of 2007-2010 and 0 otherwise, to 
investigate whether the influence of competition and revenue diversification on liquidity creation 
differs between crisis and non-crisis periods.  
3.4 Data 
Our sample comprises of an unbalanced annual panel dataset of all U.S. banks from 2001 to 
2013.25 We source the data from Call Reports, a publicly available database provided by the 
                                                 
25 We prefer annual data to quarterly data because year-end data allow us to avoid the data de-seasonalization and de-
cumulation process. Various bank activities such as lending have seasonal patterns that require de-seasonalization.  
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Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Call Reports provides comprehensive information on the 
income, balance sheet activity, and off-balance sheet activity of U.S.-domiciled banks. Bank-
specific information such as bank type and listing are further collected from the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) website.26 The sample period starts from 2001 due to major 
reporting changes in Call Reports that continuously occurred from 1976 to 2000. The changes in 
definitions and measurements of many items, especially on income statements pose a major 
challenge to the construction of a consistent time series for periods before 2001.  
We impose the following restrictions to exclude non-representative data:27 (1) banks with 
no loans outstanding, zero or negative values of equity capital, deposits and assets; (2) very small 
banks (real GTA below $25 million) or too-big-to-fail banks (real GTA more than $100 billion); 
(3) banks with residential real estate loans exceeding 50% of GTA or unused commitments 
exceeding four times GTA, and (4) subsidiaries of foreign bank holding companies. Our final 
sample consists of 88,775 bank-year observations from 9,487 U.S.-based and U.S.–held banks 
operating during the period of 2001-2013. 
                                                 
Competition and revenue diversification measures are constructed based on data from income statement items that are 
cumulative over one year, for example, data reported in the second quarter refer to the first six months of the year, 
data in the third quarter refer to the first nine months of the year, and so on. Therefore, we need to de-cumulate these 
items if we use quarterly data. In addition, our sample size is sufficiently large to not compromise data availability by 
using annual data.   
26 Information regarding bank classification (commercial versus savings banks, listed versus un-listed banks, interstate 
branch allowed versus prohibited) and bank location are collected from the following website: 
<https://www2.fdic.gov/SDI/download_large_list_outside.asp>. Information on bank holding company status and 
bank charter choice is obtained from: <https://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/warp_download_all.asp>.  
27 These restrictions are similar to Berger and Bouwman (2009), except that our sample also removes too-big-to-fail 
banks and subsidiaries of foreign BHCs.  
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Table 3.2 reports the summary statistics of key variables for our sample. Statistics are also 
reported for sub-samples categorized according to bank size, bank type, listing status, whether it 
meets the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) requirement, and the crisis period. 28  
The average liquidity creation estimates (scaled by total assets) across the four measures 
differ slightly in the full sample period. They range from 20.9% to 26.5% when the measures 
classify loans based on category (“catfat” and “catnonfat”) and from 30.8% to 35.5% when loans 
are classified according to maturity (“matfat” and “matnonfat”). As expected, liquidity creation 
measures that include off-balance sheet items (“catfat” and “matfat”) are higher than those do not 
(“catnonfat” and “matnonfat”). Liquidity creation also varies across bank size. Small banks have 
lower liquidity creation ratios, which increase as bank size increases. As will be shown later, large 
banks generate more liquidity as a proportion of total assets from off-balance sheet items, whereas 
medium-sized banks create more liquidity from on-balance sheet items. Commercial banks have 
significantly higher “cat” liquidity creation estimates than savings banks; the difference amounts 
to approximately 10%. The values of “mat” measures are, on the other hand, comparable across 
the two type of banks. Listed banks create more liquidity than unlisted banks based on all measures. 
This result is somewhat expected because listed banks tend to be larger and have an arguably 
stronger customer base. Unsurprisingly, we find that banks that fulfil the NSFR liquidity 
requirements have lower liquidity creation ratios compared to those that do not. Apparently, banks 
that fulfil the liquidity requirements hold more stable funds than what is required, thus suppressing 
their ability to create liquidity compared to those do not fulfil these requirements. We also note 
that 76.24% of all banks have met the Basel III imposed NSFR liquidity requirements. Table 3.2 
                                                 
28 Based on bank size (total assets), banks are classified into large, medium and small banks of more than $3 billion, 
between $1 billion and $3 billion, and less than $1 billion respectively (see Berger and Bouwman (2009)). Based on 
bank specialization and ownership, our sample consists of commercial banks and savings banks, listed banks and 
unlisted banks, respectively. For the NSFR calculation methodology, see Appendix 3. 
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finally shows that all four liquidity creation measures are, on average, relatively higher during the 
crisis compared to during non-crisis years. Consistent with this finding, Berger and Bouwman 
(2008) also found abnormally high liquidity creation just prior to and during the subprime lending 
crisis (2007Q2-2008Q1). 
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of bank liquidity creation using “catfat” scaled by total assets 
measure over the sample period and for each bank size sub-sample. Overall, there was a general 
upward trend in banking sector liquidity creation, primarily driven by the pattern of liquidity 
creation of small banks. On average, small banks created $0.22 of liquidity per $1 of total assets 
in 2001 and $0.27 of liquidity in 2013. Medium-sized and large banks experienced fast growth in 
liquidity creation at the beginning of the sample period but began to decline rapidly during the 
crisis period of 2008-2010 after reaching a high of 44.6% and 46.7% in 2007-2008, respectively. 
There are signs of modest recovery in liquidity creation for medium-sized banks after the financial 
crisis, while for large banks it remains relatively flat.  
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Figure 3.1. Evolution of bank liquidity creation (“catfat” scaled by total assets) over 2001-2013 for 
full sample and sub-samples by bank size. The measure is calculated at the bank-year level and then 
averaged across all banks over 2001-2013. 
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Table 3.2 further shows the summary statistics for our competition measures. The average 
Lerner index and funding-adjusted Lerner index of our sample is 16.3% and 7.3%, respectively. 
As expected, the magnitude of the average funding-adjusted Lerner is smaller than the 
conventional Lerner index, as the latter generally overestimates the degree of market power. The 
H-statistic is further estimated to be 0.588 on average, while both the HHI_Deposit and HHI_Loan 
indices are approximately 0.08. Regardless of the competition measures employed, small banks 
are shown to exhibit more competitive behaviour. Further partition of competition measures 
according to bank characteristics yields less conclusive results. For example, saving banks operate 
in more concentrated loan and deposit markets (HHI_DEPOSIT and HHI_LOAN) but demonstrate 
more competitive pricing behaviour (LERNER and LERNER_ADJ). There is mixed evidence in 
relation to the degree of competitiveness of listed banks compared to unlisted banks. Interestingly, 
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the results also show that banks that meet the NSFR liquidity requirements have more market 
power and are in general less competitive than banks that are yet to meet the requirement. Of equal 
interest is the finding that banks faced more competition during the financial crisis.  
In relation to the group of revenue diversification variables, non-interest income is 15.9% of 
net operating revenue. Large banks have a higher propensity to, and do, engage in more non-
lending activities compared to smaller banks. Due to their size and popularity, commercial listed 
banks and those that meet the NSFR liquidity requirement expectedly derive a larger share of their 
income from services, fees, and other non-interest income. The statistics also show that banks 
tended to consolidate their income streams during the financial crisis and appeared to be less 
diversified compared to non-crisis periods. Overall, commercial banks that are larger, listed, and 
meet the NSFR liquidity requirement are more diversified in their revenue structure.   
Table 3.3 presents the correlation matrix of the main variables. Due to the method of 
calculation, the pairwise correlations between the conventional Lerner and funding adjusted Lerner 
indices and between deposit concentration and loan concentration are high at 0.997 and 0.939, 
respectively. As expected, the H-statistic is negatively related to market power and concentration 
measures. Among the group of revenue diversification variables, DIV is highly correlated with 
both NON (0.609) and HHI_REV (-0.752).  
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics of key variables from 2001 to 2013 
This table presents the summary statistics of key variables for our sample. It is broken into sub-periods of crisis and non-crisis. Summary statistics are also shown 
for large banks (total assets exceeding $3 billion), medium-sized banks (total assets between $1 billion and $3 billion), small banks (total assets up to $1 billion), 
commercial banks, savings banks, listed banks, unlisted banks, and those that meet the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) requirement or not. For the NSFR calculation 
methodology, see Appendix 3. 
Variables All Small Medium Large Commercial Savings Listed Unlisted NSFR≥100% NSFR<100% Crisis Non-crisis 
CATFAT 0.265 0.254 0.397 0.417 0.27 0.166 0.268 0.098 0.247 0.396 0.277 0.260 
CATNONFAT 0.209 0.201 0.307 0.286 0.213 0.118 0.212 0.058 0.193 0.325 0.223 0.203 
MATFAT 0.365 0.352 0.529 0.537 0.364 0.378 0.365 0.318 0.338 0.565 0.370 0.362 
MATNONFAT 0.308 0.299 0.44 0.406 0.307 0.329 0.309 0.278 0.283 0.493 0.316 0.305 
LERNER 0.163 0.158 0.218 0.235 0.165 0.121 0.163 0.126 0.164 0.149 0.115 0.183 
LERNER_ADJ 0.073 0.063 0.184 0.242 0.075 0.044 0.074 0.04 0.073 0.076 0.025 0.094 
H-STAT 0.588 0.589 0.582 0.564 0.592 0.51 0.59 0.483 0.586 0.6 0.591 0.587 
HHI_DEPOSIT 0.075 0.073 0.083 0.113 0.074 0.101 0.074 0.113 0.074 0.082 0.074 0.075 
HHI_LOAN 0.078 0.077 0.084 0.113 0.077 0.094 0.077 0.103 0.077 0.084 0.080 0.077 
NON 0.159 0.153 0.209 0.261 0.159 0.151 0.159 0.12 0.159 0.155 0.150 0.162 
FIDUCIARY 0.008 0.006 0.022 0.038 0.008 0.005 0.008 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008 
TRADING 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SERVICES 0.075 0.076 0.072 0.075 0.077 0.047 0.076 0.042 0.076 0.07 0.074 0.076 
OTHERS 0.075 0.072 0.114 0.144 0.074 0.099 0.075 0.074 0.075 0.076 0.069 0.078 
DIV 0.303 0.295 0.397 0.445 0.304 0.285 0.305 0.239 0.305 0.293 0.285 0.311 
HHI_REV 0.803 0.796 0.741 1.164 0.803 0.801 0.803 0.812 0.795 0.86 0.828 0.792 
LN(GTA) 5.126 4.907 7.359 9.064 5.092 5.824 5.119 5.488 5.028 5.853 5.177 5.104 
CAPITAL 0.108 0.108 0.1 0.108 0.107 0.114 0.107 0.124 0.108 0.105 0.109 0.107 
ROA 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.013 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.01 0.007 0.004 0.012 
ROASD 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.004 
CR1 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.016 0.013 0.016 0.011 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.016 
CR2 0.632 0.631 0.659 0.612 0.633 0.606 0.633 0.573 0.619 0.733 0.654 0.622 
Obs. 88775 82403 4139 2233 84609 4161 86983 1787 78255 10520 26609 62166 
Bank no.  9487 8954 785 379 8707 830 9207 344 9260 2886 7282 9425 
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Table 3.3: Correlation matrix of key variables  
This table presents the correlation matrix of the main variables in our sample.  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) CATFAT  1.000             
(2) LERNER 0.079 1.000            
(3) LERNER_ADJ 0.102 0.997 1.000           
(4) H-STAT 0.085 -0.026 -0.028 1.000          
(5) HHI_DEPOSIT 0.015 -0.013 -0.005 -0.195 1.000         
(6) HHI_LOAN 0.011 -0.013 -0.006 -0.182 0.939 1.000        
(7) NON 0.040 0.048 0.054 -0.020 0.008 0.010 1.000       
(8) FIDUCIARY 0.031 0.009 0.018 -0.017 0.011 0.006 0.161 1.000      
(9) TRADING -0.006 -0.016 -0.012 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.076 0.008 1.000     
(10) SERVICES -0.111 0.048 0.050 -0.030 -0.073 -0.055 0.034 -0.046 0.017 1.000    
(11) OTHERS 0.066 0.034 0.037 -0.008 0.027 0.025 0.935 -0.011 -0.059 -0.248 1.000   
(12) DIV 0.043 0.204 0.204 -0.026 0.001 0.002 0.609 0.098 0.063 0.083 0.550 1.000  
(13) HHI_REV 0.002 -0.120 -0.114 0.007 0.001 0.001 -0.389 0.020 0.025 0.146 -0.432 -0.752 1.000 
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3.5 Empirical Results  
3.5.1 Effect of competition on liquidity creation and the impact of the institutional and 
regulatory framework on this relationship  
We initially examine how bank competition affects liquidity creation after controlling for 
bank-specific variables using five different measures of competition: the conventional Lerner 
index, the funding-adjusted Lerner index, the H-statistic, and bank deposit and loan concentration 
HHI indexes. The odd columns in Table 3.4 report the results of Eq. (3.1). Our preliminary findings 
strongly support the “competition-fragility” and “pricing channel” theories suggesting that higher 
competition is related to increased liquidity creation. With the exception of the H-statistics, the 
relationship is statistically significant in all competition variable specifications. Table 3.4 also 
reports results of Eq. (3.3) where a number of dummy variables are included to determine whether 
the relationship between competition and liquidity creation is further influenced by endogenous 
(loan performance, organizational form, location) and exogenous (regulatory framework, financial 
crisis) factors.29 As seen in the even columns in Table 3.4, we present a number of findings as 
follows:  
First, the positive relationship between competition and liquidity appears to be stronger 
(weaker) among banks that have a lower (higher) ratio of non-performing loans. In other words, 
banks that have lower credit risk (a lower ratio of non-performing loans) are more likely to create 
more liquidity compared to those with higher credit risk. Plausibly, banks that are more proficient 
at maintaining prudent lending standards and managing credit risks are more likely to attract 
deposits and loans. Thus, the liquidity enhancing effect of competition seems to be greater for 
banks with lower credit risk. Second, we find that the benefit of enhancing liquidity creation with 
                                                 
29 The Hansen and Arellano-Bond serial correlation tests do not reject the null hypothesis of correct specification, 
which suggests that we have valid instruments and no serial correlation. 
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competition is more pronounced for independent banks compared to BHC subsidiaries in all 
specifications. Third, we find weak evidence indicating that the adverse effect of market power on 
liquidity creation is aggravated for banks located outside metropolitan areas, for state chartered 
banks, and for those with interstate branches. The impact of the financial crisis on the competition-
liquidity creation relationship, on the other hand, remains inconclusive. Conflicting evidence is 
found depending on how competition is measured.  
We also find strong evidence that BHC status, location, bank credit risk, and asset 
composition are individually significant drivers of liquidity creation across all specifications. In 
particular, banks that are part of BHCs, those located outside metropolitan areas, those with larger 
loan portfolios relative to assets, and those with higher earnings volatility are larger liquidity 
creators.  Interestingly, the negative coefficient of the crisis dummy variable supports the view that 
banks are less able to provide liquidity in bank-centred crises. This is consistent with Mora’s study, 
which concludes that “banks often have an advantage in providing liquidity to borrowers during 
times of financial stress–but not necessarily during a bank-centered crisis” (2010, p. 41). In fact, 
the recent financial crisis of 2007-2009 is similar to previous crises in terms of increased liquidity 
demand by businesses and households. Due to the bank-centred nature of crisis, the concentration 
of risk falls on the banking system. This increased concentration of risk creates serious concerns 
regarding the safety of bank deposits, even in the presence of deposit insurance. This perception 
makes it difficult for banks to raise deposits and thus prevents them from meeting the increased 
liquidity demands of borrowers and fulfilling their liquidity creation role. There is clear evidence 
that liquidity creation is a positive function of bank size. In contrast, capital is found to have a very 
marginal impact on liquidity creation, both statistically and economically. This is possibly due to 
the confounding effect of bank size, where larger banks are shown to demonstrate a positive 
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relationship between capital and liquidity creation, while for smaller banks, the relationship is 
negative (Berger & Bouwman 2009).  
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Table 3.4: Effect of competition on liquidity creation: Different specifications of competition 
This table reports the results from two-step system GMM estimations with Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected standard errors (reported in the parentheses) of the 
effects of competition on liquidity creation using five different specifications of competition: LERNER, LERNER_ADJ, H-STATISTIC, HHI_LOAN and 
HHI_DEPOSIT. The dependent variable is CATFAT. For notation of the variables see Table 3.1. Data is on an annual frequency and covers the period of 2001-
2013. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The Arellano-Bond (AB) test for serial correlation is based on the null hypothesis of 
second-order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals. The Hansen test is used for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model estimation. 
CAPITAL and CATFAT are treated as GMM-style instruments (endogenous) through the xtabond2 procedure at lag 1 and lag 2, respectively. All other included 
regressors are treated as IV-style instruments (exogenous). The regressions include dummy variables for the different time periods that are not reported.  
Variables LERNER  LERNER_ADJ  H-STAT   HHI_LOAN   HHI_DEPOSIT 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
COMPETITION -0.018*** -0.067***  -0.013*** -0.053***  -0.034 0.057***  -0.025*** -0.079***  -0.023*** -0.058*** 
 (0.006) (0.021)  (0.004) (0.015)  (0.323) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.019)  (0.009) (0.017) 
COMPETITION * CR1  0.529***   0.486***   -1.272***   1.947***   0.580 
  (0.133)   (0.114)   (0.260)   (0.563)   (0.395) 
OBHC  0.001   0.004***   0.020***   0.006***   0.005*** 
  (0.003)   (0.002)   (0.004)   (0.002)   (0.002) 
COMPETITION * OBHC  0.028   0.023*   -0.026***   0.007   0.006 
  (0.017)   (0.014)   (0.006)   (0.015)   (0.014) 
MULBHC  0.000   0.006*   0.018***   0.010***   0.007*** 
  (0.005)   (0.003)   (0.005)   (0.003)   (0.003) 
COMPETITION * MULBHC  0.053**   0.046**   -0.016*   0.024   0.042* 
  (0.023)   (0.019)   (0.009)   (0.023)   (0.024) 
METRO  0.010***   0.009***   0.005*   0.005***   0.004*** 
  (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.003)   (0.001)   (0.001) 
COMPETITION * METRO  -0.008   -0.005   0.007   0.023**   0.027*** 
  (0.005)   (0.005)   (0.005)   (0.010)   (0.010) 
FEDCHRTR  0.000   0.002*   0.009**   0.002   0.001 
  (0.002)   (0.001)   (0.005)   (0.002)   (0.001) 
COMPETITION * FEDCHRTR  0.014*   0.008   -0.01   0.023   0.034** 
  (0.008)   (0.006)   (0.007)   (0.014)   (0.013) 
STMULT  -0.002   0.000   0.007*   0.004*   0.004 
  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.004)   (0.002)   (0.002) 
COMPETITION * STMULT  0.026***   0.024***   -0.005   -0.01   -0.008 
  (0.009)   (0.008)   (0.006)   (0.018)   (0.019) 
CRISIS  -0.068***   -0.080***   -0.108***   -0.082***   -0.074*** 
  (0.007)   (0.005)   (0.007)   (0.020)   (0.005) 
COMPETITION * CRISIS  0.008   0.006   -0.010***   -0.006   -0.023*** 
  (0.007)   (0.006)   (0.003)   (0.008)   (0.008) 
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L.CATFAT 0.716*** 0.718***  0.717*** 0.717***  0.713*** 0.714***  0.720*** 0.692***  0.720*** 0.723*** 
 (0.028) (0.028)  (0.029) (0.028)  (0.158) (0.027)  (0.029) (0.045)  (0.029) (0.027) 
LN(GTA) 0.011*** 0.010***  0.011*** 0.011***  0.011 0.010***  0.011*** 0.011***  0.0106*** 0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.014) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
CAPITAL -0.140 -0.011  -0.123 -0.001  -0.192 -0.009  -0.154* -0.008  -0.156* 0.000 
 (0.097) (0.030)  (0.096) (0.030)  (0.461) (0.028)  (0.094) (0.031)  (0.093) (0.029) 
ROA 0.296** 0.261***  0.052 0.026  -0.004 -0.024  -0.002 -0.079  -0.002 -0.07 
 (0.121) (0.100)  (0.102) (0.064)  (0.208) (0.024)  (0.069) (0.084)  (0.069) (0.083) 
ROASD 0.451*** 0.429***  0.237** 0.256***  0.387* 0.269***  0.356*** 1.319***  0.357*** 1.239*** 
 (0.120) (0.073)  (0.113) (0.088)  (0.226) (0.071)  (0.100) (0.325)  (0.100) (0.308) 
CR1 -0.004 -0.272***  -0.006 -0.236***  -0.005 0.730***  -0.006 -0.518***  -0.006 -0.202 
 (0.020) (0.070)  (0.021) (0.056)  (0.052) (0.152)  (0.021) (0.157)  (0.021) (0.151) 
CR2 0.254*** 0.254***  0.253*** 0.255***  0.254 0.257***  0.249*** 0.281***  0.249*** 0.247*** 
 (0.023) (0.021)  (0.023) (0.020)  (0.154) (0.020)  (0.023) (0.051)  (0.023) (0.021) 
INTERCEPT -0.108*** -0.100***  -0.111*** -0.109***  -0.065** -0.145***  -0.029** -0.117***  -0.087*** -0.105*** 
 (0.019) (0.010)  (0.019) (0.009)  (0.032) (0.012)  (0.012) (0.026)  (0.018) (0.010) 
F-test (p-val) 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
AB-test AR(2) 0.5390 0.488  0.4960 0.447  0.4690 0.4310  0.4810 0.4010  0.4760 0.3830 
Hansen 0.1820 0.195  0.1600 0.12  0.2020 0.1130  0.1080 0.4780  0.1140 0.4650 
Obs. 77,723 77689  77,729 77,695  77,754 77,720  77,754 77,720  77,754 77,720 
No. of banks 8,938 8,929  8,939 8,930  8,942 8,933  8,942 8,933  8,942 8,933 
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3.5.2 Effect of revenue diversification on liquidity creation and the impact of the 
institutional and regulatory framework on this relationship 
Table 3.5 reports the GMM dynamic panel model estimates for Eqs. (3.2) and (3.4) that test 
the relationship between revenue diversification and liquidity creation (proxied by the “catfat” 
measure). Columns (1), (3), and (5) of Panel A show the results of Eq. (3.2) using alternative 
proxies for revenue diversification as described in Section 3.3.2.3. The remaining columns 
similarly present the results of Eq. (3.4) using different diversification measures. For brevity, we 
only report the coefficient estimates of key variables. We find strong evidence that revenue 
diversification is related to higher liquidity creation. The impact of revenue diversification on 
liquidity creation is also economically significant. For example, a 1% increase in the non-interest 
income ratio (NON) is related to an increase to the magnitude of 1.4% to 3.3% in liquidity creation 
(Columns (1) and (3)). Given that average bank total assets are $0.613 billion, the additional 
liquidity created for a 1% increase in the non-interest income ratio is estimated to be $8.582 million 
to $20.229 million. Similarly, a 1% increase in the diversity ratio (DIV) is shown to correlate with 
an increase in liquidity creation of 0.8% to 1.4% which equates to $4.904 million to $8.582 million 
in absolute dollar amounts. These results are largely consistent with the “financial fragility-
crowding out” hypothesis.  
We further find that the positive impact of revenue diversification on liquidity creation is 
significantly more pronounced for banks with lower loan credit risk (CR1) compared to those 
performing poorly in lending activities and banks that operate in metropolitan markets. There is 
also some weak evidence indicating that the strength of the relationship between revenue 
diversification and liquidity creation is positively influenced by banks that can accept deposits in 
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multiple states. We do not find any evidence that bank charter options and the financial crisis 
influence the diversification effect on liquidity creation, regardless of the diversification measure.  
To gain a better understanding of how different components of non-interest income affect 
liquidity creation, we estimate a variant of Eqs. (3.2) and (3.4) using individual components of 
non-interest income as measures of diversification. The results of these regressions are reported in 
Panel B. Interestingly, individual components of non-interest income do not have a uniform 
relationship with liquidity creation. In particular, fiduciary income, although accounting for only 
0.8% of bank net operating income, is found to have a strong positive impact on liquidity creation. 
In economic terms, an increase of 1% in fiduciary income, which is more than double its current 
level, is related to a 6.45% increase in liquidity creation. In contrast, service charges, the largest 
component of non-interest income, are associated with a lower level of liquidity creation (3.8% 
for a 1% increase in the proportion of service charge income). Liquidity creation is also positively 
related to fees and other non-interest income, although the size of the coefficients is somewhat 
smaller.  
3.5.3 Interaction effect of competition and revenue diversification on liquidity creation 
In preceding sections, we report strong empirical evidence that competition and revenue 
diversification individually affect bank liquidity creation. In the following analysis, we investigate 
whether income diversification could alleviate or intensify the competition effect on liquidity 
creation and vice versa. We study the joint impact of these factors by including an interactive term 
as specified in Eq. (3.5). For brevity, we use the funding-adjusted Lerner index as our main 
competition measure. We estimate Eq. (3.5) in six different settings and report the results in Table 
3.6. In particular, we run the regression with and without the interaction term between competition 
and diversification variables, using three measures of revenue diversification: non-interest income 
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share (Columns (1) and (2)), diversification (Columns (3) and (4)) and HHI concentration 
(Columns (5) and (6)). The control variables are included in all regressions, but their results are 
not reported for the sake of brevity.  
As seen in Table 3.6, the coefficient of the stand-alone competition and revenue 
diversification variables strengthen our previously reported findings that banks benefit from more 
revenue diversification and high competition in the form of higher liquidity creating capacity. 
Table 3.6 further demonstrates that not only do competition and revenue diversification 
individually influence liquidity creation, they also have a joint impact on liquidity creation. In 
particular, the results reveal that the positive impact of diversification on liquidity creation is 
stronger in less competitive markets. Similarly, the positive effect of competition on liquidity 
creation is weaker when banks’ income streams are more diversified.  
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Table 3.5: Effect of revenue diversification on liquidity creation 
This table reports the results from two-step system GMM estimations with Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected standard errors (reported in the parentheses) of the 
effects of revenue diversification (Panel A) and different components of non-interest income (Panel B) on liquidity creation. Panel A reports the results using 
different specifications of revenue diversification (RD) as independent variables: NON, DIV, and HHI_REV, respectively. Panel B shows the results using different 
components (COMP) of non-interest income: FIDUCIARY, TRADING, SERVICES, and OTHERS as independent variables, respectively. The dependent variable 
is CATFAT. All control variables, lags of dependent variables, and time dummy variables are included but not tabulated. For notation of the variables see Table 
3.1. Data is on an annual frequency covering the period of 2001-2013. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The Arellano-Bond 
(AB) test for serial correlation is based on the null hypothesis of second-order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals. The Hansen test is used for over-
identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model estimation. CAPITAL and CATFAT are treated as GMM-style instruments (endogenous) through the xtabond2 
procedure at lag 1 and lag 2, respectively. All other included regressors are treated as IV-style instruments (exogenous).  
Panel A: Effects of different specifications of diversification    
Variables RD = NON                RD = DIV RD = HHI_REV    
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)    
RD 0.014*** 0.033***  0.008*** 0.014***  -0.0001*** 0.000    
 (0.004) (0.009)  (0.002) (0.004)  (0.0001) (0.000)    
RD*CR1  -0.519***   -0.411***   0.008    
  (0.172)   (0.107)   (0.005)    
OBHC  0.006***   0.004**   0.006***    
  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)    
RD* OBHC  -0.003   0.006*   0.000    
  (0.007)   (0.003)   (0.000)    
MULBHC  0.011***   0.009***   0.012***    
  (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.002)    
RD* MULBHC  0.002   0.009   -0.001*    
  (0.013)   (0.006)   (0.001)    
METRO  0.005**   0.003   0.006***    
  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)    
RD* METRO  0.007   0.009**   0.000    
  (0.007)   (0.004)   (0.000)    
FEDCHRTR  0.003   0.005**   0.003***    
  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.001)    
RD* FEDCHRTR  0.001   -0.004   0.000    
  (0.008)   (0.004)   (0.000)    
STMULT  0.002   0.000   0.003*    
  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)    
RD* STMULT  0.000   0.005   -0.001*    
  (0.009)   (0.003)   (0.001)    
CRISIS  -0.091***   -0.050***   -0.022***    
  (0.019)   (0.004)   (0.001)    
RD* CRISIS  -0.008   -0.001   0.000    
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  (0.006)   (0.003)   (0.000)    
F-test (p-val) 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000    
AB-test AR(2) 0.438 0.405  0.404 0.355  0.418 0.393    
Hansen 0.325 0.226  0.314 0.244  0.339 0.243    
Obs 77,747 77,713  77,747 77,713  77,747 77,713    
No. of banks 8942 8933  8942 8933  8942 8933    
Panel B: Effects of different components of non-interest income 
Variables COMP = FIDUCIARY  COMP = TRADING  COMP = SERVICES  COMP = OTHERS 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
COMP 0.0645** 0.133**  -0.001 0.19  -0.038*** -0.064**  0.008*** 0.032*** 
 (0.0317) (0.053)  (0.008) (0.213)  (0.013) (0.027)  (0.003) (0.010) 
COMP*CR1  0.164   -3.129*   -2.377***   -0.303* 
  (0.733)   (1.860)   (0.696)   (0.171) 
OBHC  0.006***   0.006***   0.003   0.006*** 
  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.003)   (0.002) 
COMP*OBHC  0.005   -0.12   0.046*   -0.004 
  (0.039)   (0.080)   (0.025)   (0.007) 
MULBHC  0.011***   0.012***   0.009**   0.007** 
  (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.004)   (0.003) 
COMP*MULBHC  0.055   -0.164**   0.057*   0.057*** 
  (0.059)   (0.082)   (0.032)   (0.018) 
METRO  0.007***   0.006***   -0.002   0.006*** 
  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.003)   (0.002) 
COMP*METRO  -0.082***   0.013   0.092***   -0.006 
  (0.031)   (0.209)   (0.031)   (0.009) 
FEDCHRTR  0.004**   0.004**   0.003   0.003* 
  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.003)   (0.002) 
COMP*FEDCHRTR  -0.057*   -0.019   0.008   0.006 
  (0.030)   (0.069)   (0.020)   (0.008) 
STMULT  0.004**   0.002   0.002   0.002 
  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.003)   (0.002) 
COMP*STMULT  -0.070**   0.144   -0.004   0.008 
  (0.035)   (0.131)   (0.025)   (0.009) 
CRISIS  -0.091***   -0.088***   -0.084***   -0.089*** 
  (0.019)   (0.019)   (0.022)   (0.019) 
COMP*CRISIS  0.02   -0.024   0.027*   -0.007 
  (0.021)   (0.068)   (0.014)   (0.005) 
F-test (p-val) 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
AB-test AR(2) 0.467 0.37  0.473 0.371  0.476 0.386  0.481 0.356 
Hansen 0.137 0.235  0.136 0.225  0.197 0.347  0.128 0.228 
Obs 77,743 77,709  77,743 77,709  77,743 77,709  77,743 77,709 
No. of banks 8,940 8,931  8,940 8,931  8,940 8,931  8,940 8,931 
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Table 3.6: Interaction effect of revenue diversification and competition on liquidity creation 
This table reports the results from two-step system GMM estimations with Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected standard 
errors (reported in the parentheses) of the effects of revenue diversification and competition on liquidity creation. We 
use three different specifications of revenue diversification: NON, DIV, and HHI_REV. The measures of competition 
and liquidity creation are LERNER_ADJ and CATFAT, respectively. All control variables, lags of dependent 
variables, and time dummy variables are included but not tabulated. For notation of the variables see Table 3.1. Data 
is on an annual frequency covering the period 2001-2013. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. The Arellano-Bond (AB) test for serial correlation is based on the null hypothesis of second-order 
autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals. The Hansen test is used for over-identifying restrictions in GMM 
dynamic model estimation. CAPITAL and CATFAT are treated as GMM-style instruments (endogenous) through the 
xtabond2 procedure at lag 1 and lag 2, respectively. All other included regressors are treated as IV-style instruments 
(exogenous).  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LERNER_ADJ -0.012*** -0.017*** -0.015*** 0.021 -0.013*** -0.015***  
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.016) (0.005) (0.005) 
NON 0.008*** 0.014*** 
    
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
    
LERNER_ADJ × NON 
 
0.002*** 
    
  
(0.001) 
    
DIV 
  
0.006*** 0.011*** 
  
   
(0.001) (0.002) 
  
LERNER_ADJ × DIV 
   
0.002** 
  
    
(0.001) 
  
HHI_REV 
    
-0.000** 0.000      
(0.000) (0.000) 
LERNER_ADJ × HHI_REV 
     
0.000**       
(0.000) 
F-test (p-val) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AB-test AR(2) 0.511 0.523 0.504 0.311 0.499 0.506 
Hansen 0.136 0.124 0.116 0.307 0.155 0.155 
Obs. 77,729 77,729 77,729 77,729 77,729 77,729 
No. of banks 8,939 8,939 8,939 8,939 8,939 8,939 
 
 
3.5.4 Size effect 
The relationships among liquidity creation, competition, and revenue diversification may 
vary across bank size. We expect that the “financial fragility” and the “risk absorption-opportunity 
costs” effects of competition on liquidity creation may be present to differing degrees in banks of 
differing sizes. In particular, for small banks, the “financial fragility effect” is more likely to 
manifest. On the one hand, banks with higher market powers tend to have higher franchise or 
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charter value, a manifestation of their market power. They are therefore likely to hold more liquid 
buffers to protect themselves against bank illiquidity shocks and to safeguard themselves from the 
high expected cost of financial distress. However, holding more liquid buffers is associated with 
higher opportunity costs in the form of foregone returns on loans. The opportunity cost of holding 
more capital is even higher for banks with higher market power, as they are in a position to charge 
relatively higher interest rates on their loans. Unlike large banks, small banks may prefer to act 
more prudently by creating less liquidity, as it is harder for them to quickly raise liquidity from the 
interbank market and wholesale funds when bank failures become more likely. In other words, the 
“financial fragility” effect of competition outweighs the “opportunity costs” effect for small banks, 
which explains the positive effect of competition on liquidity creation.  
On the other hand, we expect the “risk absorption-opportunity cost” arguments to dominate 
the “financial fragility” effects for large banks. First, the “risk absorption” effect is likely to be 
stronger for large banks because large banks, with higher market power, are more likely to have 
higher profit margins and capital buffers (see Keeley 1990), which may extend their capacity to 
absorb risk. Second, due to better credit ratings, large banks have an advantage in accessing the 
interbank market and securing funds in a more cost effective manner. Also, they are more likely 
to receive government bailout in times of stress because they are deemed “systemically important” 
(Standard and Poors 2012). It follows that “too-big-too-fail” subsidies from safety net policies 
distort large banks’ risk taking incentives (Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt & Zhu  2014) and reduce their 
incentives to hold ample low-return liquid assets. Accordingly, large banks with greater market 
power are expected to hold riskier illiquid assets and fewer liquid assets, effectively reducing their 
liquidity creation. As a result, we expect a negative relationship between competition and liquidity 
creation for large banks.  
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To test this conjecture, we divide the sample into large, medium, and small banks as 
described earlier and then re-run our regressions separately for each sub-group. The results are 
reported in Panel A of Table 3.7. As expected, the results suggest that the direction of the impact 
of competition on liquidity creation depends on bank size. In particular, for small banks that 
comprise of the majority of our sample, competition has a positive impact on liquidity creation. It 
appears that when the market is competitive, the actual or perceived risk of bank runs and bank 
failures are exacerbated for small banks. The increased risk prompts firms to engage in more 
thorough borrower monitoring, which allows them to extend more loans. In sharp contrast, for the 
large bank group, the relationship is negative. This finding is in line with the “risk absorption and 
opportunity costs” hypothesis. It also appears that the results relating to large banks drive the 
aggregate results reported in Table 3.4. Given that large banks only account for 2.73% of the total 
number of banks in the sample, their overpowering results emphasize their important role in the 
economy. For large banks, we also find that the relationship between competition and liquidity 
creation depends on the level of revenue diversification. Market competition is shown to affect 
liquidity creation more profoundly when banks are more diversified in their revenue streams. This 
effect is absent in other bank size classes.  
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Table 3.7: Relationship between competition, revenue diversification, and liquidity creation for different bank size classes 
This table reports the results from two-step system GMM estimations with Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected standard errors (reported in parentheses) of the effects 
of revenue diversification and competition on liquidity creation (Panel A) and on each component of liquidity creation (Panel B) for different groups of banks by 
size. Panel A uses CATFAT as the dependent variable. Panel B uses individual components of liquidity creation (e.g., liquid assets/GTA, semi-liquid assets/GTA, 
illiquid assets/GTA, etc.) as dependent variables. Small banks, medium banks, and large banks are classified using total assets of $1 and $3 billion as the cut-off 
points. The measures of competition, revenue diversification, and liquidity creation are LERNER_ADJ, DIV, and CATFAT respectively. All control variables, 
lags of dependent variables, and time dummy variables are included but not tabulated. For notation of the variables see Table 3.1. Data is on an annual frequency 
and covers the period of 2001-2013. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The Arellano-Bond (AB) test for serial correlation is 
based on the null hypothesis of second-order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals. The Hansen test is used for over-identifying restrictions in GMM 
dynamic model estimation. CAPITAL and CATFAT are treated as GMM-style instruments (endogenous) through the xtabond2 procedure at lag 1 (or 2, 3, 4) and 
lag 2, respectively. All other included regressors are treated as IV-style instruments (exogenous).  
Panel A: Effect of competition and revenue diversification on liquidity creation   
Small banks  Medium banks  Large banks  
LERNER_ADJ -0.016***  -0.008  0.078***  
 (0.006)  (0.019)  (0.013)  
DIV 0.007***  0.017**  0.029***   
(0.002)  (0.008)  (0.009)  
LERNER_ADJ × DIV -0.0002  0.002  0.011***   
(0.0003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
F-test (p-val) 0.000  0.000  0.000  
AB-test AR(2) 0.327  0.202  0.181  
Hansen 0.198  0.715  0.981  
Obs. 72,562  3,166  1,259  
No. of banks 8,472  639  256  
Panel B: Effect of competition and revenue diversification on each component of liquidity creation 
Variables Assets/GTA (Liability + Equity) /GTA Off-balance sheet /GTA 
 Illiquid Semi-liquid Liquid 
 Illiquid Semi-liquid Liquid  Illiquid Semi-liquid Liquid 
Weight +0.50 0.00 -0.50  -0.50 0.00 +0.50  +0.50 0.00 -0.50 
Large banks              
LERNER_ADJ 0.018** -0.004 -0.043***  -0.001 -0.001 -0.061  0.073** 0.002** 0.008*  
(0.009) (0.014) (0.013)  (0.001) (0.012) (0.038)  (0.034) (0.001) (0.005) 
DIV -0.005 0.001 -0.014  -0.001 0.021 -0.030*  0.011 0.001 0.002  
(0.007) (0.006) (0.009)  (0.003) (0.016) (0.016)  (0.026) (0.002) (0.002) 
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LERNER_ADJ × DIV -0.002 0.000 -0.006*  -0.001 0.007 -0.012**  0.005 0.000 0.001  
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004)  (0.001) (0.005) (0.006)  (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) 
F-test (p-val) 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
AB-test AR(2) 0.104 0.996 0.614  0.853 0.385 0.274  0.672 0.368 0.298 
Hansen 0.859 0.198 0.612  0.244 0.322 0.865  0.884 0.685 0.155 
Obs. 1,259 1,259 1,259  1,259 1,259 1,259  1,259 1,259 1,259 
No. of banks 256 256 256  256 256 256  256 256 256 
Medium banks 
LERNER_ADJ 0.005 -0.052** 0.068  -0.008 0.036** 0.058  0.303 -0.034* 0.0003  
(0.017) (0.026) (0.065)  (0.006) (0.018) (0.100)  (0.202) (0.020) (0.0003) 
DIV 0.006 -0.009 -0.020**  0.006** 0.002 0.022*  0.062 -0.005 0.000  
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009)  (0.002) (0.010) (0.013)  (0.039) (0.004) (0.0002) 
LERNER_ADJ × DIV 0.001 -0.008 -0.001  0.002* 0.001 0.012  0.037 -0.005 0.000  
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)  (0.001) (0.004) (0.010)  (0.025) (0.003) (0.0001) 
F-test (p-val) 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
AB-test AR(2) 0.951 0.414 0.571  0.864 0.156 0.332  0.276 0.207 0.732 
Hansen 0.108 0.540 0.816  0.110 0.724 0.135  0.140 0.647 0.332 
Obs. 3,166 3,166 3,166  3,166 3,166 3,166  3,166 3,166 3,166 
No. of banks 639 639 639  639 639 639  639 639 639 
Small banks 
LERNER_ADJ -0.026 -0.134* 0.023  0.019* -0.079 -0.036  0.004 0.0001 -0.00004  
(0.016) (0.069) (0.030)  (0.010) (0.080) (0.033)  (0.048) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
DIV -0.008*** 0.001 -0.006  0.004** -0.006 -0.002  0.010** 0.000 0.000  
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004)  (0.001) (0.007) (0.003)  (0.005) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
LERNER_ADJ × DIV -0.002* -0.007** 0.001  0.001** -0.004 -0.002  0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.004) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.000) (0.0001) 
F-test (p-val) 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
AB-test AR(2) 0.182 0.536 0.112  0.147 0.588 0.151  0.781 0.598 0.816 
Hansen 0.197 0.313 0.217  0.552 0.275 0.134  0.123 0.652 0.118 
Obs. 72,562 72,562 72,562  72,562 72,562 72,562  72,562 72,562 72,562 
No. of banks 8,472 8,472 8,472  8,472 8,472 8,472  8,472 8,472 8,472 
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3.5.5 Explanation for the heterogeneous impact of competition on liquidity creation 
across bank size classes 
To get a better understanding of why the effect of competition on liquidity creation is 
different for large and small banks, we disaggregate the liquidity creation measure into its 
individual components. In particular, we use the normalized individual components of the 
“catfat” liquidity creation measure as dependent variables in a variant of Eq. (3.5).30 The 
coefficient estimates relating to the key variables are reported in Panel B of Table 3.7. As the 
diversification effects do not vary across bank size as previously shown in subsection 3.5.4, we 
focus our analysis on the relationship between competition and liquidity creation’s 
components.  
For large banks, we find that market power is positively related to liquidity creation on 
the asset side of the balance sheet, as well as in off-balance-sheet activities. Although market 
power has a negative impact on liquid assets, this negativity appears to be overpowered by the 
positive coefficients on the remaining variables. The findings support our aforementioned 
hypothesis that the “too-big-too-fail” perception and market power allow large banks to bear 
more risks by issuing riskier illiquid assets such as commercial loans and risky illiquid 
guarantees while holding less of a liquid assets buffer.  
For medium-sized and small banks, the results show very different effects of market 
power on liquidity creation. For medium banks, market power appears to have no impact on 
liquidity creation as it only affects semi-liquid items that carry a zero weight in the calculation 
of liquidity creation. For small banks, bank market power primarily influences liquidity 
creation through illiquid liability. Overall, the effect of market power on large banks is opposite 
                                                 
30 The individual components are: illiquid assets, semi-liquid assets, liquid assets, illiquid liability and equity, 
semi-liquid liability and equity, liquid liability and equity, illiquid off-balance sheet activities, semi-liquid off-
balance sheet activities, and liquid off-balance sheet activities.  
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to that on small banks because market power increases the illiquid items on the asset side for 
large banks and illiquid items on the liability side for smaller banks. The results in Panel B are 
also consistent with that of Panel A in that the reported relationship between competition and 
liquidity is largely driven by the set of results relating to the largest banks.  
3.5.6 Robustness 
We conduct a number of tests to ensure the robustness of our results. First, we exclude 
the financial crisis period from the sample period. This allows us to remove the impact of 
possible substantial and nonlinear shocks on the relationship of interest. Second, we check our 
results using the alternative liquidity creation measures: “catnonfat”, “matfat”, and 
“matnonfat”, normalized by total assets. Third, we divide our sample according to bank 
ownership (listed versus unlisted banks), bank specialization (commercial banks versus savings 
banks), bank holding company status (BHC members versus independent banks), location 
(metro versus micro areas), bank charter (federally chartered versus state chartered), and 
branch restrictions (allowed versus restricted). We then re-run our regressions separately for 
each sub-sample to see whether our main results are sensitive when controlling for certain types 
of institutions, bank locations, and regulatory environments. Last but not least, we categorize 
banks into two groups based on whether they already fulfil the NSFR requirement and re-run 
the main regressions for each sub-sample. Banks may be subject to illiquidity risks in their role 
as liquidity creators. However, liquidity creation does not necessarily hamper bank stability as 
long as it holds an adequate level of stable funding (i.e., NSFR≥100%). In contrast, liquidity 
creation beyond a certain threshold may have implications for financial stability. The results of 
these robustness tests are reported in Table 3.8. 
 As can be seen from Panel A of this table, the diversification effect on liquidity creation 
remains at a 5% level of significance, while the competition effect is only weakly present in 
the “catnonfat” category, suggesting that the financial crisis had a very strong bearing on the 
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baseline results reported in Table 3.4. Outside the financial crisis period, competition does not 
appear to significantly affect liquidity creation; this result holds regardless of the degree of 
revenue diversification. The weakened effect of competition on liquidity creation during non-
crisis times can be explained by the pro-cyclicality of competition in banking, which is less 
likely to be related to the financial crisis period (RBA 2014). Unlike competition, the results 
relating to diversification hold across all measures.  
Panel B also shows the results of our ownership test. There are a number of noteworthy 
findings. First, for savings banks, neither competition nor revenue diversification has any 
impact on liquidity creation. Second, the favourable effect of revenue diversification on banks’ 
ability to create liquidity remains across all banks types (except for savings banks). Third, 
competition is found to be unrelated to the liquidity created by listed banks, saving banks, 
independent banks that are not part of BHCs, federally chartered banks, and banks operating 
in states allowing interstate branches. Fourth, the effect of the joint occurrence (interaction) of 
market power and diversification on liquidity creation appears to be significantly positive for 
listed banks, unlisted banks, large banks, and banks with relaxed branch restrictions.  
Panel C reports the results of our final robustness test. We find that banks with 
NSFR≥100% tend to create more liquidity by diversifying their sources of income, while banks 
with NSFR<100% do not. Interestingly, market power does not affect the liquidity creation of 
the former category of banks, but it does amplify the benefits of diversification on liquidity 
creation. In contrast, market power significantly endangers the liquidity creation of banks that 
do not fulfil the liquidity requirements. For banks with NSFR≥100%, the creation of additional 
liquidity does not seem to pose a risk to those banks’ stability. However, for banks that do not 
(yet) meet the liquidity requirement, the liquidity enhancing effect of competition may have 
adverse implications on the banking system due to substantially high illiquidity risk and the 
threat of financial distress. 
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Table 3.8: Robustness checks 
This table reports the results from two-step system GMM estimations with Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected standard errors (reported in the parentheses) of the effects of revenue 
diversification and competition on liquidity creation. Panel A reports the main results excluding financial crisis years (2007-2010) from the full sample period and using 
alternative measures of liquidity creation: CATNONFAT, MATFAT, and MATNONFAT scaled by GTA, respectively. Panel B reports the results separately for different types 
of banks. Panel C reports the results separately for a group of banks that fulfil liquidity requirement (NSFR≥ 100%) and a group of bank that do not (NSFR<100%). For NSFR 
calculation methodology, see Appendix 3. The measures of competition and revenue diversification are LERNER_ADJ and DIV, respectively. Panels B and C use CATFAT 
scaled by GTA as a dependent variable. All control variables, lags of dependent variables, and time dummy variables are included but not tabulated. For notation of the variables 
see Table 1. Data is on an annual frequency covering the period of 2001-2013. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The Arellano-Bond (AB) 
test for serial correlation is based on the null hypothesis of second-order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals. The Hansen test is used for over-identifying restrictions 
in GMM dynamic model estimation. CAPITAL and CATNONFAT/MATFAT/MATNONFAT are treated as GMM-style instruments (endogenous) through the xtabond2 
procedure at lag 1 (or 3,5) and lag 2, respectively. All other included regressors are treated as IV-style instruments (exogenous). For NSFR calculation methodology see 
Appendix 3. 
 
Panel A: Other measures of liquidity creation 
Variables                           Excluding crisis period   Full sample – Different measures of liquidity creation 
 CATFAT   CATNONFAT  MATFAT  MATNONFAT 
LERNER_ADJ -0.014   -0.015**  0.092  0.057 
 (0.009)   (0.006)  (0.064)  (0.045) 
DIV 0.009**   0.003**  0.021*  0.014** 
 (0.004)   (0.001)  (0.011)  (0.007) 
LERNER_ADJ ×  0.000   -0.0004  0.005  0.003 
 (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.002) 
F-test (p-val) 0.000   0.000  0.000  0.000 
AB-test AR(2) 0.517   0.757  0.517  0.501 
Hansen 0.118   0.105  0.195  0.168 
Obs. 46,228   77,729  77,729  77,729 
No. of banks 8,802   8,939  8,939  8,939 
Panel B: Banks with different regulation, ownership and location 
          Ownership Specialization  BHC status Location Charters Interstate Branch 
 Listed  Unlisted   Comm. banks 
Saving 
banks 
 BHCs  Ind. banks 
 Metro 
Areas 
Micro 
areas 
 Federally 
chartered  
State 
chartered  
 Allowed Restricted 
LERNER_
ADJ 0.019 -0.049*** 
 
-0.027*** -0.011 
 
-0.024*** 0.028 
 
-0.015** -0.031*** 
 
0.004 -0.040*** 
 
0.012 -0.016*** 
 (0.016) (0.016)  (0.010) (0.012)  (0.007) (0.042)  (0.007) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.013)  (0.011) (0.006) 
DIV 0.010*** 0.027*  0.008*** 0.015  0.006*** 0.017***  0.008*** 0.008*  0.011** 0.005*  0.017** 0.006*** 
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 (0.002) (0.014)  (0.002) (0.012)  (0.002) (0.006)  (0.002) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.003)  (0.007) (0.002) 
LERNER_
ADJ 0.002* 0.036*  -0.0004 0.002  -0.001 0.003  0.0001 0.005  0.001 -0.001  0.016** -0.0002 
× DIV (0.001) (0.02)  (0.001) (0.004)  (0.000) (0.002)  (.0005) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.007) (0.0003) 
F-test (p-
val) 0.000 0.000 
 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
AB-test 
AR(2) 0.33 0.287 
 0.424 0.969  0.347 0.465  0.257 0.125  0.318 0.656  0.207 0.466 
Hansen 0.189 0.649  0.156 0.175   0.124 0.347   0.113 0.25   0.58 0.241   0.302 0.215 
Obs. 76,314 1,359  74,513 3,173  63,498 13,322  41,580 35,838  15,833 61,888  4,447 72,721 
No. of 
banks 8,688 292  8,248 706  7,194 2,394  5,321 3,876  2,057 6,885  782 8,576 
Panel C: Banks that fulfil NSFR liquidity requirement or not  
NSFR<100%  NSFR ≥ 100% 
LERNER_ADJ -0.0226***  0.016 
 (0.0084)  (0.016) 
DIV 0.0018  0.011***  
(0.0063)  (0.003) 
LERNER_ADJ × DIV -0.0002  0.002*  
(0.0015)  (0.001) 
F-test (p-val) 0.000  0.000 
AB-test AR(2) 0.343  0.873 
Hansen 0.272  0.110 
Obs. 6,656  65,520 
No. of banks 1,902  8,579 
 
 
Overall, all of our robustness checks reinforce our main finding of the positive relationship between diversification and liquidity creation. 
However, the liquidity-enhancing effect of bank competition depends on the liquidity creation measures used, the type of bank, and the global financial 
crisis.  
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3.6 Conclusion 
Liquidity risk and credit risk are the two important aspects underlying bank fragility. 
Most empirical literature studying the impact of competition and revenue diversification on 
bank stability has focused on the credit risk channel while neglecting liquidity risk as a source 
of instability. Therefore, this study contributes to this literature by providing comprehensive 
empirical evidence on the link between competition, revenue diversification, and liquidity 
creation.  
Based on the preferred “catfat” liquidity creation measure, we document that competition 
and income diversification have a positive impact on a bank’s capacity to create liquidity across 
different proxies of competition and diversification. Also, the interaction between the two 
factors significantly determines bank liquidity creation.  
We also examine the impact of the institutional and regulatory environment on the 
competition-liquidity creation and revenue diversification-liquidity creation relationships. We 
find strong evidence that the liquidity-enhancing effect of competition is more pronounced for 
banks with low credit risk, banks operating in micropolitan markets, and banks in markets 
where interstate branches are restricted. On the other hand, the positive effect of diversification 
on liquidity creation is more beneficial for banks operating in metropolitan markets than those 
in micropolitan markets. In addition, banks with lower loan credit risk have the potential to 
increase their liquidity creation capacity by implementing revenue diversification strategies.  
The relationship between liquidity creation and diversification is consistent across bank 
size, while the impact of competition is not. For large banks, the relationship between 
competition and liquidity creation is negative, consistent with the expected empirical 
dominance of the “risk absorption-opportunity cost” effect. In sharp contrast, for small banks, 
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the relationship is positive, consistent with the expected “financial fragility” argument. We find 
no evidence of competition effects for medium-sized banks.  
Finally, our results regarding the NSFR liquidity requirement and liquidity creation have 
interesting policy implications. For banks that hold sufficient stable funds, the positive effect 
of diversification implies that additional liquidity creation does not increase illiquidity risk and 
pose a threat to overall stability. However, the liquidity enhancing effect of competition for 
banks that do not meet the liquidity requirements may have adverse implications on the banking 
system due to substantially high illiquidity risk and the threat of financial distress. The findings 
suggest that policymakers should place stronger emphasis on the importance of the NSFR 
liquidity requirement when considering banking deregulation.  
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CHAPTER 4: A TRADE-OFF ON BANK STABILITY WHEN BANKS 
CREATE MORE LIQUIDITY 
4.1 Introduction 
Against the backdrop of a potential contagion across the financial sector following the 
recent global financial crisis, the stability of the banking sector is a major concern for bank 
regulators, deposit insurers, and the public at large. Extensive academic and regulatory 
discussions highlight various risks banks face such as credit risks, market risks, and operational 
risks. However, little attention is paid to liquidity risks—one of the major risks faced by banks 
and clearly manifested in the 2007–2008 global financial crisis (Landskroner & Paroush 2008).  
The root cause of liquidity risks seems to lie in the preeminent function of commercial 
banks as liquidity creators. Components of liquidity creation such as loans, deposits, and off-
balance sheet operations can be seen as sources of liquidity risk for banks. To illustrate, on-call 
bank deposits are often thought to be the primary source of liquidity risk. Liquidity risk is 
exacerbated on the asset side where existing loans are typically illiquid and there is uncertainty 
surrounding the timing and volume of future loan requests. Off-balance sheet activities can 
also give rise to liquidity risk. For instance, loan commitments, standby letters of credit, and 
derivative positions taken by banks provide essential liquidity and payment services. However, 
these positions leave banks exposed to liquidity shortages and instability, especially during 
periods of economic downturn (Rochet 2008). Despite the apparent theoretical connection 
between liquidity creation and bank risk, little empirical literature exists to support this 
hypothesis. The goal of this study is therefore to identify the empirical relationship between 
liquidity creation and bank stability, as well as potential factors that impact this relationship.  
There is conflicting evidence in the existing literature regarding the connection between 
liquidity creation and financial stability via its effects on bank failure and risk-taking 
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behaviour. On the one hand, the theoretical models of Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983) and their extensions (such as Diamond & Rajan 2000; Diamond & Rajan 2001; 
Diamond & Rajan 2002; Allen & Gale 2004a) support the “liquidity creation-fragility” view 
in which liquidity creation is a driver of bank fragility. Banks create liquidity by financing 
relatively long-term illiquid assets with relatively short-term, liquid liabilities. Consequently, 
they are exposed to liquidity risk when faced with unexpected large deposit withdrawals. Such 
liquid claims allow depositors to inter-temporally optimize their consumption preferences but 
render banks vulnerable to the risk of bank runs. The suggested negative relationship between 
liquidity creation and bank stability is further supported by empirical studies focusing on the 
financial crisis of 2007-2008. For example, Berger and Bouwman (2008, 2009) have shown 
that banking crises in the U.S. have been preceded by periods of abnormal liquidity creation. 
Berger and Bouwman (2015) further empirically documented the significant positive effect of 
the aggregate excessive liquidity creation by the U.S. banking sector on the probability of a 
future financial crisis.  
On the other hand, an opposing view posits that liquidity creation can mitigate moral 
hazard problems by influencing risk-taking behaviour, which in turn promotes bank stability. 
Wagner (2007) developed a model showing that higher asset liquidity reduces the cost of asset 
liquidation for banks in the event of crisis but induces bank managers to take on offsetting new 
risk on their balance sheet. Consequently, the probability of default eventually increases. 
Consistent with this view, Acharya and Naqvi (2012) showed that in an economy where there 
is high macroeconomic risk, bank liquidity increases in the form of more deposits taken from 
investors who switch to savings from direct investments. As a consequence of excess liquidity, 
banks overconfidently take on more risk by engaging in more aggressive lending practices, 
thereby make the banking sector more fragile. It can therefore be argued that liquidity creation, 
which facilitates a higher number of illiquid assets, might mitigate the risk-taking moral hazard 
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by inducing bank managers to be less risky in other business activities in order to reduce the 
likelihood of bank runs, particularly during turbulent economic periods. 
This study is accordingly motivated to address a series of unanswered questions 
regarding the effect of liquidity creation on bank stability. In particular, we aim to shed light 
on the following questions: First, how does a change in total bank liquidity creation and its two 
main components, on- and off-balance sheet activity, affect bank stability? Does this 
relationship depend on particular bank characteristics such as bank specification, ownership, 
location, BHC status, and bank size? Do bank capital buffers affect the liquidity creation-
stability relationship, and if so, how? Conversely, does liquidity creation make capital 
requirements a more effective instrument to ensure stability? Do competition and revenue 
diversification strategies have any impact on the effect of liquidity creation on stability? How 
do regulatory liquidity requirements and current bank health conditions interfere with the 
impact of liquidity creation on bank stability? Finally, what are the implications of our results 
for micro-prudential regulation?  
Among the determinants of bank stability, the literature has identified capital buffers, 
competition, and revenue diversification as major driving forces. It is, therefore, important for 
an empirical investigation to be conducted in order to understand how these variables 
individually contribute to bank stability and whether they are associated with the changes in 
the effects of liquidity creation on bank stability. Bank risk taking is generally shown to 
decrease following the implementation of capital adequacy requirements, suggesting that 
capital buffers have a positive effect on bank stability.31 According to the “risk absorption” 
hypothesis, proposed by Berger and Bouwman (2009), a high capital buffer allows banks to 
expand their capacity to absorb liquidity shock, thereby potentially mitigating the destabilizing 
                                                 
31 See Furlong and Keeley (1989), Konishi and Yasuda (2004), Lindquist (2004), Repullo (2004), Lee and Hsieh 
(2013), Zhang, Wu and Liu (2008), Hyun and Rhee (2011). 
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effect of increased liquidity creation. In addition, Wagner (2007) argued that when asset 
liquidity becomes large (the less liquidity is created in the economy), the less effective capital 
requirements might be as a stability-ensuring instrument. The reason for this is that the fewer 
potential losses associated with fire sales of assets make bank closure less of a threat for bank 
owners. Thus, we expect an enhanced impact of capital requirements on stability as liquidity 
creation increases. 
The influence of competition on the liquidity creation-stability relationship, however, is 
not as clear. On the one hand, the well-known “competition-fragility” theories advanced by 
Keeley (1990) imply that, all else being equal, low competition weakens the fragility-
enhancing effect of liquidity creation through a number of channels. First, monopolistic banks 
operating in an uncompetitive banking market enjoy higher profit margins, which are 
associated with higher franchise or charter values. As a result, they have higher financial 
distress costs when bank runs occur.32 Consequently, bank managers are more conservative 
regarding excessive risk-taking behaviour and accordingly extend loans to less risky borrowers. 
The volume of non-performing loans, in turn, decreases, thus mitigating the negative impact 
of liquidity creation on bank stability. Second, banks with higher market power are also argued 
to be likely to have higher capital buffers (Keeley 1990). According to the “risk absorption” 
effect, a higher capital buffer may help banks extend their capacity to absorb liquidity risk, 
hence market power might counter the negative impact of liquidity creation on bank stability. 
Third, high market power allows banks to better screen and differentiate between low and high 
quality borrowers, leading to lower risk loan portfolios (Cetorelli & Peretto 2000). Finally, it 
is argued that supervision of banks in a more concentrated market is more effective due to 
                                                 
32 See Marcus (1984), Keeley (1990), Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000), Repullo (2004), Allen and Gale 
(2000), Allen and Gale (2004b).   
 127 
lower monitoring costs, as the risk of system-wide contagion presumably fades because a 
market with a few large banks may be easier to monitor (Allen & Gale 2000).  
The “competition-stability” nexus (Boyd & De Nicolo 2005), on the other hand, suggests 
that low competition leads to higher bank risk and thereby might exacerbate the negative effect 
of liquidity creation on bank stability. First, in a low competitive market, monopolistic banks 
are more likely to impose less favourable price and non-price terms on their customers.33 
Accordingly, borrowers have more incentive to take on risky investments to compensate for 
higher loan repayments (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2006), which in turn aggravates the likelihood 
of loan defaults and bank failures. Second, when banks become large, they are more likely to 
be subject to the “too-big-too-fail” problem, where bank managers are incentivized to take on 
more risk (Mishkin 1999). In addition, a highly concentrated market is more likely to associate 
with more complex organizations who use sophisticated financial instruments and are engaged 
in business lines that can be detrimental to their stability (Amidu & Wolfe 2013). All in all, the 
“competition-stability” view postulates that the joint occurrence of liquidity creation and a low 
competition environment may have a significant negative effect on bank stability.  
Similarly, the impact of revenue diversification on bank stability and risk is equally 
unclear. One line of research suggests that revenue diversification into non-interest income 
activities helps banks reduce risk (Landskroner, Ruthenberg & Zaken 2005; Baele, De Jonghe 
& Vander Vennet 2007; Sanya & Wolfe 2011). However, recent studies find that greater 
reliance on non-interest income hampers banks’ financial stability though increased bank risk 
and earning stream volatility.34  
                                                 
33 See Berger (1995a), Garmaise and Moskowitz (2006), Carbo-Valverde, Rodriguez Fernandez and Udell  (2009), 
Hannan (1991), Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2004), Hainz, Weill and Godlewski (2013). 
34 See DeYoung and Roland (2001), Stiroh (2004), Lepetit et al. (2008), Hidayat, Kakinaka and Miyamoto  (2012), 
Stiroh and Rumble (2006), Mercieca, Schaeck and Wolfe (2007), and DeJonghe (2010). 
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Our investigations contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First and 
foremost, to our knowledge our study is the first to empirically examine the direct impact of 
banks’ core function as liquidity creators on bank stability. We document a trade-off on bank 
stability when banks create more liquidity. In particular, in line with the “liquidity creation-
fragility” hypothesis proposed by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), we find that banks that create 
more liquidity appear to be more vulnerable. Second, this study analyses the potential negative 
effect of liquidity creation on stability across bank types (i.e., size, ownership, and 
specification). Specifically, the fragility-aggravating effect of liquidity creation is found for 
commercial banks and listed banks but absent for savings banks and unlisted banks. 
Additionally, the destabilizing effect of liquidity creation is found to be much stronger within 
large banks than in small and medium-sized banks. Third, we not only add to the current 
inconclusive literature that addresses the impact of capital requirements, bank competition, and 
revenue diversification on bank soundness; we also expand this literature by investigating how 
their individual effects vary in interaction with liquidity creation. Our evidence indicates that 
a capital buffer is an effective instrument to enhance stability, contrary to the destabilizing 
effect of competition, which supports the “capital-at-risk effect” and “competition-fragility” 
hypothesis. Our results further reveal that two strands of the literature regarding the impact of 
revenue diversification on bank stability need not necessarily exclude each other. More 
precisely, it seems that banks with a moderate level of diversification are less fragile than those 
that over- and under-diversify revenue. Most importantly, capital buffer, competition, and 
revenue diversification are consistently found to reduce the fragility-aggravating effect of 
liquidity creation. Nevertheless, when liquidity creation is low, capital become a less effective 
instrument for ensuring stability. Fourth, we offer new insights suggesting there is an important 
relationship between bank health and liquidity creation, which affects overall bank stability. In 
particular, distressed banks and banks with insufficient liquidity are likely to benefit from 
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“successful gambling for resurrection” through the creation of more liquidity. Finally, we 
employ comprehensive Call Reports data, which provide detailed bank-level information not 
available in the Bankscope database.35 As a result, our findings are based on actual maturities, 
not assumptions of maturities.  
Our results have the following implications for current regulatory financial reforms: 
First, our findings support recent regulations imposing stricter capital and NRSF liquidity 
requirements under the Basel III framework. Although liquidity creation is likely to result in 
more bank vulnerability, banks that fulfil the NSFR requirement appear more stable. In 
addition, capital buffers are shown to be effective tools for promoting bank stability and 
mitigating the fragility-aggravating effect of liquidity creation. However, this study also 
suggests that policymakers should be cautious about a uniform liquidity regulatory approach. 
The size of the liquidity buffer should be tailored to an individual bank’s characteristics such 
as its complexity, size, specification, capital structure, riskiness, and current competition 
environment and diversification strategies. For instance, liquidity creation generally affects 
small and medium-sized banks to a lesser extent than large banks. It also does not have any 
significant influence on the soundness of savings banks and unlisted banks. Therefore, the level 
of stable funding imposed on these type of banks should take into account these institutional 
differences. Finally, liquidity risk management should be considered in conjunction with 
maintaining the core function of banks as liquidity creators. Given that the new Basel III 
liquidity requirements aim to promote bank stability by managing the illiquidity risk arising 
from liquidity creation, our research suggests that these requirements should also incorporate 
the potential unexpected effects of liquidity creation shortages through stricter risk 
management practices. In fact, banks in the bottom quartile as ranked by the amount of liquidity 
                                                 
35 In particular, Call Reports distinguish between time deposits, borrowed money, broker deposits, and loans and 
leases according to maturity, enabling us to calculate more robust liquidity creation (“mat” vs “fat” measures) and 
NSFR measures. Call Reports also offer a decomposition of non-interest income while Bankscope does not.   
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created in our sample appear to create concerningly low amounts of liquidity,  raising concerns 
about the central role of these institutions in ensuring a well-functioning economy. 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows: Section 4.2 provides the theoretical 
background and hypothesis development for our analysis. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 describe the 
methodology and data. Section 4.5 presents our empirical analyses, and the last section 
concludes the study.  
4.2 Theoretical Background 
While a number of theoretical studies have extensively examined the link between asset 
liquidity and risk in banking, few focused on the concept of liquidity creation. Accordingly, 
the direct effects of liquidity creation, the prominent role performed by banks, on bank stability 
is somewhat lacking. Nevertheless, two main theoretical research strands bear some relevance 
for this potential relationship. The first strand draws on classic financial intermediation theories 
(Bryant 1980; Diamond & Dybvig 1983) and their extensions (Diamond & Rajan 2000; 
Diamond & Rajan 2001; Diamond & Rajan 2002; Allen & Gale 2004b) and suggests a negative 
effect of liquidity creation on bank stability. The second strand, pioneered by Wagner (2007), 
suggests an opposing view on this relationship by emphasizing banks’ risk-taking incentive 
channels.  
The “liquidity creation-fragility” hypothesis developed by Bryant (1980) and Diamond 
and Dybvig (1983) show that liquidity creation subjects banks to vulnerability. Extensions of 
these models (Diamond & Rajan 2000; Diamond & Rajan 2001; Diamond & Rajan 2002; Allen 
& Gale 2004b) further demonstrate that financial fragility is needed to create liquidity and that 
banks’ role as risk transformers and liquidity creators make them prone to failure. The more 
liquidity a bank creates, the higher the likelihood of distress due to the severity of possible 
losses from asset fire sales to meet unexpected large deposit withdrawals. In relation to off-
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balance sheet liquidity creation, Thakor (2005) has suggested that banks tend to avoid 
exercising material adverse change clauses in loan commitment contracts during economic 
booms due to reputational concerns. As a result, excessive credit risk is taken on, and greater 
off-balance sheet liquidity is created during such times. Berger and Bouwman 
(2015) empirically found that U.S. banks’ excessive liquidity creation is associated with the 
increased likelihood of a future financial crisis. These findings collectively lead to this study’s 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: There is a trade-off on bank stability when banks create more 
liquidity. Liquidity creation therefore leads to bank instability. 
A different perspective on the relationship between liquidity and bank stability was 
proposed by Wagner (2007), which suggests that this hypothesis might not hold. In the 
conventional view, a high amount of liquid assets reduces the level of risk on a bank’s balance 
sheet by facilitating diversification and transferring risk out of the banking sector. Banks are 
therefore less vulnerable to liquidity shocks. However, bank risk-taking behaviours may 
change as a result of increased asset liquidity. In particular, holding more liquidity makes crisis 
less costly for banks because assets can be liquidated more easily. Banks are therefore 
incentivized to take on new risks that exactly or more than offset the initial lower risk level 
associated with holding more liquid assets. Measuring stability as the probability of bank 
default and increased asset liquidity modelled as the exogenous decrease of the discount rate 
on loan sales, Wagner (2007) found that stability is not affected in normal economic 
environments but is reduced in times of crisis following an increase in asset liquidity. Wagner 
(2007) concluded that higher asset liquidity reduces fragility but does not increase stability due 
to an offsetting change in a bank’s risk-taking behaviour in the primary market. In another key 
paper, Acharya and Naqvi (2012) showed that, theoretically, excess liquidity induces 
overconfidence which leads bank managers to take on more risk by lowering lending standards 
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and increasing loan volumes in order to enhance their short-term managerial performance. The 
aggressive lending and aggregate lower loan quality may in turn trigger bank failure. This idea 
originates from the “free cash flow” hypothesis developed by Jensen (1986), which argues that 
free cash flows may lead to poor investments. Empirical support for the risk-enhancing effect 
of asset liquidity is further given by Khan et al. (2014) who use the Z-score and the ratio of 
total deposits to total assets as main proxies for risk and liquidity, respectively.  
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Model framework 
To gauge the relationship between bank liquidity creation and bank stability, this study 
employs the following dynamic panel data model suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (2000): 
𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡
= 𝑓(𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡, 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡, 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡, 𝑍𝑖,𝑡)
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                                                        (4.1) 
We first run the regression for the full sample and then for different sub-samples. The 
following are the set of characteristics used to classify banks: size (small-medium-large banks), 
specification (commercial banks or savings banks), ownership (listed or unlisted banks), BHC 
status (independent banks or BHC banks), and location (metropolitan or micropolitan). These 
classifications aim to capture different banks’ business models. 
In the second stage, we analyse how capital buffers, competition, and revenue 
diversification affect the relationship between liquidity creation and stability, respectively, 
through extended models specified as follows: 
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𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡, 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡, 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡×
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡, 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡, 𝑍𝑖,𝑡) +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                                                 (4.2) 
𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡, 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡, 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡
×𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡, 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡, 𝑍𝑖,𝑡)   
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                  (4.3) 
𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡
= 𝑓(𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡, 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡, 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡, 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡
×𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡, 𝑍𝑖,𝑡)
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                                               (4.4) 
Finally, we examine whether the main relationship of interest is influenced by bank 
health by introducing an interaction term to the baseline regression model. In particular, we 
estimate the following equation: 36 
𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡
= 𝑓(𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡, 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡, 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡, 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ,
𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡×𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡, 𝑍𝑖,𝑡)
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                                                (4.5) 
In Eqs. (4.1)-(4.5), our dependent variable is bank stability measured by Z-score. The 
main explanatory variables of interest are liquidity creation—using the preferred “catfat” 
                                                 
36 Bank health is measured in two ways: (1) whether the bank meets the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) 
requirement (NSFR≥ 1) and (2) whether it falls into the distressed or healthy category. For the NSFR calculation 
methodology, see Appendix 2. Distressed and healthy banks are defined based on the Z-score ranking method, 
following DeYoung and Torna (2013). First, we rank all banks in each year based on their Z-score, and then x 
banks with the lowest Z-scores in each year are identified as financially distressed banks, where x is the number 
of failed banks on the published FDIC list each year, available at 
<https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html>. 
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measure advocated by Berger and Bouwman (2009) scaled by total assets—bank capital buffer, 
bank competition, and bank revenue diversification. tiZ , is a set of bank-specific control 
variables that capture the influence of location and regulatory and institutional frameworks on 
liquidity creation. i and t denote bank i and year t, respectively. We include the time-fixed 
effects in all regressions to account for time-specific features. The descriptions of each variable 
are reported in Table 4.1.  
To deal with the potential problem of endogeneity and heteroskedasticity among 
variables, we employ the two-step system GMM dynamic panel estimators of Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (2000) with Windmeijer’s (2005) robust standard error37. 
Z-score is treated as a GMM-style instrument (endogenous), while all other regressors are 
treated as IV-style instruments (exogenous). To examine the validity of the instruments, we 
adopt the Hansen’s test for over-identifying restrictions in addition to the Arellano-Bond (AB) 
serial correlation test. 
4.3.2 Variable definitions 
4.3.2.1 Risk taking and bank stability measures  
The main measure of bank overall stability used in this study is the widely used Z-score 
measure.38 Z-score is calculated as the sum of average bank return on assets (net income divided 
by total assets) and bank equity to assets ratio, scaled by the standard deviation of return on 
assets over a three-year rolling window. The Z-score, hence, solely relies on accounting data. 
This makes it particularly appealing for our sample, which includes not only listed banks but 
                                                 
37 Given the relationship between liquidity creation with competition and revenue diversification as proved in the 
second essay, we are aware of the endogeneity concerns in explanation variables, which is fully alleviated by 
using well-developed dynamic GMM estimator. 
38 See Mercieca, Schaeck and Wolfe (2007), Laeven and Levine (2009), Houston et al. (2010), Demirguc-Kunt 
and Huizinga (2010), Tabak, Fazio and Cajueiro (2012), Jin et al. (2013). 
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also unlisted banks for which stock return data are not available.39 Although the popularity of 
the Z-score as a proxy for bank soundness stems from its simplicity and it being less data 
demanding, it has also proved to be as effective as more data demanding models, like the 
CAMELS (capital, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market 
risk) variables, in predicting bank distress and capturing banks’ financial stability 
(Chiaramonte et al. 2015). 
The Z-score indicates the number of standard deviations by which a bank’s return on 
assets (ROA) has to decrease from the mean before the bank is insolvent because equity is 
depleted (Boyd, Graham & Hewitt 1993). Thus, assuming that a bank’s profits are normally 
distributed, the Z-score can be interpreted as the inverse probability of insolvency (Roy 1952). 
A higher Z-score value implies a lower probability of insolvency and greater financial stability.  
In addition, we use credit risk (CR) as the proxy for risk-taking behaviour in our 
robustness checks. This is calculated as the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. High 
values indicate high risk-taking behaviour or a riskier loan portfolio. CR is widely used as a 
proxy for ex-post credit risk in the banking literature (Ayuso, Pérez & Saurina 2004; Fiordelisi, 
Marques-Ibanez & Molyneux 2011; Shim 2013). Given that banking crises typically originate 
from a prolonged deterioration in asset quality captured by a rapid increase in non-performing 
loans, this measure is an effective indicator of bank risk (Shim 2013).  
4.3.2.2 Liquidity creation measures 
We construct five liquidity creation measures (scaled by total assets) following the 
methodology of Berger and Bouwman (2009): “catfat”, “matfat”, “catnonfat”, “matnonfat”, 
and “off”. While “catfat” and “matfat” measure total liquidity creation, the others capture its 
                                                 
39 Indeed, other market-based measures of risk such as Merton distance-to-default and Marginal Expected 
Shortfall (MES) as proposed by Acharya, Engle, and Richardson (2012) cannot be used to capture the stability of 
banks that are not listed on a stock exchange.  
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components. For instance, “catnonfat” and “matnonfat” measure on-balance sheet liquidity 
creation, whereas “off” reflects off-balance sheet liquidity creation. The calculation of “catfat”, 
“matfat”, “catnonfat”, and “matnonfat” are described in Section 3.3.2.1, while “off” is 
calculated as follow:    
𝑂𝑓𝑓 = 𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑡 − 𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑎𝑡                                                                                      (4.6)                                   
             
All liquidity creation measures are normalized by total assets and employed in Eq. (4.1). 
Following Berger and Bouwman (2009), we use “catfat” (scaled by total assets) as our 
preferred measure in Eqs. (4.2)-(4.5) for brevity.  
4.3.2.3 Capital buffer measures 
We use two measures of bank capital. The primary and preferred measure is regulatory 
capital buffer (BUFF) defined as the total risk-based capital ratio (Tier 1 + Tier 
2) minus minimum regulatory capital (i.e., 8%), (Jokipii & Milne 2008; Shim 2013). The 
alternative measure is the ratio of Tier-1 capital, including common equity, non-perpetual, and 
non-cumulative preference shares based on the Basel accord, over risk-weighted assets 
(Jacques & Nigro 1997; Aggarwal & Jacques 1998; Rime 2001, Distinguin, Roulet & Tarazi 
2013). 
4.3.2.4 Competition measures 
Our two measures of competition are the funding-adjusted Lerner index and conventional 
Lerner index, which have been utilized in a number of recent banking studies.40 Section 3.3.2.2 
presents the calculation for these measures. As the funding-adjusted Lerner index and 
conventional Lerner index are inversely proportional to competition, for ease of interpretation, 
                                                 
40 See Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss (2009), Anginer et al. (2014), Beck, De Jonghe and Schepens (2013), Turk-
Ariss (2010), Amidu and Wolfe (2013), and Fu, Lin and Molyneux (2014). 
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we multiply them by -1 and name them “comp” and “comp2”, respectively, to make them 
directly proportional to competition. 
4.3.2.5 Revenue diversification measures 
To assess the degree of bank revenue diversification, we use two alternative measures 
that were introduced in Section 3.3.2.3. The first measure of bank diversification, which has 
been widely utilized in recent studies, is revenue diversity (DIV).41 DIV is calculated as:  
𝐷𝐼𝑉 = 1 −
 |𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 − 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒|
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
 
The second measure is non-interest income ratio (NON), which is the ratio of total non-
interest income over net operating income. 
4.3.2.6 Control variables 
Following the literature, to avoid a potential omitted variable problem, our regressions 
contain a broad set of bank-specific control variables, including proxies for size (natural log of 
bank total assets – LN(GTA)), profitability (return on assets ratio – ROA), reliance on deposit 
for funding (ratio of deposit over total assets – DEPOSIT) and asset composition (ratio of total 
loan over total assets – LOAN). Moreover, a set of control dummy variables are used in the 
regressions. These dummy variables include location (METRO, which takes on the value of 1 
if a bank’s local market is in a Metropolitan Statistical Area), BHC status (BHC equals 1 if a 
bank is a member of a bank holding company), regulatory and institutional frameworks 
(FEDCHRTR, which takes the value of 1 if a bank is chartered by an agent of the federal 
government, and STMULT, which the value of 1 if a bank has branches that can accept FDIC-
insured deposits in more than one state), and financial crisis (CRISIS, which takes the value of 
1 if an observation occurs during the financial crisis period of 2007 – 2010 and 0 otherwise).  
                                                 
41 See Baele, De Jonghe and Vander Vennet (2007), Elsas, Hackethal and Holzhäuser (2010), and Sawada (2013). 
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Table 4.1: Variable definitions  
Variables Acronym Description Values 
Dep. variables    
Bank overall 
stability  ZSCORE 
Measured as the sum of average return on assets and average equity/asset ratio divided by the 
standard deviation of return on assets. Each component of ZSCORE is calculated using a three-
year period rolling window. 
High values indicate high bank 
stability and less overall bank risk. 
Risk taking  CR The ratio of nonperforming loans over total loans (expressed in %). 
High values indicate high bank risk-
taking behaviour or a riskier loan 
portfolio. 
Indep. variables    
Liquidity creation CATFAT 
Dollar amount of “catfat” liquidity creation normalized by real total assets. The “catfat” measure 
classifies loans based on category and includes off-balance sheet activities (expressed in %). 
High values indicate a high level of 
liquidity creation and thus high 
liquidity risk. 
 CATNONFAT 
Dollar amount of “catnonfat” liquidity creation normalized by real total assets. The “catnonfat” 
measure classifies loans by category but excludes off-balance sheet activities (expressed in %). 
 OFF 
Dollar amount of off-balance sheet liquidity creation normalized by real total assets, calculated 
by CATFAT minus CATNONFAT (expressed in %).  
 MATFAT 
Dollar amount of “matfat” liquidity creation normalized by real total assets. The “matfat” 
measure classifies loans on maturity and includes off-balance sheet activities (expressed in %). 
  MATNONFAT 
Dollar amount of “matnonfat” liquidity creation normalized by real total assets. The “matnonfat” 
measure classifies loans on maturity but excludes off-balance sheet activities (expressed in %). 
Competition  COMP 
Multiplying the funding-adjusted Lerner index by (-1). The funding-adjusted Lerner index 
captures a bank’s pricing power by measuring the mark-up of price over marginal costs 
expressed as a percentage of price. This measure is free of any deposit market distortions such as 
monopoly power in deposit markets, which can be reflected in the conventional Lerner index 
(expressed in %). 
Higher values indicate high 
competition. 
 COMP2 
Multiplying the conventional Lerner index by (-1). The conventional Lerner index captures a 
bank’s pricing power by measuring the mark-up of price over marginal costs expressed as a 
percentage of price (expressed in %). 
 
Revenue 
diversification DIV 
Revenue diversification is measured as 𝐷𝐼𝑉 = 1 −  |𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒−𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒|
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
 
(expressed in %). 
High values indicate more revenue 
diversified. Ranges between 0 and 1.  
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 NON 
Non-interest income share, which is the ratio of non-interest income over net operating income 
(expressed in %).  
Capital BUFF 
Regulatory capital buffer calculated as total risk-based capital ratio minus minimum regulatory 
capital (i.e., 8%) (expressed in %).  
 TIER1 Tier-1 risk-based capital (expressed in %).  
Control Variables 
Profitability ROA Return on assets (expressed in %).  
Reliance on 
deposits for funding DEPOSIT Ratio of deposit over total assets (expressed in %). 
 
Asset composition LOAN Ratio of total loan over total assets (expressed in %).  
Bank size LN(GTA) Log natural of real total assets.   
BHC status BHC A dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is a member of a bank holding company.  
Location METRO 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the local market in which the bank’s offices are located is in a 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and 0 otherwise 
 
Interstate Branches STMULT 
A dummy variable that take the value of 1 if a bank has branches that can accept FDIC-insured 
deposits in more than one state (interstate branches).  
Charter FEDCHRTR 
A dummy variable that take the value of 1 if a bank is chartered by an agent of the federal 
government.  
Crisis CRISIS A dummy variable that take the value of 1 during the financial crisis period from 2007 to 2010.  
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4.4 Data 
In this chapter, we utilize the same dataset used in Chapter 3. The data sources and data 
selection criteria are fully described in Section 3.4. To recall, we use an unbalanced panel of 
88,775 bank-year observations from 9,487 unique banks in the U.S. during the sample period 
of 2001-2013. 
Table 4.2 reports the summary statistics of key variables for our sample. Statistics are 
reported for the full sample as well as sub-samples categorized in the following ways: by bank 
size,42 by contrasting the top 25% and bottom 25% liquidity creators, by whether the bank 
meets the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) requirement, and by distinguishing between 
distressed banks and healthy banks.  
Although there is clear evidence that bank size is an important determinant of stability, 
the Z-score does not increase linearly with bank size. Medium-sized banks have the smallest 
Z-score values and are generally the least stable, while small banks appear to be the most stable. 
Not surprisingly, healthy banks, banks that create the least liquidity, and those that meet the 
liquidity requirement of holding enough stable funds experience significantly higher financial 
stability. In term of the credit risk measure, large banks pursue higher-risk loan portfolio 
strategies compared to medium and small banks. It is interesting that low liquidity creators and 
banks with NRSF equal to or greater than 100% exhibit higher risk than their counterparts. 
This is consistent with the spirit of Wagner (2007), which indicates that safe banks that hold 
enough liquidity have more incentive to take on more credit risk. As expected, distressed banks 
on average have more credit risk than healthy banks.  
The average liquidity creation estimates (scaled by total assets) across the five measures 
differ slightly for the full sample period. These range from approximately 20.9% to 26.5% 
                                                 
42 Bank size is determined using the 25th and the 75th percentile of total assets of all banks in each year as cut-
off points. 
 141 
when the measures classify loans based on category (“catfat” and “catnonfat”) and from 30.8% 
to 36.5% when loans are classified according to maturity (“matfat” and “matnonfat”). Off-
balance sheet liquidity creation (“off”) is significantly lower, at 5.64% as a proportion of total 
assets. Liquidity creation seems to be positively correlated to bank size. In particular, small 
banks create the least liquidity while large banks create the most liquidity creation. The 
difference in the amount of liquidity created between the two groups is significant. For 
instance, the average amount of liquidity created by the bottom 25% of liquidity creators is 
surprisingly small at around 1%. When the liquidity creation measure is based on “catnonfat”, 
it is negative, suggesting that banks in the low liquidity creator category on average destroy 
liquidity as opposed to create liquidity. Table 4.2 further shows that banks that meet the NSFR 
liquidity requirement create less liquidity compared to those that do not. Apparently, banks that 
fulfil this liquidity requirement hold more stable funding than what is required, thus 
suppressing their ability to create liquidity. We also note that 76.24% of all banks have met the 
Basel III-imposed NSFR liquidity requirements. Finally, with the exception of the off-balance 
sheet category, distressed banks appear to create more liquidity than healthy banks across all 
measures. This result implies a positive correlation between liquidity creation and financial 
distress.  
From Table 4.2, we observe an average regulatory capital buffer of 9.14% and a Tier-1 
capital ratio of 15.9% for the full sample. Larger banks appear to be well-capitalized, while 
low liquidity creators, healthy banks, and those with NSFR greater than or equal to 100%, as 
expected, hold much higher regulatory capital than their counterparts.  
The mean of our competition measures, the Lerner index and funding-adjusted Lerner 
index, is 16.3% and 7.3%, respectively. As expected, the magnitude of the average funding-
adjusted Lerner is smaller than the conventional Lerner index, as the latter generally 
overestimates the degree of market power. Regardless of the competition measures employed, 
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small banks, low liquidity creators, and distressed banks exhibit more competition. 
Interestingly, the results show that there is not much difference in competitive behaviour 
between banks that meet the NSFR liquidity requirement and those that have not yet met the 
requirement. In relation to the revenue diversification variables, non-interest income is 
approximately 16% of net operating revenue. Large banks have a higher propensity to, and do, 
engage in more non-lending activities than smaller banks. The statistics also show that low 
liquidity creators, distressed banks, and banks that are yet to meet the NSFR liquidity 
requirement tend to consolidate their income streams and appear to be less diversified.  
Table 4.3 presents the correlation matrix of the main variables. As expected, Z-score and 
credit risk are negatively correlated. Correlations between the five iquidity creation measures 
and Z-score are all significantly negative. Similarly, both competition measures are negatively 
correlated with Z-score. Capital, on the other hand, is positively correlated with Z-score, while 
the correlation coefficients between diversification and Z-score are not significant. “Catfat” 
appears to be negatively correlated with capital and competition and positively correlated with 
revenue diversification, implying that banks that create higher liquidity have a higher 
propensity to hold less capital and are less competitive but more diversified in their revenue 
streams.  
4.5. Empirical Results 
4.5.1 Liquidity creation and bank stability  
The results of Eq. (4.1) are presented in Table 4.4. Model specifications (4.1)-(4.5) 
present the results using five measures of liquidity creation: “catfat”, “catnonfat”, “off”, 
“matfat”, and “matnonfat”. There is overwhelmingly strong evidence that liquidity creation is 
related to lower a Z-score, or lower bank stability. The estimated coefficients of all liquidity 
creation measures are negative and statistically significant at 1%. In particularly, a 1% increase 
in bank liquidity creation over total assets reduces the Z-score by 0.29 to 0.73. This finding is 
 143 
in line with our hypothesis and complements previous studies that suggest higher liquidity 
creation makes the financial system more vulnerable to bank runs (Diamond & Dybvig 1983; 
Diamond & Rajan 2000; Diamond & Rajan 2001; Diamond & Rajan 2002; Allen & Gale 
2004b). 
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics of key variables from 2001 to 2013 
Variables  All Small Medium Large 
High 
liquidity 
creator 
Low 
liquidity 
creator 
NSFR<1 NSFR≥1 Distressed banks 
Healthy 
banks 
ZSCORE 117.310 122.609 115.512 117.429 92.899 150.062 75.792 122.869 3.713 123.347 
CR 1.625 1.694 1.575 1.704 1.583 1.706 1.594 1.629 3.211 1.542 
CATFAT 26.492 17.781 25.679 37.646 50.722 0.916 39.598 24.730 31.166 26.248 
CATNONFAT  20.853 13.807 20.427 29.182 40.179 -1.399 32.454 19.294 26.644 20.552 
OFF 5.638 3.973 5.252 8.463 10.543 2.315 7.144 5.436 4.523 5.696 
MATFAT 36.454 23.368 36.095 50.624 59.604 9.561 56.470 33.764 44.013 36.061 
MATNONFAT 30.816 19.395 30.844 42.161 49.060 7.247 49.325 28.328 39.491 30.365 
BUFF 9.140 13.253 8.657 6.474 4.654 19.066 5.505 9.628 5.239 9.343 
TIER1 15.984 20.156 15.528 13.179 11.397 25.990 12.283 16.482 11.978 16.193 
COMP -7.320 6.259 -8.619 -17.018 -13.538 -1.418 -7.628 -7.279 25.824 -9.046 
COMP2 -16.253 -6.976 -17.632 -21.402 -20.477 -12.132 -14.901 -16.435 15.999 -17.932 
DIV 30.342 25.712 29.238 38.291 32.780 27.773 29.293 30.484 15.554 31.112 
NON 15.852 13.263 15.208 20.375 17.117 14.876 15.467 15.904 11.515 16.078 
ROA 0.945 0.639 0.986 1.136 1.065 0.959 0.746 0.971 -1.619 1.080 
DEPOSIT 83.003 84.219 83.833 79.296 82.670 81.965 80.704 83.312 85.699 82.863 
LOAN 61.828 57.094 62.714 63.902 73.757 43.294 71.814 60.485 63.387 61.746 
LN(GTA) 5.126 3.758 4.982 6.927 5.872 4.581 5.853 5.028 5.268 5.119 
BHC 0.815 0.742 0.816 0.888 0.880 0.698 0.816 0.815 0.787 0.817 
METRO 0.548 0.375 0.528 0.781 0.745 0.414 0.764 0.519 0.758 0.537 
STMULT 0.067 0.006 0.033 0.230 0.135 0.023 0.123 0.059 0.095 0.065 
CRISIS 0.300 0.300 0.300 0.300 0.300 0.300 0.457 0.279 0.436 0.293 
Obs. 88,775 17,759 53,264 17,751 17,751 17,759 10,520 78,255 4,393 84,382 
Bank no.  9,487 3,083 6,583 2,510 3,657 3,426 2,886 9,260 1,821 9,452 
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Table 4.3: Correlation matrix of key variables 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) ZSCORE 1.000             
(2) CR -0.006 1.000            
  (0.079)             
(3) CATFAT  -0.026 -0.010 1.000           
 (0.000) (0.002)            
(4) CATNONFAT -0.027 -0.010 0.952 1.000          
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)           
(5) OFF -0.010 -0.006 0.608 0.336 1.000         
 (0.003) (0.056) (0.000) (0.000)          
(6) MATFAT -0.026 -0.013 0.876 0.857 0.474 1.000        
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
(7) MATNONFAT -0.026 -0.012 0.781 0.845 0.210 0.961 1.000       
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)        
(8) BUFF 0.017 0.050 -0.295 -0.321 -0.075 -0.282 -0.290 1.000      
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
(9) TIER1 0.018 0.050 -0.298 -0.323 -0.078 -0.286 -0.292 1.000 1.000     
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)      
(10) COMP -0.014 0.009 -0.094 -0.101 -0.027 -0.082 -0.083 0.131 0.131 1.000    
 (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
(11) COMP2 -0.001 0.000 -0.018 -0.021 -0.002 -0.018 -0.019 0.033 0.033 0.775 1.000   
  (0.737) (0.973) (0.000) (0.000) (0.501) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
(12) DIV 0.002 -0.011 0.053 0.036 0.071 0.067 0.052 -0.014 -0.015 -0.147 -0.018 1.000  
 (0.653) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
(13) NON -0.001 0.017 0.049 0.020 0.098 0.058 0.033 0.009 0.008 -0.045 0.005 0.611 1.000 
 (0.875) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.018) (0.000) (0.131) (0.000)  
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Table 4.4: Effect of liquidity creation on overall bank stability using different specifications of liquidity creation  
This table reports the results from two-step system GMM estimations with Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected standard errors (reported in parentheses) of the effect of liquidity 
creation on overall bank stability using five measures of liquidity creation: CATFAT, CATNONFAT, OFF, MATFAT, and MATNONFAT. We also add specifications using 
dummies of low, average, and high liquidity creation, which are determined using the 25th and the 75th percentile of CATFAT of all banks in each year as the cut-off points. 
The dependent variable is ZSCORE. For notation of the variables see Table 4.1. Data is on an annual frequency covering the period of 2001-2013. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The Wald test is a contrast of the null hypothesis of all the coefficients except the constant terms are 0. The Arellano-Bond (AB) 
test for serial correlation is based on the null hypothesis of second-order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals. The Hansen test is used for over-identifying restrictions 
in GMM dynamic model estimation. ZSCORE is treated as a GMM-style instrument (endogenous) through the xtabond2 procedure. All other included regressors are treated 
as IV-style instruments (exogenous).  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
INTERCEPT 185.098*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 193.817*** 0.000 205.113*** 0.000 
 (26.966) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (25.817) (0.000) (26.924) (0.000) 
L.ZSCORE 0.215*** 0.216*** 0.219*** 0.219*** 0.220*** 0.217*** 0.219*** 0.221*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
CATFAT -0.594***        
 (0.108)        
CATNONFAT  -0.737***       
  (0.134)       
OFF   -0.633***      
   (0.211)      
MATFAT    -0.354***     
    (0.078)     
MATNONFAT     -0.288***    
     (0.081)    
HIGH LC      -9.869***   
      (3.702)   
AVERAGE LC       1.138  
       (2.649)  
LOW LC        10.759*** 
        (3.936) 
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BUFF 1.304*** 1.286*** 1.520*** 1.411*** 1.452*** 1.587*** 1.575*** 1.438*** 
 (0.301) (0.303) (0.303) (0.303) (0.304) (0.306) (0.312) (0.299) 
COMP -0.386*** -0.387*** -0.389*** -0.366*** -0.370*** -0.399*** -0.393*** -0.379*** 
 (0.114) (0.112) (0.111) (0.106) (0.105) (0.113) (0.109) (0.107) 
DIV -0.077*** -0.078*** -0.083*** -0.072*** -0.076*** -0.086*** -0.086*** -0.081*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) 
ROA 1.571 1.404 1.491 1.441 1.320 1.388 1.302 1.363 
 (1.807) (1.719) (1.694) (1.664) (1.586) (1.691) (1.589) (1.607) 
LN(GTA) 4.189*** 3.969*** 2.614* 4.153*** 3.443** 2.983** 2.068 2.420* 
 (1.473) (1.436) (1.381) (1.534) (1.465) (1.462) (1.355) (1.298) 
DEPOSIT -0.221 -0.144 -0.286* -0.212 -0.182 -0.186 -0.214 -0.219 
 (0.167) (0.165) (0.164) (0.162) (0.161) (0.166) (0.162) (0.163) 
LOAN 0.292** 0.340*** -0.073 0.162 0.089 -0.021 -0.122 0.019 
 (0.116) (0.118) (0.107) (0.103) (0.102) (0.106) (0.108) (0.119) 
BHC 2.265 2.308 1.117 0.652 0.500 1.470 0.920 1.206 
 (3.424) (3.395) (3.456) (3.469) (3.478) (3.456) (3.448) (3.469) 
METRO -18.255*** -18.453*** -19.156*** -18.140*** -18.611*** -18.883*** -19.555*** -19.350*** 
 (2.672) (2.657) (2.665) (2.640) (2.635) (2.678) (2.653) (2.670) 
STMULT -7.470 -6.836 -8.257 -8.336 -7.877 -7.929 -7.766 -7.985 
 (5.975) (5.995) (5.987) (5.968) (5.949) (5.935) (5.948) (5.957) 
FEDCHRTR 6.355* 6.201 5.613 5.843 5.486 5.760 5.370 5.048 
 (3.759) (3.772) (3.665) (3.693) (3.676) (3.677) (3.678) (3.700) 
CRISIS -125.260*** 29.146 84.160*** 41.961** -149.700*** 45.494** -125.254*** 45.675** 
 (15.693) (19.800) (19.927) (19.609) (15.506) (21.564) (15.490) (20.187) 
AB-test AR(2) 0.882 0.884 0.896 0.896 0.9 0.891 0.899 0.903 
Hansen 0.176 0.18 0.141 0.174 0.164 0.163 0.135 0.171 
No. of banks 8,930 8,930 8,930 8,930 8,930 8,930 8,930 8930 
Obs. 77,594 77,594 77,594 77,594 77,594 77,594 77,594 77,594 
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To capture banks that suffer from shortages in liquidity creation and those that create 
high liquidity in the banking system in a given year, we use the 25th and the 75th percentile of 
liquidity creation measures of all banks in each year as the cut-off point to create three 
dummies: low liquidity creation, average liquidity creation, and high liquidity creation, 
respectively. Columns (6), (7), and (8) of Table 4.4 show the negative, insignificant, and 
positive coefficients of high, average, and low liquidity creation, respectively, again confirming 
the significant destabilizing impact of liquidity creation.  
Our results further show that a capital buffer enhances overall stability, evidenced by the 
positive coefficient of the BUFF variable at the 1% significance level. On the other hand, 
competition and revenue diversification are both found to hamper bank stability. These results 
are largely in line with the existing literature (Konishi & Yasuda 2004; Repullo 2004; Furlong 
& Keeley 1989; Lee & Hsieh 2013; Zhang, Wu & Liu 2008; Lindquist 2004; Hyun & Rhee 
2011).  
Bank characteristics, as well as time-fixed effects, are included in all regressions to 
control for unobservable factors that affect bank stability. Of the control variables, bank size, 
bank location, and the financial crisis appear to be the most important factors in explaining 
bank stability. Larger banks that are located outside metropolitan areas are found to be more 
stable. The results in relation to the financial crisis are mixed depending on which category of 
liquidity creation is used in the regression.  
To further understand the relationship between liquidity creation and bank stability, we 
re-run Eq. (4.1) in a number of sub-samples. In particular, we divide banks by size (small-
medium-large banks), by specification (commercial banks versus savings banks), by ownership 
(listed versus un-listed), by BHC status (BHC members versus independent banks) and bank 
location (metro area versus micro area). For brevity, we solely focus on the main variable—
liquidity creation proxied as “catfat”.  
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Table 4.5 first presents the results for banks of different sizes. There is strong evidence 
across the board that higher liquidity creation is related to a lower Z-score. However, the de-
stabilizing effect of liquidity creation appears to be economically stronger for large banks than 
for small and medium banks. To illustrate, the magnitude of the “catfat” variable coefficient is 
1.741 for large banks compared to 0.399 and 0.317 for small and medium banks. Despite 
varying degrees of economic and statistical significance, liquidity creation is found to have a 
destabilizing impact on banks in all size categories. The results presented in Table 4.5 support 
the aggregate result reported earlier and indicate that it was not driven by any particular bank 
size group.  
Table 4.5 further examines the impact of liquidity creation on bank stability according to 
bank specification, listing status, holding status, and location. The negative impact of liquidity 
creation is robustly found for all types of banks, with the exception of savings banks, unlisted 
banks, and banks that operate in metro areas. Because the nature of their business focuses on 
taking savings deposits, savings banks plausibly acquire lower risk assets, such as more liquid 
loans, which reduces the overall liquidity risk. Because the majority of unlisted banks in our 
sample are savings banks, it is plausible a similar result regarding the effect of liquidity creation 
for this type of bank would be obtained.
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Table 4.5: Effect of liquidity creation on overall bank stability in different types of banks 
This table reports the results from two-step system GMM estimations with Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected standard errors (reported in parentheses) of the effect of liquidity 
creation on bank overall stability for different bank types. We use CATFAT as a measure of liquidity creation. The dependent variable is ZSCORE. For notation of the variables 
see Table 4.1. Bank size is determined using the 25th and the 75th percentile of total assets of all banks in each year as the cut-off points. Data is on an annual frequency 
covering the period of 2001-2013. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The Wald test is a contrast of the null hypothesis of all the coefficients 
except the constant terms are 0. The Arellano-Bond (AB) test for serial correlation is based on the null hypothesis of second-order autocorrelation in the first differenced 
residuals. The Hansen test is used for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model estimation. ZSCORE is treated as a GMM-style instrument (endogenous) through 
the xtabond2 procedure. All other included regressors are treated as IV-style instruments (exogenous).  
 Size Specification Ownership BHC status Location 
 Small Medium Large Commercial Savings Listed Unlisted BHC Independent Metro Micro 
CATFAT -0.399** -0.317*** -1.741* -0.624*** -0.378 -0.568*** -1.325 -0.252*** -3.126*** -0.273 -0.661*** 
 (0.171) (0.088) (1.051) (0.116) (0.622) (0.112) (1.308) (0.091) (1.071) (0.201) (0.206) 
BUFF 1.008*** 1.177* -1.040 1.009*** 2.337** 1.306*** 1.736 0.744*** -0.421 0.497 2.414*** 
 (0.371) (0.613) (0.953) (0.307) (1.159) (0.332) (1.110) (0.278) (1.064) (0.315) (0.522) 
COMP -0.233 -0.276** 0.377 -0.139** -0.429 -0.388*** 0.090 0.005 0.090 -0.155 -0.054 
 (0.313) (0.115) (0.458) (0.062) (0.272) (0.112) (0.919) (0.026) (0.268) (0.110) (0.165) 
DIV -0.202** -0.064*** -0.050 -0.069*** -0.032 -0.074*** -0.024 -0.034** -0.191** -0.018 -0.184** 
 (0.085) (0.024) (0.122) (0.024) (0.094) (0.027) (0.240) (0.014) (0.086) (0.019) (0.074) 
AB-test AR(2) 0.943 0.551 0.798 0.813 0.339 0.87 0.181 0.509 0.321 0.62 0.701 
Hansen 0.394 0.128 0.494 0.173 0.259 0.198 0.404 0.464 0.258 0.214 0.216 
No. of banks 2,291 6,063 2,134 8,238 707 8,679 292 7,185 2,394 5312 3875 
Obs. 14,110 45,775 14,106 74,397 3,152 76,193 1346 63,392 13,289 41,474 35,811 
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4.5.2 The role of capital buffer, competition, and revenue diversification in the 
destabilizing effect of liquidity creation  
While previous section (ie. Section 4.5.1) confirm the destabilizing effect of liquidity 
creation, this section analyses whether the liquidity creation-stability relationship changes due 
to the influence of capital, competition, and revenue diversification on bank stability. To this 
end, we estimate Eqs. (4.2), (4.3), and (4.4). In this set of regressions, in addition to the 
continuous variables, we introduce an interactive term between liquidity creation and a set of 
dummy variables, which act as proxies for capital buffers, competition, and revenue 
diversification, respectively. The set of dummy variables are created as follows:  
(a) High (average/low) liquidity creation takes the value of 1 in a given year 
if the value is more than the 75th percentile (between the 25th and the 75th percentile/ 
below the 25th percentile) of liquidity creation measures of all banks in that year and 0 
otherwise.  
(b)  High (average/low) capital takes the value of 1 in a given year if the 
value is more than the 75th percentile (between the 25th and the 75th percentile/ below 
the 25th percentile) of capital measures of all banks in that year and 0 otherwise.  
(c) High (average/low) competition takes the value of 1 in a given year if 
the value is more than the 75th percentile (between the 25th and the 75th percentile/ 
below the 25th percentile) of competition measures of all banks in that year and 0 
otherwise.  
(d) High (average/low) revenue diversification takes the value of 1 in a 
given year if the value is more than the 75th percentile (between the 25th and the 75th 
percentile/ below the 25th percentile) of revenue diversification measures of all banks 
in that year and 0 otherwise.  
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4.5.2.1 The role of capital buffers 
The effect of capital buffers on the relationship between liquidity creation and bank 
soundness is reported in Table 4.6. In Panel A of Table 4.6, the amount of capital buffer (BUFF) 
is used as a measure of bank capital. As evident in all model specifications using a continuous 
measure for capital buffers, an increase in capital buffer helps enhance bank stability. The 
positive impact of capital buffers on bank stability further manifests in regression results using 
capital dummy variables. Most notably, the top quartile banks, ranked according to their capital 
buffer, have a Z-score that is 29.30 higher than that of other banks. Similarly, the bottom 
quartile banks are generally riskier—with a Z-score that is 36.53 (or approximately 31.14%) 
lower than the rest of the banks.43  
Despite the overall negative impact of liquidity creation on bank stability, the 
coefficient of the interactive variable between CATFAT and BUFF suggests that capital buffer 
somewhat alleviates this negative impact. This result is consistent with our prediction that an 
increased capital buffer allows banks to expand their capacity to absorb liquidity shock, thus 
counteracting the enhanced financial fragility arising from increased liquidity creation. When 
capital buffer is disaggregated into high, average, and low, we further find that this alleviating 
effect is largely confined to the group of banks that have low or average capital. While capital 
reduces bank risk, this soundness enhancing effect diminishes as capital increases. One 
plausible explanation for the diminishing marginal benefit of capital buffer is what is known 
as the “franchise value effect”. Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) argue that due to the 
cost of holding capital and associated lower future profits, banks that have high capital buffers 
have strong incentives to take on more risk to restore their profits and franchise value. Franchise 
                                                 
43 This figure is calculated using a sample mean Z-score of 117.31. 
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value-induced risk-taking behaviours therefore offset the marginal benefit of holding more 
capital.  
By interacting the capital buffer variable with different levels of liquidity creation, we 
further find that banks that create little liquidity benefit less than other banks from an increase 
in capital buffer. This finding complements Wagner’s (2007) theoretical argument that the 
positive impact of capital on bank stability is less pronounced as asset liquidity becomes large. 
Essentially, the more bank asset liquidity increases the less liquidity is created in the economy. 
Bank risks are therefore lower, making capital less important as a defence mechanism against 
negative shocks.  
In Panel B, we use an alternative proxy of capital adequacy, the ratio of Tier-1 capital 
to risk weighted assets. While BUFF captures the extra capital above regulatory minimum 
requirement that banks build up to protect themselves against future potential losses, the Tier-
1 capital ratio reflects the quality of regulatory capital that banks hold.  
The results reported in Panel B are qualitatively similar to those in Panel A. In 
particular, capital, as expected, is found to have a positive impact on bank stability. The 
marginal benefit of holding capital, however, diminishes as capital increases and disappears 
for the best capitalized banks. The bottom 25% of banks, ranked by the amount of liquidity 
created to the economy, are also found to benefit less from an increase in capital compared to 
other more prolific liquidity creators.  
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Table 4.6: Interaction of bank capital buffers and liquidity creation on bank stability 
This table reports the results from two-step system GMM estimations with Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected standard errors (reported in parentheses) of the interaction effect of 
bank capital buffer and liquidity creation on overall bank stability. Low, average, and high liquidity creation (BUFF or TIER1) are determined using the 25th and the 75th 
percentile of CATFAT (BUFF or TIER1) of all banks in each year as cut-off points. Panel A and B report the results using BUFF and TIER1 as alternative measures of capital, 
respectively. We use CATFAT as a measure of liquidity creation. The dependent variable is ZSCORE. For notation of the variables see Table 4.1. Data is on an annual frequency 
covering the period of 2001-2013. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The Wald test is a contrast of the null hypothesis of all the coefficients 
except the constant term are zero. The Arellano-Bond (AB) test for serial correlation is based on the null hypothesis of second-order autocorrelation in the first differenced 
residuals. The Hansen test is used for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model estimation. ZSCORE is treated as a GMM-style instrument (endogenous) through 
the xtabond2 procedure. All other included regressors are treated as IV-style instruments (exogenous).  
PANEL A: CAPITAL MEASURE = BUFF 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CATFAT -0.725*** -0.583*** -1.075*** -0.893***    
 (0.111) (0.118) (0.115) (0.122)    
HIGH LC     -8.370**   
     (3.913)   
AVERAGE LC     -3.757  
      (4.549)  
LOW LC       24.380*** 
       (6.173) 
BUFF 1.710***    1.587*** 1.463*** 2.448*** 
 (0.253)    (0.306) (0.328) (0.344) 
HIGH BUFF 29.340***      
  (5.124)      
AVERAGE BUFF  -19.956***     
   (5.064)     
LOW BUFF   -36.529**    
    (14.929)    
CATFAT × BUFF 0.022***       
 (0.003)       
CATFAT × HIGH BUFF  -0.282      
  (0.208)      
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CATFAT × AVR. BUFF   0.547***     
   (0.130)     
CATFAT × LOW BUFF    0.688**    
    (0.315)    
BUFF × HIGH LC     -0.317   
     (0.657)   
BUFF × AVR. LC      0.628  
      (0.429)  
BUFF × LOW LC       -1.282*** 
       (0.408) 
COMP -0.364*** -0.362*** -0.383*** -0.368*** -0.398*** -0.388*** -0.367*** 
 (0.109) (0.113) (0.126) (0.111) (0.111) (0.107) (0.101) 
DIV -0.077*** -0.069*** -0.076*** -0.082*** -0.086*** -0.086*** -0.083*** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) 
AB-test AR(2) 0.86 0.897 0.91 0.866 0.892 0.892 0.881 
Hansen 0.218 0.336 0.281 0.291 0.16 0.144 0.223 
No. of banks 8,930 8,930 8,930 8,930 8,930 8,930 8,930 
Obs. 77,594 77,594 77,594 77,594 77,594 77,594 77,594 
PANEL B: CAPITAL MEASURE: TIER1 
  
  
  
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CATFAT -0.881*** -0.590*** -1.084*** -0.879***    
 (0.119) (0.115) (0.115) (0.123)    
HIGH LC     -7.459   
     (7.218)   
AVERAGE LC     -9.001  
      (7.093)  
LOW LC       34.752*** 
       (8.477) 
TIER1 1.757***    1.605*** 1.476*** 2.548*** 
 (0.254)    (0.310) (0.329) (0.342) 
HIGH TIER1 29.166***      
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  (4.755)      
AVERAGE TIER1  -19.741***     
   (4.700)     
LOW TIER1   -38.231**    
    (15.703)    
CATFAT × TIER1 0.023***       
 (0.003)       
CATFAT × HIGH TIER1  -0.268      
 (0.195)      
CATFAT × AVR. TIER1   0.562***     
  (0.120)     
CATFAT × LOW TIER1    0.695**    
   (0.329)    
TIER1 × HIGH LC     -0.202   
     (0.666)   
TIER1 × AVR. LC      0.693  
      (0.427)  
TIER1 × LOW LC       -1.375*** 
       (0.406) 
COMP -0.362*** -0.360*** -0.381*** -0.365*** -0.397*** -0.387*** -0.365*** 
 (0.107) (0.112) (0.126) (0.110) (0.110) (0.106) (0.100) 
DIV -0.077*** -0.069*** -0.076*** -0.083*** -0.085*** -0.086*** -0.082*** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) 
AR(2) 0.862 0.891 0.907 0.862 0.895 0.893 0.88 
Hansen  0.222 0.402 0.316 0.304 0.161 0.146 0.228 
No. of banks 8,930 8,930 8,930 8,930 8,930 8,930 8,930 
Obs. 77,594 77,594 77,594 77,594 77,594 77,594 77,594 
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4.5.2.2 The role of bank competition  
In this section, we explore the impact of competition on the relationship between liquidity 
creation and bank fragility. The results of our regression model, specified in Eq. (4.3), are 
reported in Table 4.7. As with capital, we report two sets of results using two different measures 
of competition: the funding-adjusted Lerner index (COMP) in Panel A and the conventional 
Lerner index (COMP2) in Panel B.  
In line with Keeley’s (1990) “competition-fragility” hypothesis, we find in Panel A of 
Table 4.7 that banks with higher competition levels are consistently more fragile than those 
operating under lower competition levels. The fragility effect of competition also appears to 
concentrate in the group of banks that face most intense competition. Banks that are in the top 
quartile of the funding-adjusted Lerner index have, on average, a Z-score that is 53.17 lower 
than banks that operate in less competitive environments. This result is economically 
significant given the sample mean Z-score of 117.31. By the same token, banks that are in the 
bottom quartile as ranked by competition, have a Z-score that is 33.99 higher than the rest of 
the banks.  
To determine the impact of competition on the relationship between liquidity creation 
and bank stability, we examine the coefficients of the interactive variables. We find strong 
evidence that while both competition and liquidity creation individually make banks more 
fragile, competition mitigates the negative impact of liquidity creation. In particular, the 
detrimental impact of liquidity creation on bank stability is less pronounced in highly 
competitive environments. This result is confirmed by interacting the liquidity creation 
measure with competition dummy variables where it is revealed that high competition 
significantly alleviates the negative impact of liquidity creation on bank stability. On the other 
hand, low competition aggravates this negative impact. We further find that the largest liquidity 
creators benefit substantially more from the alleviating effect of competition. Using the 
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conventional Lerner index as an alternative measure of competition, we obtain highly similar 
results (Panel B).  
Overall, we find support for the “competition-fragility” hypothesis that competition 
makes bank more fragile. However, competition has an alleviating impact on the relationship 
between liquidity creation and bank stability, whereby the negative impact of liquidity creation 
is reduced as banks face higher competition. An explanation for this finding is that when market 
competition becomes intense, loans are less profitable due to lower lending rates, which lowers 
the opportunity cost of banks to hold liquid assets (reserve) (Carletti & Leonello 2014). This, 
in turn, provides banks with an incentive to maintain more buffer stock of liquid assets to repay 
deposits claimed on demand, which results in decreased overall liquidity risks with more 
liquidity being create.44 
                                                 
44 A bank has high liquidity risk if it “engages in ‘fire sales‘ or foregoes profitable investment opportunities 
(including loans) to meet demands for liquidity by its customers” (Berger & Bouwman 2016, p. 55). 
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Table 4.7: Interaction of bank competition and liquidity creation on bank stability 
This table reports the results from two-step system GMM estimations with Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected standard errors (reported in parentheses) of the interaction effect of 
bank competition and liquidity creation on bank overall stability. Low, average, and high liquidity creation (COMP or COMP2) are determined using the 25th and the 75th 
percentile of CATFAT (COMP or COMP2) of all banks in each year as cut-off points. Panels A and B report the results using COMP and COMP2 as alternative measures of 
competition, respectively. We use CATFAT as a measure of liquidity creation. The dependent variable is ZSCORE. For notation of the variables see Table 4.1. Data is on an 
annual frequency covering the period of 2001-2013. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The Wald test is a contrast of the null hypothesis of 
all the coefficients except the constant term are zero. The Arellano-Bond (AB) test for serial correlation is based on the null hypothesis of second-order autocorrelation in the 
first differenced residuals. The Hansen test is used for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model estimation. ZSCORE is treated as a GMM-style instrument 
(endogenous) through the xtabond2 procedure. All other included regressors are treated as IV-style instruments (exogenous).  
PANEL A: COMPITITION MEASURE: COMP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CATFAT -0.577*** -0.668*** -0.540*** -0.551***    
 (0.107) (0.122) (0.163) (0.106)    
HIGH LC     -8.314**   
     (3.492)   
AVERAGE LC      1.534  
      (2.656)  
LOW LC       9.245** 
       (3.972) 
BUFF 1.181*** 1.217*** 1.326*** 1.153*** 1.450*** 1.433*** 1.324*** 
 (0.309) (0.290) (0.328) (0.290) (0.300) (0.307) (0.303) 
COMP -0.280***    -0.226*** -0.202*** -0.142** 
 (0.073)    (0.084) (0.068) (0.064) 
HIGH COMP  -53.166***      
  (7.889)      
AVERAGE COMP   15.778**     
   (7.527)     
LOW COMP    33.985***    
    (10.299)    
CATFAT × COMP 0.005***       
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 (0.002)       
CATFAT × HIGH COMP  0.357*      
  (0.194)      
CATFAT × AVR. COMP   -0.103     
   (0.179)     
CATFAT × LOW COMP    -0.487**    
    (0.212)    
COMP × HIGH LC     0.198***   
     (0.064)   
COMP × AVR. LC      0.006  
      (0.079)  
COMP × LOW LC       -0.202** 
       (0.087) 
DIV -0.069*** -0.023 -0.026 0.001 -0.087*** -0.087*** -0.074*** 
 (0.023) (0.016) (0.026) (0.018) (0.026) (0.026) (0.023) 
AB-test AR(2) 0.854 0.79 0.843 0.906 0.862 0.874 0.877 
Hansen 0.157 0.187 0.103 0.146 0.157 0.129 0.153 
No. of banks 8,929 8,933 8,933 8,933 8,929 8,929 8,929 
Obs. 77,588 77,612 77,612 77,612 77,588 77,588 77,588 
PANEL B: COMPITION MEASURE: COMP2  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CATFAT -0.534*** -0.689*** -0.327*** -0.579***    
 (0.109) (0.121) (0.093) (0.103)    
HIGH LC     -6.520*   
     (3.419)   
AVERAGE LC      1.65  
      (2.896)  
LOW LC       6.868 
       (4.240) 
BUFF 1.173*** 1.202*** 0.686*** 1.165*** 1.445*** 1.432*** 1.321*** 
 (0.306) (0.293) (0.219) (0.286) (0.299) (0.306) (0.302) 
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COMP2 -0.307***    -0.243*** -0.219*** -0.152** 
 (0.079)    (0.089) (0.074) (0.068) 
HIGH COMP2  -45.361***      
  (7.449)      
AVERAGE COMP2   -2.747     
   (5.109)     
LOW COMP2    27.725***    
    (8.241)    
CATFAT × COMP2 0.005***       
 (0.002)       
CATFAT × HIGH COMP2  0.352**      
  (0.177)      
CATFAT × AVR. COMP2   0.119     
   (0.110)     
CATFAT × LOW COMP2    -0.403**    
    (0.174)    
COMP2 × HIGH LC     0.215***   
     (0.069)   
COMP2 × AVR. LC      0.009  
      (0.085)  
COMP2 × LOW LC       -0.226** 
       (0.095) 
DIV -0.069*** -0.022 -0.01 0.001 -0.088*** -0.087*** -0.075*** 
 (0.023) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.025) (0.026) (0.023) 
AB-test AR(2) 0.854 0.849 0.414 0.895 0.862 0.873 0.877 
Hansen 0.158 0.131 0.602 0.172 0.157 0.129 0.155 
No. of banks 77,588 77,612 77,612 77,612 77,588 77,588 77,588 
Obs. 8,929 8,933 8,933 8,933 8,929 8,929 8,929 
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4.5.2.3 The role of bank revenue diversification 
To examine the impact of revenue diversification on bank stability and the liquidity 
creation-stability relationship, we estimate Eq. (4.3) using two measures of revenue 
diversification: diversity index (DIV) and non-interest income share (NON). The results based 
on these two revenue diversification variables are provided in Panels A and B of Table 4.8, 
respectively.  
As is the case with competition, we find that revenue diversification is related to more 
bank fragility. Banks that are most diversified in their revenue streams have a Z-score that is 
on average 16.11 lower than those of banks that are not as well diversified. Interestingly, banks 
with a moderate level of diversification are more stable than those in both the high and low 
revenue diversification groups. Nevertheless, we do not find any evidence that the least 
diversified banks benefit from a higher level of financial stability. Noteworthy of the findings 
is the implication that two strands of aforementioned literature (in Section 3.2.2) need not 
necessarily yield opposing predictions regarding the impact of revenue diversification on bank 
stability. This implies the importance of disaggregating the level of diversification in studies 
investigating its effect on bank stability.  
Despite the direct negative impact on bank stability, diversification is found to lessen the 
impact of liquidity creation on bank risk. This alleviating effect, however, does not seem to 
vary between banks with differing levels of diversification. Specifically, the benefit of 
diversification in moderating the impact of liquidity creation is indistinguishable between 
banks that are classified as highly diversified, moderately diversified, and lowly diversified. 
We find, however, that the alleviating effect of diversification, if any, is weakest in the group 
of banks that create the least liquidity. As shown in Panel B, these findings are largely robust 
to the alternative measure of revenue diversification: non-interest income. 
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Table 4.8: Interaction of bank revenue diversification and liquidity creation on bank stability 
This table reports the results from two-step system GMM estimations with Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected standard errors (reported in parentheses) of the interaction effect of 
bank competition and liquidity creation on overall bank stability. Low, average, and high liquidity creation (DIV or NON) are determined using the 25th and the 75th percentiles 
of CATFAT (DIV or NON) of all banks in each year as the cut-off points. Panels A and B report the results using DIV and NON as alternative measures of competition, 
respectively. We use CATFAT as a measure of liquidity creation. The dependent variable is ZSCORE. For notation of the variables see Table 4.1. Data is on an annual frequency 
covering the period of 2001-2013. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The Wald test is a contrast of the null hypothesis of all the coefficients 
except the constant term are zero. The Arellano-Bond (AB) test for serial correlation is based on the null hypothesis of second-order autocorrelation in the first differenced 
residuals. The Hansen test is used for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model estimation. ZSCORE is treated as a GMM-style instrument (endogenous) through 
the xtabond2 procedure. All other included regressors are treated as IV-style instruments (exogenous).  
PANEL A: REVENUE DIVERSIFICATION MEASURE = DIV 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CATFAT -0.921*** -0.642*** -0.512*** -0.622***    
 (0.169) (0.104) (0.142) (0.119)    
HIGH LC     -9.852**   
     (4.319)   
AVERAGE LC     -2.12  
      (3.349)  
LOW LC       20.165*** 
       (5.456) 
BUFF 1.222*** 1.280*** 1.351*** 1.344*** 1.588*** 1.566*** 1.408*** 
 (0.300) (0.297) (0.304) (0.305) (0.306) (0.312) (0.298) 
COMP -0.413*** -0.340*** -0.331*** -0.338*** -0.399*** -0.389*** -0.375*** 
 (0.130) (0.111) (0.102) (0.103) (0.113) (0.110) (0.107) 
DIV -0.478***    -0.086*** -0.171** -0.063*** 
 (0.184)    (0.030) (0.067) (0.024) 
HIGH DIV  -16.108*      
  (8.249)      
AVERAGE DIV  11.766**     
   (5.899)     
LOW DIV    -7.629    
    (6.442)    
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CATFAT × DIV 0.011***       
 (0.004)       
CATFAT ×HIGH DIV  0.297      
  (0.181)      
CATFAT × AVR. DIV   -0.125     
   (0.138)     
CATFAT × LOW DIV    0.035    
    (0.169)    
DIV × HIGH LC     -0.001   
     (0.060)   
DIV × AVR. LC      0.109  
      (0.071)  
DIV × LOW LC       -0.329*** 
       (0.116) 
AB-test AR(2) 0.882 0.877 0.890 0.897 0.890 0.894 0.900 
Hansen 0.163 0.877 0.192 0.187 0.165 0.130 0.150 
No. of banks 8,930 8,930 8,930 8,930 8,930 8,930 8,930 
Obs. 77,594 77,594 77,594 77,594 77,594 77,594 77,594 
PANEL B: REVENUE DIVERSIFICATION MEASURE = NON 
  
  
  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CATFAT -0.762*** -0.635*** -0.508*** -0.615***   
 (0.125) (0.106) (0.141) (0.118)    
HIGH LC     -9.438**   
     (4.354)   
AVERAGE LC     -5.095  
      (3.462)  
LOW LC       23.859*** 
       (5.210) 
BUFF 1.317*** 1.301*** 1.361*** 1.333*** 1.590*** 1.575*** 1.458*** 
 (0.293) (0.295) (0.301) (0.306) (0.306) (0.305) (0.287) 
COMP -0.352*** -0.338*** -0.331*** -0.340*** -0.363*** -0.357*** -0.346*** 
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 (0.120) (0.112) (0.102) (0.103) (0.119) (0.111) (0.110) 
NON -0.391***   -0.107* -0.421*** -0.036 
 (0.133)    (0.064) (0.139) (0.050) 
HIGH NON -14.804*      
  (7.792)      
AVERAGE NON  12.401**     
   (5.927)     
LOW NON   -5.861    
    (6.509)    
CATFAT × NON 0.010***       
 (0.003)       
CATFAT ×HIGH NON  0.263      
 (0.172)      
CATFAT × AVR. NON   -0.138     
   (0.139)     
CATFAT × LOW NON    -0.015    
    (0.171)    
NON × HIGH LC     -0.027   
     (0.112)   
NON × AVR. LC      0.406***  
      (0.147)  
NON × LOW LC       -0.910*** 
       (0.205) 
AR(2) 0.884 0.878 0.889 0.898 0.893 0.892 0.897 
Hansen  0.155 0.159 0.192 0.181 0.158 0.129 0.142 
No. of banks 8,930 8,930 8,930 8,930 8,930 8,930 8,930 
Obs. 77,594 77,594 77,594 77,594 77,594 77,594 77,594 
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4.5.3 Does the liquidity creation-stability relationship change due to bank health 
conditions? 
In this section, we examine whether bank health conditions play an important role in the 
liquidity creation-stability relationship. We define bank health based on two characteristics: (1) 
whether a bank meets the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) requirement (NSFR≥ 1) and (2) 
whether it belongs to the distressed or healthy category. The interactions between “catfat” and 
the above dummies are then allowed in the regression.  
Table 4.9 reports the estimation results of Eq. (4.5). Not surprisingly, the negative and 
statistically significant coefficient of the NSRF and distressed dummies indicate that banks that 
do not fulfil the NSFR liquidity requirement and distressed banks appear to be more fragile 
than their counterparts. However, the destabilizing effect of liquidity creation is less for these 
banks, as shown by the significantly positive interaction between the dummies and “catfat” at 
1%.  
The explanation for this somewhat puzzling finding relates to “gamble for resurrection” 
behaviour by problematic banks. A body of literature suggests that banks facing immediate 
distress, especially with explicit (deposit insurance) or implicit support (too-big-too-fail), 
behave differently from healthy banks in term of their risk taking, due to the higher likelihood 
of default (Merton 1977; Imbierowicz & Rauch 2014). In essence, banks facing the danger of 
going bankrupt choose between two options: continuing to operating with a failed business 
model until reaching the point of default or pursuing higher risk activities, which promise 
higher returns. Bank managers would have less incentive to hedge risks as the bank is likely to 
be eliminated anyway without high-risk business activities. Rather, they have strong incentives 
to attempt to save the bank from failure by engaging in very risky strategies to pursue 
potentially very high payoffs. These behaviours are referred to as “gambling for resurrection” 
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(Keeley 1990; Corbett & Mitchell 2000; Gropp & Vesala 2001; Freixas, Parigi & Rochet 
2003). In some instances, the gamble is successful and attenuates the probability of insolvency. 
Supported by the theoretical literature, Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014) found empirical 
evidence that a joint increase in liquidity risk and credit risk decreases financially distressed 
banks’ probability of default. Our results corroborate this reasoning in the sense that a 
successful gamble for resurrection by creating more liquidity (i.e., engaging higher liquidity 
risk) to pursue higher payoffs mitigates the distance to default and leads to a higher Z-score.  
Overall, our results suggest that although liquidity creation has a strong negative impact 
on bank stability, bank health conditions can somewhat mitigate the negative impact to banks 
soundness. That is, distressed banks and banks with low NSRF are able to benefit from creating 
more liquidity in term of mitigated default risk and enhanced bank stability.  
4.5.4 Robustness check 
To ascertain the extent to which the main results are sensitive to our choice of stability 
proxy, the Z-score, we reexamine the effect of liquidity creation using credit risk as an 
alternative proxy for bank instability. The estimation results are presented in Table 4.10. The 
key result that higher liquidity creation is related to higher bank instability remains. The 
coefficients of liquidity creation are positive and highly significant at 1% and 5% in all 
specifications. The results confirm our earlier findings that liquidity creation have a 
destabilizing effect and that bank risk increases with the level of liquidity banks create. The 
robustness checks also confirm our reported results in relation to the impact of capital, 
competition, and revenue diversification on bank stability, as well as on the relationship 
between liquidity creation and bank stability.
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Table 4.9: Effect of liquidity creation on bank stability by bank health 
This table reports the results from two-step system GMM estimations with Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected 
standard errors (reported in parentheses) of the interaction effect of bank health and liquidity creation on overall 
bank stability. NSRF<1 (≥ 1) is a dummy variable for a bank not fulfilling (fulfilling) the liquidity requirement. 
For our NSFR calculation methodology, see Appendix 2. Distressed (healthy) is a dummy variable for a 
financially distressed bank (healthy bank) that is defined based on the Z-score ranking method (i.e., we rank all 
banks in each year based on their Z-score, and then x banks with the lowest Z-scores in each year are identified 
as financially distressed banks, where x is the number of failed banks on the published FDIC list). We use 
CATFAT as a measure of liquidity creation. The dependent variable is ZSCORE. For notation of the variables 
see Table 4.1. Data is on an annual frequency covering the period of 2001-2013. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The Wald test is a contrast of the null hypothesis of all the 
coefficients except the constant term are zero. The Arellano-Bond (AB) test for serial correlation is based on the 
null hypothesis of second-order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals. The Hansen test is used for over-
identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model estimation. ZSCORE is treated as a GMM-style instrument 
(endogenous) through the xtabond2 procedure. All other included regressors are treated as IV-style instruments 
(exogenous).  
  (1) (2) 
CATFAT -0.648*** -0.645*** 
 (0.117) (0.114) 
NSRF < 1 -27.225***  
 (6.720)  
CATFAT × NSRF < 1 0.517***  
 (0.147)  
DISTRESSED  -65.218*** 
  (4.854) 
CATFAT × DISTRESSED  0.800*** 
  (0.103) 
BUFF 1.283*** 1.236*** 
 (0.300) (0.297) 
COMP -0.379*** -0.300*** 
 (0.112) (0.084) 
DIV -0.078*** -0.079*** 
 (0.027) (0.025) 
AB-test AR(2) 0.871 0.823 
Hansen 0.165 0.213 
No. of banks 8,930 8,930 
Obs. 77,594 77,594 
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Table 4.10: Robustness check: Alternative measure of bank stability 
This table reports results from the two-step system GMM estimations with Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected standard errors (reported in parentheses) of the effect of liquidity 
creation on bank loan portfolio risk using five measures of liquidity creation: CATFAT, CATNONFAT, OFF, MATFAT and MATNONFAT. We also add specifications using 
dummies for low, average and high liquidity creation, which are determined using the 25th and the 75th percentile of CATFAT of all banks in each year as the cut-off points. 
The dependent variable is CR. For notation of the variables see Table 4.1. Data is on an annual frequency covering the period of 2001-2013. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The Wald test is a contrast of the null hypothesis of all the coefficients except the constant term are zero. The Arellano-Bond (AB) test for 
serial correlation is based on the null hypothesis of second-order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals. The Hansen test is used for over-identifying restrictions in 
GMM dynamic model estimation. CR is treated as a GMM-style instrument (endogenous) through the xtabond2 procedure. All other included regressors are treated as IV-style 
instruments (exogenous).  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CATFAT 0.003***        
 (0.001)        
CATNONFAT  0.004***       
  (0.001)       
OFF   0.009**      
   (0.004)      
MATFAT    0.003**     
    (0.002)     
MATNONFAT    0.006**    
     (0.003)    
HIGH LC      0.051***   
      (0.012)   
AVERAGE LC       -0.016  
       (0.010)  
LOW LC        -0.032 
        (0.031) 
BUFF 0.004* 0.005** 0.003* 0.004 0.005 0.003* 0.003 0.004* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
COMP -0.005** -0.006** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005* -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
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DIV -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AB-test AR(2) 0.379 0.379 0.379 0.379 0.380 0.380 0.380 0.380 
Hansen 0.144 0.169 0.113 0.115 0.133 0.181 0.179 0.196 
No. of banks 8,932 8,932 8,932 8,932 8,932 8,932 8,932 8,932 
Obs. 77,885 77,885 77,885 77,885 77,885 77,885 77,885 77,885 
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4.6 Conclusion 
Bank liquidity creation is a core function of banks and an economic service that is of 
substantial importance to the economy. However, as far as the issue of financial stability is 
concerned, the overall impact of liquidity creation is still the topic of an inconclusive debate 
among academics and policymakers.  
Our study fills a gap in the literature by offering a comprehensive analysis of the 
relationship between liquidity creation and bank stability. Using different measures of liquidity 
creation and bank stability, we find a robust negative relationship between them. Our results 
indicate that the more liquidity banks create, the more banks are subject to fragility, which 
supports the theoretical foundation developed by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). 
This study further shows that regulators can address the stability problem by increasing 
capital requirements. The negative impact of increased liquidity creation on stability can be 
mitigated by increasing the capital buffer. However, capital become a less effective instrument 
for ensuring stability when banks are in the bottom 25% of liquidity creators. Further, our 
results also show that competition and revenue diversification are separately associated with 
lower Z-scores. Nevertheless, their joint effects with liquidity creation make banks more 
financially sound by dampening the otherwise fragility-aggravating individual effect of each 
variable.  
Finally, we document that the destabilizing effect of liquidity creation is conditional upon 
bank health. That is, distressed banks and banks that do not fulfil the NSFR requirement are 
able to benefit from creating more liquidity in terms of mitigated default risk and enhanced 
bank stability. The fragility-enhancing effect of liquidity creation, on the other hand, is 
intensified for their counterparts.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation investigates comprehensive dimensions surrounding liquidity creation, 
a vital role of banks in the economy. By conducting three empirical studies, it provides answers 
to a number of important research questions unsolved in the existing literature: how liquidity 
creation is affected by bank regulatory capital and vice versa, the impact of competition and 
revenue diversification on liquidity creation, and the effects of liquidity creation on bank 
profitability and stability. In all cases, the studies examine whether the results hold across 
different sub-periods and whether they depend on bank characteristics such as size, 
specification, ownership, BHC status, location, etc. The dissertation subsequently offers 
important strategy recommendations for bank executives on bank liquidity risk management 
and diversification and policy recommendations contributing to the ongoing debate regarding 
Basel III reforms for liquidity, capital requirements, and deregulation. 
5.1 Essay 1 
The first essay attempts to enrich the extant literature by offering a first-hand 
comprehensive empirical study that simultaneously investigates the impact of tightening 
capital requirements on bank liquidity creation and profitability.  
Using different measures of capital, we use the VAR model on panel data that covers 
12,732 U.S. commercial banks over the period 1996–2010. Our main findings are as follows:  
First, the impact of bank capital on a bank’s ability to create liquidity is found to be 
heterogeneous across banks of different sizes, different sample periods, different capital 
measures, and banks with different levels of regulatory capital. In particular, we find that an 
increase in the capital-to-asset ratio and Tier-1 risk-based ratio is likely followed by an increase 
in liquidity creation. Higher quality capital (i.e., tangible common equity capital), in contrast, 
hinders a bank’s ability to create liquidity. In addition, the positive bidirectional relationship 
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between liquidity creation and regulatory capital is present only among small banks and banks 
with higher regulatory capital, and this relationship holds true primarily during non-crisis 
periods.  
Second, liquidity creation is found to be associated with a reduction in bank performance, 
which is consistent with the expected bankruptcy-cost hypothesis, regardless of the capital 
measure used.  
Third, the relationship between regulatory capital and bank performance is subject to the 
level of bank capitalization. Raising additional capital will improve the performance of 
undercapitalized banks but hurt the profitability of adequately capitalized banks. These results 
are consistent with the trade-off theory of capital structure, which argues that deviations from 
optimal capital structure affect bank performance.  
Our findings have important implications for current regulatory financial reforms. First, 
the positive bidirectional interrelationship between liquidity creation and capital for small 
banks suggests that higher capital relates to greater bank liquidity creation, which benefits the 
economy. Hence, there should be support for a higher capital requirement under Basel III, as it 
promotes greater safety and soundness. The capital requirement does not appear to be excessive 
from the standpoint of economic growth (Berger & Bouwman 2016). Second, if a higher capital 
requirement is imposed on all banks, the effects on liquidity creation and bank performance 
might not be those expected by regulators due to the heterogeneous impact of capital standards 
on liquidity creation across bank size. Thus, it is important for policy makers to be cautious 
about a one-size-fits-all approach to the design of stringent capital requirements. For example, 
lower capitalized banks should raise their regulatory capital, not only to reduce their default 
risk, but also to enhance their performance. Large banks, which tend to have lower capital 
ratios, should therefore be required to hold higher regulatory capital ratios. In contrast, there is 
less need to increase regulatory capital for smaller banks.  
 174 
5.2 Essay 2 
Examining the effects of competition and revenue diversification on liquidity creation is 
important. Existing studies, which have posed divergent views on the impact of market power 
and revenue diversification on financial stability, have only concentrated on the credit risk 
channel, neglecting illiquidity risk as a source of instability. No research to date, however, has 
directly linked competition, revenue diversification, and their joint impact on bank liquidity 
creation. This is the main research focus of the second essay. 
The findings reveal that competition and diversification individually lead to greater 
liquidity creation. The results are consistent across different proxies for competition and 
diversification. Importantly, liquidity creation is positively related to the joint occurrence of 
market power and diversification, meaning that the liquidity-enhancing effect of diversification 
is stronger in less competitive markets and the liquidity-enhancing effect of competition is 
weaker when bank revenues are more diversified.  
We further document that the effects of competition and revenue diversification on 
liquidity creation depend on the institutional and regulatory environment to some extent. For 
example, the independent favourable effect of both competition and diversification is more 
pronounced in banks with low credit risk. The impact of competition is aggravated for banks 
operating in micropolitan areas, while that of revenue diversification is, on the other hand, more 
beneficial for banks located in metropolitan areas.  
 Investigating the effect of bank size on competition-liquidity creation and revenue 
diversification-liquidity creation relationships, the results show that the former depends on 
bank size, while the latter does not. For large banks, competition appears to endanger a bank’s 
ability to create liquidity, consistent with the expected empirical dominance of the “risk 
absorption-opportunity cost” effect. In sharp contrast, small banks have the potential to 
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increase their liquidity creation capacity under higher competitive pressure, where the 
“financial fragility effect” is manifested. This implies that future research and associated 
regulatory reforms ought to pay attention to bank size when examining the economic role 
competition plays.  
Finally, our findings emphasize the relevance of liquidity creation as an intermediate 
factor through which competition and revenue diversification might affect bank soundness. For 
banks with NSFR≥100%, the significant positive effect of diversification on liquidity creation 
implies favorable impacts on economic growth because diversified banks have the potential to 
create and provide more liquidity to the economy without incurring significant increases in 
bank instability. In contrast, competition increases the liquidity creation level of banks that do 
not (yet) fulfil the liquidity requirement, implying a potential benefit of competition to 
economic growth (in terms of more liquidity being created) but at the expense of the soundness 
of the banking system (in terms of substantially high illiquidity risk and threats of financial 
distress). These findings support the need to implement the minimum NSFR liquidity 
requirement concomitant to any future deregulation of the banking sector.  
It is worth noting that the results only reflect the potential costs of bank competition. The 
examination of a trade-off between the liquidity-enhancing effect of competition and the higher 
probability of financial distress for banks operating in competitive environments, while 
essential for formulating regulatory policies, is still underexplored in the empirical banking 
literature and should be the subject of further research. 
5.3 Essay 3 
The third essay contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence on the direct 
impact of banks’ core function as liquidity creators on bank stability, which to our knowledge 
is so far non-existent. 
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Using different measures of liquidity creation and bank stability, this essay consistently 
indicates a negative effect of liquidity creation on bank stability. The results further confirm 
the role of capital buffers as an effective instrument for promoting bank stability. The capital 
buffer is not only positively associated with banks’ Z-scores but also counteracts the 
destabilizing effect of liquidity creation. However, we find that this instrument become less 
effective when banks are low liquidity creators. When capital buffer is disaggregated into high, 
average, and low, the alleviating effect is found to be absent for banks with average and low 
capital buffers. One plausible explanation is that the “franchise-value effect” is likely to 
dominate for banks with a high capital buffer. That is, the cost of holding capital lowers future 
profits, which induces banks to take on more risk in order to offset the marginal benefit of 
holding more capital (Hellmann, Murdock & Stiglitz 2000).  
Furthermore, our findings suggest the significant destabilizing effects of competition, as 
well as revenue diversification. Nevertheless, their joint effects with liquidity creation make 
banks more financially sound by limiting the otherwise fragility-aggravating individual effect 
of each variable.  
Finally, we document that bank health affects the liquidity creation-stability relationship. 
Unsurprisingly, distressed banks and banks that do not fulfil the NSFR requirement are more 
fragile than their counterparts. However, the destabilizing effect of liquidity creation is less 
pronounced for these banks. Problematic banks, who are subject to “gambling for resurrection” 
behaviours, seek to avoid failure by engaging in high-risk business activities to pursue 
potentially high payoffs. In this case, a successful gamble for resurrection by creating more 
liquidity reduces the probability of insolvency.  
Our findings have several important policy implications. First, we emphasize the 
advantages of adding a liquidity requirement in the current regulatory Basel III framework, 
concomitant to stricter capital standards, to strengthen bank stability. Indeed, our results show 
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that banks that meet the NSFR requirement appear more stable, and capital buffers are shown 
to be an effective tool for promoting bank stability and mitigating the fragility-aggravating 
effect of liquidity creation.  
However, any policy moves to impose stricter liquidity risk management should be 
treated with caution, as this could have the unintended consequence of liquidity creation 
shortages, as opposed to promoting stability. In fact, banks categorized as low liquidity creators 
in our sample create alarmingly low amounts of liquidity, posing a threat to economic growth.  
Although liquidity creation is likely to result in increased bank vulnerability, the 
destabilizing effect is less in environments with higher competition and for banks that are more 
revenue diversified. Hence, bank supervisors attempting to create more liquidity should take 
into consideration the level of market competition and encourage a mix of nontraditional 
activities to achieve more effective risk management. 
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APPENDIX 1: Liquidity level of bank activities 
Assets Liquidity 
level 
Liability and equity Liquidity 
level 
Commercial real estate loans Illiquid Transaction deposits Liquid 
Loans to finance agricultural production Illiquid Savings deposits Liquid 
Commercial and industrial loans Illiquid Overnight federal funds purchased  Liquid 
Other loans and lease financing receivables  Illiquid Trading liabilities Liquid 
Other real estate owned (OREO) Illiquid Time deposits Semiliquid 
Customers’ liability on banker’s acceptance Illiquid Other borrowed money Semiliquid 
Investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries Illiquid Liabilities on banker’s acceptance Illiquid 
Intangible assets Illiquid Subordinated debt Illiquid 
Premises Illiquid Other liabilities Illiquid 
Other assets Illiquid Equity Illiquid 
Residential real estate loans  Semiliquid 
  
Consumer loans Semiliquid 
  
Loans to depository institutions Semiliquid 
  
Loans to state and local governments  Semiliquid 
  
Loans to foreign governments Semiliquid 
  
Cash and due from other institutions Liquid 
  
All securities Liquid 
  
Trading assets  Liquid 
  
Fed funds sold Liquid 
  
Off-balance sheet guarantees Liquidity 
level 
Off-balance sheet derivatives Liquidity 
level 
Unused commitments Illiquid Interest rate derivatives  Liquid 
Net standby letters of credit Illiquid Foreign exchange derivatives Liquid 
All other off-balance sheet liabilities Illiquid Equity and commodity derivatives Liquid 
Net credit derivatives Semiliquid 
  
Net securities lent Semiliquid 
  
Net participations acquired  Liquid 
  
Source: Berger and Bouwman (2009) 
 195 
APPENDIX 2: Break-down of non-interest income sources 
Fiduciary activities 
These include gross income from services rendered by the bank’s trust department or by any of its consolidated 
subsidiaries acting in any fiduciary capacity such as from commissions and fees on the sale of annuities by 
these entities. 
Service charges on deposit accounts 
These include charges for maintenance of deposit accounts, failure to maintain specified minimum deposit 
balances, writing excessive checks, withdrawals from non-transaction accounts, closing of savings accounts, 
dormant accounts, use of ATM or remote service units, processing of checks with insufficient funds, and other 
fees. 
Trading revenue 
This includes the net gain or loss from trading cash instruments and off-balance sheet derivative contracts 
(including commodity contracts). It also includes revaluation adjustments to the carrying value of assets and 
liabilities resulting from the periodic marking to market, revaluation adjustments from the periodic marking 
to market of interest rates, foreign exchange rates, commodities, and equity derivative contracts, and incidental 
income and expenses related to the purchase and sale of cash instruments reportable in trading assets and 
liabilities. 
Other non-interest income 
This includes fees, commissions, and all other service charges that cannot properly be included elsewhere. The 
sources of other non-interest income include the following: rental of safe deposit boxes; safekeeping of 
securities; the sale of bank drafts, money orders, and travelers’ checks; the collection of utility bills; 
redemption of savings bonds; handling of food stamps; execution of acceptances and issuance of letters of 
credit; notarizing of forms; consulting and advisory services; credit card fees; charges to merchants for credit 
card handling; data processing services; loan commitment fees; rental fees; interest on tax refunds; and life 
insurance proceeds on policies. It also includes net gains (losses) from the sale of branches, transactions of 
foreign currency, or non-hedging derivative instruments. 
Source: Shim (2013, p. 771)
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APPENDIX 3: Balance sheet weighting used to calculate “net stable 
funding ratio” (NSFR) as defined in the Basel III accords 
𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅 =  
𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝐴𝑆𝐹)
𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝑅𝑆𝐹)
 
Weight ASF Components Corresponding BCBS definition (2014) 
100 Tier 1 plus Tier 2 Total regulatory capital  
 
Wholesale funding and other 
liabilities with effective residual 
maturity of one year or more 
Other capital instruments and liabilities with effective 
residual maturity of one year or more 
95 Stable deposits  
Stable non-maturity (demand) deposits and term deposits 
with residual maturity of less than one year provided by retail 
and SME customers 
90 Less stable deposits 
Less stable non-maturity (demand) deposits and term deposits 
with residual maturity of less than one year provided by retail 
and SME customers 
50 
Wholesale funding with 
effective residual maturity of 
less than 1 year 
Wholesale funding provided by non-financial corporate 
customers, sovereign central banks, multilateral development 
banks and public sector entities, central banks and financial 
institutions (non-maturity or residual maturity of less than 
one year) 
0 All other liabilities and equity not included above All other liabilities and equity not included above 
 Derivatives with a negative fair value 
Derivatives payable net of derivatives receivable if payables 
are greater than receivables 
Weight RSF Components Corresponding BCBS definition (2014) 
0 Cash Cash 
5 U.S. Treasury securities Unencumbered Level 1 assets 
 Off-balance sheet item   
50 
All securities plus other liquid 
assets other than U.S. Treasury 
securities 
Unencumbered Level 2b assets 
 Loans to depository institutions 
and acceptances of other banks 
Loans to banks subject to prudential supervision with residual 
maturities of six months or more and less than one year and 
deposits held at other financial institutions for operational 
purposes 
 
Loans and leases with a 
remaining maturity of one year 
or less  
All other assets not included in the above categories with 
residual maturity of less than one year 
65 Residential real estate loans Unencumbered residential mortgages with a residual maturity of less than  one year 
85 
Other loans with residual 
maturities of one year or more 
excluding residential real estate 
loans 
Other unencumbered performing loans with residual 
maturities of one year or more 
100 Derivatives with a positive fair value 
Derivatives receivable net of derivatives payable if 
receivables are greater than payables 
 All other assets  All other assets that not included in the above categories 
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Due to the lack of standardized liquidity risk reporting across banks, several assumptions were 
made to generate the NSFR calculations: 
 70% of deposits are stable, 30% of deposits are less stable (King 2013).  
 U.S. Treasury securities are treated as Unencumbered Level 1 assets. All securities plus 
other liquid assets other than U.S. Treasury securities are treated as Unencumbered 
Level 2b assets (Gobat, Yanase & Maloney 2014).  
 All residual real estate loans have maturities of more than one year (Gobat, Yanase & 
Maloney 2014). 
 Off-balance sheet items weighted 5% (Dietrich, Hess & Wanzenried 2014).  
  
 
 
 
 
